




APO PRODUCTIVITY DATABOOK 2020





APO
PRODUCTIVITY
DATABOOK
2020

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Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
APO	Asian Productivity Organization
APO21	21 member economies of the Asian Productivity Organization: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Republic of China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which consists of 10 countries of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The ASEAN is separated to two groups in Databook, i.e., the ASEAN6 and CLMV.
ASEAN6	Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
Asia25	APO21 plus Bhutan, Brunei, China, and Myanmar
Asia31	Asia25 plus GCC countries
CLMV	Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam
CPI	consumer price index
CPTPP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
COE	compensation of employees
ESRI	Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan
EU	European Union
EU15	15 member economies of the European Union prior to enlargement: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
EU28	European Union: the EU15 plus Bulgaria, Republic of Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia
FDI	foreign direct investment
FISIM	financial intermediation services indirectly measured
FTAs	free trade agreements
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
GDP	gross domestic product
GFCF	gross fixed capital formation
GNI	gross national income
ICP	International Comparisons Program
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOT	Input-Output Table
ISIC	International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities
IT	information technology
KEO	Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University
LDCs	less developed countries
NPISHs	non-profit institutions serving households
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP	purchasing power parity
QALI	quality adjusted labor inputs
QNA	quarterly national accounts
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
ROC	Republic of China
R&D	research and development
SNA	System of National Accounts
SUT	Supply and Use Tables
TFP	total factor productivity
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
WTO	World Trade Organization

Foreword

The evolving COVID-19 pandemic is drastically affecting the global economy. Estimates are that it will result in greater damage than any preceding pandemic as economic activities slow or are suspended, triggering severe recession over the months and years to come. Full recovery is obviously not likely in the near future.

The 2020 edition of the *APO Productivity Databook* is part of ongoing efforts to support APO member governments in coping with current challenges, including the pandemic. Even though the magnitude of impact of COVID-19 has yet to be fully determined, projections of productivity and economic growth indicate the damage to Asia-Pacific economies.

Aside from forecasts, this newest edition of the annual *APO Productivity Databook* contains an analytical report on recent and long-term productivity and economic performance in the Asia-Pacific. Productivity measurement with baseline indicators based on official data enables relevant comparisons of the quality of economic growth and productivity gains achieved. It also supports the monitoring of national productivity performance, which is at the core of public policy formulation. Such international comparisons and analyses are the basis for evidence-based policy advisory services offered by the APO to its members.

A new feature of this edition includes the development of a growth accounting framework for Turkey as an APO member since March 2020. For the third year, mid-term projections of future economic growth and labor productivity in the Asia-Pacific through 2030 were updated. Expansion of the productivity indicators covered in the country and regional profiles makes it easier for readers, especially policymakers, to use the publication. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on Asian economies in the first and second quarters of 2020 are also discussed.

The APO appreciates the collaborative efforts of Keio Economic Observatory, Keio University, Tokyo. The inputs of all contributors who helped develop the productivity database and databook were extremely valuable. Work with national statistics offices in APO members to improve data quality will continue. It is hoped that the 2020 *APO Productivity Databook* will serve a useful reference on the current and future status of productivity in the region for all involved in researching, measuring, and designing policies for socioeconomic growth.

Dr. AKP Mochtan
Secretary-General
Asian Productivity Organization
Tokyo, October 2020

1 Introduction

1.1 Databook 2020

Productivity gains enable an economy to produce more for the same amount of inputs, or to consume less to produce the same amount of outputs. These gains are the only route to sustainable economic growth in the long run. Thus, it follows that monitoring and improving national productivity capability are important targets of public policy. In this thirteenth edition of the *APO Productivity Databook* series, a useful reference is provided for the quality of economic growth and productivity, which is comparable across countries at different development stages in Asia, covering the period from 1970 to 2018.

In this edition, baseline indicators on economic growth and productivity are calculated for 31 Asian economies, representing the 21 Asian Productivity Organization member economies (APO21) and the 10 non-member economies in Asia. The APO21 consists of Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Republic of China (ROC), Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), Japan, the Republic of Korea (Korea), the Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. The 10 non-member economies in Asia are: the Kingdom of Bhutan (Bhutan), Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), the People's Republic of China (China), Myanmar, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, Australia, the European Union (EU), and the United States (US) are included as reference economies.

The analyses in the Databook series are based on the comprehensive productivity accounts (APO Productivity Database), which have been developed by a joint research effort between the APO and the Keio Economic Observatory (KEO), at Keio University, since 2007. In this edition of the Databook, the growth accounting frameworks are developed for 25 Asian economies (Asia25) – the APO21 plus Bhutan, Brunei, China, and Myanmar – along with the US as a reference economy. The sources of economic growth in each economy are further decomposed to factor inputs of capital and labor and total factor productivity (TFP). It is a notable achievement that the growth accounting framework for Turkey, which became the APO's 21st member on March 11, 2020, is newly developed in this edition.

In addition to the productivity account in each economy, the regional growth accounts are developed in the APO Productivity Database for six economy groups: the APO21, the Asia25, East Asia, South Asia, CLMV, and the ASEAN6. The country list of these country groups is provided in the Abbreviation (p. 8). In development of the regional productivity accounts, the price differentials among economies not only on outputs, but also on capital and labor inputs, are considered by following the framework in Nomura (2018). The level comparison in this edition is based on the new benchmark estimates on the purchasing power parities (PPPs), which was published in April 2020 by the International Comparisons Program (ICP) 2017 round (World Bank, 2020a). The revision on the PPPs from the ICP 2011 round, which has been used until the Databook 2019, are presented in Appendix 8 (p. 162).

The productivity measures in the Databook are based on the official national accounts and our own estimates collated for the APO Productivity Database 2020. In the Asia25, the System of National Accounts 2008 (2008 SNA) by United Nations (2009) has been introduced in 16 economies, partially or fully. Because the varying SNA adaptations among the economies can result in discrepancies between data definitions and coverage, data harmonization is necessary for comparative productivity analyses. The Databook attempts to reconcile these national account variations which are based on the different concepts and definitions. This is done by following the 2008 SNA and providing harmonized estimates for better international comparison.

To analyze the overall productivity performance, as well as productivity subsets (e.g., capital productivity and labor productivity), capital services, which provides an appropriate concept of capital inputs as

recommended in the 2008 SNA, are estimated in the productivity accounts. To take the composition change of assets into account, the current database classifies 15 types of produced assets, including IT and R&D capital, and four types of land. In most Asian countries it is a challenging task to develop the data on average prices of land (for agricultural, industrial, commercial, and residential uses) at the national level. The Databook uses land data, which has been developed at KEO for each of the Asia25 since 2016. However, it is necessary to continuously review it to verify its accuracy.

In measuring the quality-adjusted labor inputs (QALI), the project to develop a comprehensive labor database on number of workers, hours worked per worker, and hourly wages (which are cross-classified by gender, education attainment, age, and employment status), has been conducted since 2013 at KEO. The first report of this data (the Asia QALI Database) was provided in Nomura and Akashi (2017) for six South Asian countries. The latest version of the Asia QALI Database covers all economies of Asia25. The use of the Asia QALI Database enables us to identify the impact of labor quality changes from the gross estimates of TFP.

The structure of the Databook is as follows. The recent trends in global and regional economic growth and the summary of findings are presented in Chapter 2. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Asian economies in the first and second quarters of 2020 are discussed in Box 1 in this chapter. In order to understand the dynamics of the long-term economic growth within Asia, Chapter 3 details countries' diverse development efforts and achievements through cross-country level comparisons of GDP. Decompositions of GDP, which is defined by three approaches in SNA – production by industry, expenditure on final demand, and income to factor inputs – are valuable in understanding the structure and, in turn, the behavior of an economy. Chapter 4 presents the demand side decomposition, analyzing the sources of countries' expenditure growth.

In Chapter 5, the supply side decompositions of economic growth and productivity improvement are analyzed in each country and region. In this edition, the output prices are revised to reflect our revision on the final demand prices in some countries such as Bhutan, Brunei, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, Vietnam. The different compositions of economic activity among countries is one of the main sources of the vast gap in average labor productivity at the aggregate level. The industry structure is presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 analyzes the income side of GDP by measuring the growth of real income and evaluating an improvement, or deterioration, in the terms of trade. Finally, Chapter 8 provides the country profiles on productivity indicators from 1970 to 2018 and our projections through 2030 for the APO21 economies and five regions: the APO21, the Asia25, East Asia, South Asia, and the ASEAN.

The official national accounts and metadata information used for constructing the APO Productivity Database 2020 has been collected by national experts in APO member economies and research members at KEO. These contributors are listed in Section 1.2. The submitted data was then examined and compiled at KEO, where further information was collected on labor, production, prices, trades, and taxes. Readers should consider that international comparisons of economic performance are never a precise science. Instead, they are fraught with measurement and data comparability issues. Operating within a reality of data issues, some of the adjustments in the Databook are necessarily conjectural, while others are based on assumptions with scientific rigor. Despite best efforts in harmonizing data, some data uncertainty remains.

This edition effectively reflects the revisions to the official national accounts and other statistical data published through June 2020 and the population prospects published in June 2019 by United Nations (2019). In particular, to evaluate the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the growth rates in the second quarter of 2020 published by late August 2020 are reflected in Box 1 and our projections in Box 7 and Chapter 8. The project was managed by Koji Nomura (Keio University), under the consultancy of Professor Dale W. Jorgenson (Harvard University) and Professor W. Erwin Diewert (University of

British Columbia), and with coordination by Huong Thu Ngo (APO). The text, tables, and figures of this edition were authored by Koji Nomura and Fukunari Kimura (Keio University), with support from research assistants Hiroshi Shirane, Shiori Nakayama, and Takahisa Saruta. The Databook project appreciates Eunice Ya Ming Lau for her contribution to developing the foundation of the Databook series during her stay at KEO and Trina Ott for her review of the draft.

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2 Economic Trends

At the timing of writing, COVID-19 is spreading throughout the world, with a number of Asian countries are still struggling at the verge of catastrophic spread of the disease. Various forms of social distancing are being implemented in order to contain the epidemic within the capacity of medical services. Major economic activity in Asia and the world has been halted, with a massive slowdown of economic growth expected to follow.

Our daily lives have changed drastically while social distancing. What is often thought of as the “new normal” may forever replace the “old normal.” What would be the new normal? Rather than having a series of completely new phenomena, the three trends seem to exist and expand. First, the globalization of economies is not likely to stop because it is driven by underlining technological progress. Second, the turmoil in the international trading regime will continue due to the populism in developed countries and the rise of newly developed economies such as China. Third, the application of digital technology will pick up the pace in both developed and developing countries. It is thus meaningful to review these existing trends before COVID-19 in order to visualize the new normal.

Before the outbreak of COVID-19, the growth performance of Asia was still strong though it showed some signs of slowing down. In Asia³¹ and East Asia, the average annual growth of GDP at constant market prices in 2015–2018 was 4.8% and 4.5%, respectively, while the growth solely in 2017–2018 was 4.5% and 3.9% (Table 10 in Appendix). Advanced economies also fared well. The US economy performed well despite the turmoil in the international trading regime. The average annual growth of GDP at constant market prices in 2015–2018 was 2.2%. The unemployment rate dropped to 3.5% in 2019, which was very low by US standards. The European economy presented significant recovery. The average annual growth rate of GDP at constant prices in 2015–2018 in EU15 and EU28 became 2.0% and 2.2%, respectively. The Japanese economy also performed well though its potential growth rate seemed to stay low. The annual growth of GDP at constant market prices in 2015–2018 in Japan was 1.0%. The unemployment rate declined to as low as 2.4% in 2019.

Although the growth slowdown continued, China still achieved 5.7% in the average annual growth of GDP at constant prices in 2015–2018, with 5.0% in 2017–2018. The impact of the US-China trade war, as well as a number of structural economic problems slowed the growth. Korea, heavily depending on the Chinese economy, also decelerated growth, yet posted 2.9% growth in 2015–2018 with 2.7% in 2017–2018.

Latecomers in ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, have continuously grown in the past two decades, reaching \$1,570, \$2,570, and \$860 in per capita GDP, using the 2018 exchange rate, respectively (Table 12). To achieve sustained economic growth, they must engage in international production networks more deeply. “Thai plus one” investment by machinery parts producers that set up fragmented satellite factories off Thailand appeared to slow slightly. Vietnam achieved deeper involvement in international production networks with \$2,630 per capita GDP, using the 2018 exchange. However, the ratio of manufacturing value added to GDP was 17.8% in 2018, with the anticipation of the development of supporting industry and industrial agglomeration (Table 22).

The Philippines and Indonesia are in the process of forming an efficient industrial agglomeration with \$3,140 and \$3,970 in per capital GDP using the 2018 exchange rate. Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore reached \$7,510, \$11,100, and \$66,200 in per capita GDP using the 2018 exchange rate, though they struggled with industrial upgrading, and formation of new development strategies.

Although the South Asian countries have yet to take full advantage of international production networks, some have been successful in connecting with slow global value chains in labor-intensive industries such

as garment and footwear. The per capita GDP using the 2018 exchange rate in Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India was \$1,180, \$1,390, \$1,650, and \$2,040, respectively.

The first trend appears with many Asian economies effectively taking advantage of the wave of globalization for their economic development. In the Global Financial Crisis and the following “slow trade” period, some claimed that the era of global value chains (GVCs) was over. However, even in the slow trade period of 2011–2016, intra-East-Asian trade in parts and components, as well as finished products, grew strongly (Obashi and Kimura, 2018). Still, there exists significant potential for expanding and deepening international production networks in Asia.

A second trend, the turmoil in international trading regime, declined. Direct effects of the US-China trade war on other Asian economies were mixed. Consistent with the intuition from the international trade theory, a third country may experience a “positive” trade/investment diversion effect, substituting US-China trade. Vietnam and other Asian economies captured some of such effects. However, a “negative” trade/investment creation effect, due to the weakening of the rule-based trading regime, gradually dominated even in the third countries. With the enhanced uncertainty, investment necessary for reformulating GVCs moved slowly. Particularly in East Asia, which heavily depends on international production networks, or the second unbundling, which is averse to uncertainty. Overall negative effects in this dynamic context seemed to mount, as a series of US trade policies under the Trump Administration were problematic from the viewpoint of the rule-based trading regime. Beginning in June 2018, the US-China trade war escalated with a series of tit-for-tat tariff impositions that were implemented. This put a vast amount of bilateral trade between the US and China under high tariffs. Perhaps the more dangerous issue was the Huawei trade ban, because of its geopolitical context.

The third trend, digital transformation, seemed to arrive in Asia even before COVID-19. In particular, communications technology such as the internet and smartphones penetrated into people’s daily life. With this, new digital businesses were mushrooming, which included social media, e-commerce, matching in transportation and lodging, service outsourcing, e-payment, and fintech. India, the Philippines, and some other countries expanded cross-border service outsourcing, and business processing operations (BPOs). Conversely, “reshoring” cases seemed to be limited. The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics would accelerate the substitution of labor by machines. This allowed for some labor-intensive production activities located in developing countries to move back to developed countries; such a move is called “reshoring.” To date, in Asia extensive reshoring has not occurred.

With these three underlining trends, COVID-19 struck Asia in early 2020. The initial impact of the disease on Asian economies, other than China, was a supply shock. In January and February, supplies of parts and components, as well as various intermediate inputs from China, were interrupted. After March, the disease spread in many Asian economies, and social distancing stopped a significant portion of economic activities. The spread of the disease and the strength of imposed social distancing widely differ across countries. As of July 2020, ROC and Vietnam as well as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Thailand seemed to block the disease effectively at the national border, allowing them to start loosening restrictions on people’s movements. Singapore and Malaysia have slowed the spread while Indonesia and the Philippines are struggling with containment. India is also close to the pandemic situation.

As the pandemic emergency escalates, the containment of the disease within the capacity of medical care is crucial. A consensus among specialists focuses on the relationship between health policy and economic policy. The understanding is that these two sets of policies are not a tradeoff, rather proper health policy is a prerequisite for further economic stability. The failure of containing the epidemic will come at a high cost both economically and politically. Some emergency responses may require a bailout program or mitigation policy for people or firms with serious economic damage resulting from the pandemic.

Once countries reach the point of containment of the disease, they will need to consider exist strategies. One obstacle will be a slow removal of restrictions on domestic and cross-border movements of people. The achievement of disease containment is likely to vary across regions within a country, as well as across countries. Therefore, resuming population mobility must proceed with caution to avoid a second wave of epidemic. These conditions indicate the potential of a long road ahead to get the international economy back to the pre-COVID status.

A more serious obstacle to resuming economic activities will be a major demand shock. As shown in Box 1, the trough of each Asian economy in the second quarter of 2020 is deep – deeper than the slowdown in the first quarter of 2009 under the Global Financial Crisis. The forecasts of international organizations, as well as our estimates, indicate a GDP growth rate of the world in 2019–2020 of –5 to –6%. This growth rate would be positive in 2020–2021 though not strong hit the original growth path. This points to a shortage of demand and serious recession as likely to come in the exit stage.

Strong macroeconomic stimulus, both monetary and fiscal, are needed to make the trough shallower and shorter. Virtually all countries have made some announcements for bold policy measures. There is concern over lack of a strong global leadership like that which existed in the Global Financial Crisis. Unilateralism in the US, in addition to the US-China trade war, create a bleak outlook for possible international policy coordination. From the viewpoint of newly developed and developing economies, long-term fiscal health will also become a great concern. The short-run shortage of foreign currencies and the worsening of macro fundamentals will be a possibility. The strengthening of regional economic cooperation mechanisms may be required in Asia.

What would happen with international production networks in Asia? Actually, our production system and logistics are mostly intact and ready to restart immediately. From our experience in the Global Financial Crisis, East Japan Earthquake, and other crises, we know that production networks are robust against a short-term negative shock (Ando and Kimura, 2012). Transactions in production networks are less likely to be interrupted than other transactions, and even if interrupted, they are more likely to resume. This is because a substantial sunk costs, or investments, are needed in order to set up production networks, thus a firm would like to keep those networks in place. In other words, if interruptions continued for a long term, production networks would be lost forever. During the Global Financial Crisis, a number of ASEAN Member States conducted a series of policies to keep production networks and therefore strengthened competitiveness. As fiscal conditions tighten, some strategic moves may be necessary to maintain these networks.

The China factor is an issue of concern for Asian economies. Because the relationship between the US and China has worsened after the outbreak of COVID-19, politically motivated economic “decoupling” has followed. Many Asian economies have a close economic relationship with both the US and China and do not want to be forced to choose between the two. However, the situation is not quite controllable for many other countries. How far decoupling will go is a crucial issue. Whether it is limited to some sensitive products or is extended to a wide range of economic activities, Asian economies must better position themselves in production networks.

To secure a more predictable and a more stable trade environment, the promotion of mega-FTAs (free trade agreements) becomes even more important. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) was signed by 11 countries in March 2018. The agreement went into effect on December 2018 for six signatories, i.e., Mexico, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia. The following month, it took effect for Vietnam. With the worsening of the US-China relationship, CPTPP is regarded as a forum of free-trade-oriented, like-minded, middle powers in the Asia-Pacific. The expansion of the membership is now considered with the United Kingdom, Thailand, ROC,

and others. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership has been negotiated by ten countries in ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India. It is approaching final agreement among 15 countries except India. Considering the weakening of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the rule-based trading regime, many Asian economies place emphasis on the mega-FTAs in their trade policy strategies.

In a positive light, the dissemination of digital technology has created growth potential. COVID-19 clearly accelerated the introduction of digital technology in developed economies. Now, newly developed and developing economies must catch up. The introduction of information technology (IT) such as industrial robots in newly developed and developing countries may strengthen their positions in production networks (Obashi and Kimura, 2020). In addition, there is ample room for traditional industries such as agriculture, cottage industry, transportation, and tourism to enhance productivity by introducing IT. Furthermore, the proliferation of remote workers in developed economies is likely to expand the scope of cross-border service outsourcing or the third unbundling. This may become one of the major forms of international division of labor in the near future (Baldwin, 2016). Newly developed and developing economies in Asia must promote the application of IT in their development strategies in order to be ready for the new normal.

The latter half of this year and next year will be rife with challenges.

Box 1 COVID-19 Shock on Economic Growth

The economic impact of COVID-19 will be significant. Figure B1.1 shows the year-on-year economic growth rates in the first and second quarters of 2020 in selected Asian economies with the US and some EU countries for comparison, based on official quarterly national accounts published by late August 2020. For reference, the year-on-year economic growth rates in the first quarter of 2009, i.e., at the bottom of the Global Financial Crisis, are also presented.




Figure B1.1 Impacts of COVID-19 Pandemic on Quarterly Economic Growths
 —Year-on-year growth rate in the periods of global financial crisis and COVID-19 pandemic

Source: Official quarterly national accounts in each country.

Note: In (a,b,c) of each country, a, b, and c, present the year-on-year growth rates in 2009 Q1, in 2020 Q1, and in 2020 Q2, respectively.

In the first quarter of 2020, growth in most of countries slowed, with some showing negative growth. Major dips appeared in China (-6.8%), Hong Kong (-9.1%), and Mongolia (-10.7%). However, the downturns in the second quarter were drastic in the range of -3% to -24% except China (3.2%), Vietnam (0.4%), and ROC (-0.2%). The trough went deeper than that in the Global Financial Crisis. Such a recession will challenge businesses, create unemployment, possibly hurt the financial sector, and perhaps jeopardize asset markets. Even though our production system and logistics networks are still mostly in tact, the demand recovery may be challenging in some countries and the world as a whole.

Figure B1.2 tabulates growth rates in 2018–2019 and estimated growth rates in 2019–2020 (the first and second quarterly growth rates are actual, where available) and 2020–2021 in Asian economies, as well as the US and the world, forecasted by IMF and OECD, the World Bank, and our projection in the Databook. Forecasted growth rates were actually dropping the beginning of this year as we gradually learned the nature of the COVID-19 crisis. The drop in the growth rate in 2019–2020 in each country will be huge, causing negative growth in most of the countries in the sample. The recovery may come in 2020–2021 though the growth rates will not likely rebound to the original growth path. In the event of a second wave of the pandemic, the trough would get deeper and longer, indicating a further weakening growth performance.

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Although many Asian economies are keenly focused on the health policy to contain the spread of the disease, a huge economic challenge will follow. The shock could be much more significant than the one in the Global Financial Crisis. Asian economies must prepare for a massive demand shock in the exit from the COVID-19 pandemic.




Figure B1.2 Impacts of COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Recoveries
 —Growth rates in 2018–2019 and the projected growth rates in 2019–2020 and 2020–2021

Sources: Our projections based on APO Productivity Database 2020 and Asia QALI Database 2020, IMF (2020), and OECD (2020b), World Bank (2020b).
 Note: In (a,b,c) of each country, a, b, and c, present the growth rates in 2018–2019, in 2019–2020, and in 2020–2021, respectively, based on our projections.

3 Economic Growth

Highlights

- The economic scale of the Asia31 was 30.8 trillion US dollars in 2018 in terms of exchange-rate-based GDP, which is 49% larger than the US (Table 8). Japan was the largest economy in Asia until 2010, when China overtook Japan's position to become the largest economy in Asia (Figure 3).
- In terms of PPP-based GDP, the Asia31 was 2.7 times that of the US in 2018 (Figure 5). In this measure, China has overtaken Japan as the largest Asian economy since 2002, and the US since 2017. India surpassed Japan, replacing it as the second largest economy in Asia in 2009. In the same period, the ASEAN also surpassed Japan (Table 9).
- The economic growth rate of the Asia31 was 4.8% per year on average in 2015–2018 (Figure 6 and Table 10). The growth in China and India accounted for 44% and 22% of this regional growth, respectively. (Figure 7).
- Average per capita GDP of the Asia31 was \$13,300 in 2018, which is still 21% of the US level (Table 13). Chinese per capita GDP increased to \$15,100 in 2018, 14% greater than the Asia31 average. The regional averages of the ASEAN6, South Asia, and CLMV were \$14,300, \$6,330, and \$6,300, respectively, in 2018 (Figure 11). A huge per capita GDP gap between most of the Asian countries and the US is predominantly explained by their inferior performance of labor productivity (Figure 14).

From the mid-1980s, the story of the world economy belonged to Asia, featuring its steady rise in economic prowess (Figure 1). It is no surprise that the center of gravity in the global economy is gradually shifting towards Asia. In 2018, the Asian economy contributed 46% (41% for the Asia25) of world output, compared with the US and the EU28, each accounting for 16% and 17%, respectively, as shown in Figure 2. According to our projection for the Asia25 economy and the rest of the world, the Asian share in world output will continue to rise, reaching 49% (44% for the Asia25) by 2025.¹ In contrast, the output shares of each of the US and the EU28 will decrease by a similar extent to 15–16%.

To better understand the dynamics of the long-term economic growth within the region, the remainder of this chapter details countries' diverse development efforts and achievements, through cross-country level comparisons of GDP and other related performance indicators. To facilitate international level comparisons, harmonized GDP for each of the individual countries is expressed in its equivalent, in a common currency unit, customarily in the US dollar, using a set of conversion rates between the individual national currencies. The choices for conversion rates are exchange rate and PPP.

3.1 Economic Scale and Growth

Figure 3 presents the time-series level comparison of Japan, China, and the EU, based on GDP at current market prices using exchange rates,² relative to the US. A snapshot-level comparison of all Asian countries is provided in Table 8 in Appendix 10 (p. 165). By this measure, in 2018 the Asia31 was 49% and 60% greater than the US and the EU15, respectively. Japan was the largest economy in Asia until 2010

1: Our projections of economic growth for the Asia25 are provided in Box 7. These reflect the declines in economic growth in the first and second quarters of 2020 due to the COVID-19 shock (see Box 1).




Figure 1 GDP Growth of Asia, the EU, and the US
 —Annual growth rate of GDP at constant market prices in 1970–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 2 Asia in World GDP in 2018 and Projection for 2025
 —Share of GDP using constant PPP

Sources: Our estimates for the Asia25 economies, IMF (2020) for rest of the world, and our projections (Box 7, p. 92).

when China finally overtook Japan’s position to become the second-largest economy in the world, next to the US. The turn of Japan’s fortune came in the mid-1990s. Thereafter, stagnation in Japan, combined with vibrant growth in developing Asia, resulted in the rapid erosion of Japan’s prominence in the regional economy.

2: The exchange rates used in this *Databook* are the adjusted rates, which are called the Analysis of Main Aggregate (UNSD database) rates in the UN Statistics Division’s National Accounts Main Aggregate Database. The AMA rates coincide with the IMF rates (which are mostly the annual average of market, or official exchange rates) except for some periods in countries with official fixed exchange rates and high inflation, when there could be a serious disparity between real GDP growth and growth converted to US dollars based on IMF rates. In such cases, the AMA adjusts the IMF-based rates by multiplying the growth rate of the GDP deflator relative to the US.

Comparisons based on exchange rates, however, appear arbitrary as movements in exchange rates can be volatile and subject to short-term or substantial fluctuations of speculative capital flows and government intervention. Furthermore, comparisons based on exchange rates typically underestimate the size of a developing economy and, in turn, the perceived welfare of its residents. The scale of economy ranking changes dramatically when international price differences are taken into account.³

Figure 4 shows the extent to which the exchange rates have failed to reflect countries' price differentials properly, relative to the US, based on the PPP estimates of the 2017 International Comparisons Program (ICP) round, published in April 2020. Except for Australia, exchange rates systematically under-represent the relative purchasing power in 2017 for all the countries covered in this report. Thus, the exchange-rate-based GDP considerably underestimates the economic scales in real terms for those countries. By considering the international price differentials, PPP rectifies the trade sector bias, and in turn the relative size of economies can be more adequately measured.




Figure 3 GDP using Exchange Rate of Asia and the EU, Relative to the US
 —Index of GDP at current market prices in 1970–2018, using annual exchange rate

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 4 Price Differentials of GDP
 —Price Level Index for GDP defined as the ratio of PPP for GDP to exchange rate (reference country=US) in 2017 and 2018

Sources: PPP by World Bank (2020a) and AMA rates by United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD).

3: This is because exchange rates embody the trade sector bias (i.e., it is more influenced by the prices of traded than non-traded goods and services) and thus do not necessarily succeed in correcting the price differentials among countries. As developing economies tend to have relatively lower wages and, in turn, lower prices for non-traded goods and services, a unit of local currency has greater purchasing power in the local economy than reflected in its exchange rate.

By correcting international price differentials, the Asia31 has been expanding rapidly. Figure 5 presents the level comparisons of real GDP for Asian regions, using PPP as conversion rates, while Table 9 in Appendix 10 (p. 166) presents cross-country comparisons. Based on GDP using constant PPP, the weight of the world economy is even more tilted toward Asia in Figure 5 than portrayed by GDP using exchange rates in Figure 3. This reflects the fact that nearly all Asian countries increase in relative size after international price differentials have been properly considered. The size of the Asia31 was 2.7 times that of the US in 2018, having overtaken it in 1975. Figure 5 also shows the rapid expansion of the relative size of the South Asian economy (consisting of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), 81% of which was accounted for by India in 2018. The ASEAN also showed strength in their catch-up effort.




Figure 5 GDP of Asia and the EU, Relative to the US
 —Index of GDP at constant market prices in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Figure 6 shows regional comparisons of real GDP growth, while Table 10 in Appendix 10 (p. 167) presents cross-country comparisons. The change of guards in Asia is clearly illustrated in Figure 7, which presents the country contributions to gross regional products in the Asia31. China and India have emerged as the driving force, propelling Asia forward since 1990. The growth in China and India accounts for 66% of the regional growth in 2015–2018.




Figure 6 GDP Growth by Region
 —Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant market prices in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 7 Country Contributions to GDP Growth of Asia
 —Contribution share to the growth of gross regional products (the Asia31 growth=100) in 2010–2015 and 2015–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.
 Note: Only the top 15 countries are presented.

3.2 Catching Up in Per Capita GDP

Figure 8 presents the share of the current world population, illustrating that Asia is the most populous region in the world. In 2018, the population of Asia accounted for 59% of the world's population (56% for the Asia31). In addition, there is a significant difference in the population among Asian economies, as shown in Table 11 in Appendix 10 (p. 168). The population of seven countries was in excess of 100 million in 2018, but the populations were less than 10 million in 12 economies of the Asia31. Performance comparisons based on the whole-economy GDP in Section 3.1 do not take into account the population, which can exaggerate the wellbeing of countries with large populations. Based on per capita GDP, which adjusts for the differences in population, China and India, two rising giants in the Asian economy, remain substantially less well-off in light of the US standard. Conversely, the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and the ROC) thrive.




Figure 8 Asia in World Population
 —Share of number of populations in 2018

Source: United Nations (2019).

Figure 9 shows comparisons of per capita current-price GDP, using exchange rates as conversion rates, among Japan and the Asian Tigers, relative to the US. A snapshot-level comparison is also presented in Table 12 in Appendix 10 (p. 169). It is worth noting that snapshot comparisons can appear arbitrary due to the volatile nature of exchange rates.

The views found in Table 12 are considerably revised when focusing on production or real income per capita, using PPP as the conversion rate. In terms of per capita GDP at constant prices using PPP in Figure 10 and Table 13 in Appendix 10 (p. 170), Japan was the highest among Asian countries until it was overtaken by Singapore in 1987. The result highlights the outcome of the dramatic development effort made by the Asian Tigers, as shown in Figure 10.

The relative performance of China and India, the two most populous countries in the world (1.40 billion and 1.35 billion in 2018, respectively, as presented in Table 11 in Appendix 10, p. 168), is diminished in this measure due to their population. Their per capita GDP is 24% and 11% of the US in 2018, respectively, as shown in Figure 11. The income gap between the US and most Asian countries is still sizable (the level achieved by the Asia31 was 21% of the US),⁴ indicating a significant opportunity for catch-up.

Table 13 in Appendix 10 (p. 170) also presents individual figures for seven oil-rich economies (the six GCC countries and Brunei). At first glance, figures in 1970, and those to a lesser extent in 1990, suggest these economies had remarkably higher per capita GDP than those of Japan and the US. However, the measurement of GDP as an indicator of production is misleading for these countries, as it erroneously includes proceeds from the liquidation of a natural resource stock as part of the income flow. In other words, GDP overestimates income from the oil-exporting economies because it does not account for depletion of their natural resource assets. To give a rough




Figure 9 Per Capita GDP using Exchange Rate of Japan and the Asian Tigers, Relative to the US
—Index of GDP at current market prices per person in 1970–2018, using annual average exchange rate

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 10 Per Capita GDP of Japan and the Asian Tigers, Relative to the US
—Index of GDP at constant market prices per person in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

4: Per capita GDP may have underestimated the welfare of people in some countries. In the ROC, Hong Kong, and Japan, for example, GNI is consistently higher than GDP although the fluctuations are within +6%. The Philippines is the exception where the divergence between GNI and GDP has been increasing and has become significant for the past two decades, and GNI was more than 30% higher than GDP in the 2010s (See Figure 71 in Section 7.1, p. 87).

indication of the extent of distortion, Figure 12 provides comparisons of per capita GDP excluding production of the mining sector (e.g., crude oil and natural gas). The non-mining GDP per person in GCC economies, such as the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait, is almost identical to Japan's level, although total GDP per capita is much larger. In Iran and Malaysia, the dependence on the mining sector is more moderate than those in GCC in this period.

Catching up with the per capita GDP level of advanced economies is a long-term process that could take several decades to accomplish. Empirical evidence suggests there may be a negative correlation between per capita GDP level and the speed of catching up, with some exceptions. With the possibility of adopting successful practices and technologies from the more advanced economies, less advanced economies are poised to experience faster growth in per capita GDP, enabling themselves to catch up to average income levels. However, as their income levels approach those of the more advanced countries, their economic growth rates are expected to gradually decline over time. Figure 13 plots countries' initial per capita GDP levels against their respective average growth rates per year between 1970 and 2018.

Table 1 summarizes Figure 13 by grouping countries with four levels of per capita income groups. The speed of catch-up with the US is defined as the difference in the average annual growth rate of per capita real GDP between each country and the US. It shows that many Asian countries have managed to close the gap in per capita real GDP with the US over the last four decades, although some are more successful than others. One can see the initial economic level does not fully explain the catch-up process. If it did, the table would have been populated diagonally from the bottom left corner to top right corner.




Figure 11 Per Capita GDP of China, India, and the ASEAN, Relative to the US
 —Index of GDP at constant market prices per person in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 12 Per Capita Non-Mining GDP of Resource-Rich Countries and Japan
 —GDP at constant market prices per person in 2018, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Table 1 Country Groups Based on the Initial Economic Level and the Pace of Catching Up
 —Level and average annual growth rate of per capita GDP at constant market prices, using 2017 PPP

Per capita GDP level in 1970, relative to the US	Average annual rate of catch-up to the US during 1970–2018					
	(A6) <-1%	(A5) -1% ≤ -< 0%	(A4) 0% ≤ -< 1%	(A3) 1% ≤ -< 2%	(A2) 2% ≤ -< 3%	(A1) 3% ≤
(B1) 60% ≤	Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia	Australia, EU15, UAE				
(B2) 20% ≤ -< 60%		Fiji, Iran	Japan, Oman	Turkey	Hong Kong, Singapore	
(B3) 10% ≤ -< 20%			Lao PDR, Philippines		Malaysia	ROC
(B4) 0% ≤ -< 10%		Cambodia	Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan	India, Mongolia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Vietnam	Bhutan, Indonesia, Thailand	China, Korea

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.
 Note: The annual catch-up rates are based on the difference in the growth of per capita GDP at constant prices between each country and the US during 1970–2018.




Figure 13 Initial Level and Growth of Per Capita GDP
 —Level and average annual growth rate of GDP at constant market prices in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

3.3 Sources of Per Capita GDP Gap

To further understand the diverse performance in the Asian group, per capita GDP can be broken into two components: labor productivity (defined as real GDP per worker in this section); and the employment rate (defined as the ratio of workers relative to the population). Figure 14 shows the percentage point differences in per capita GDP decomposed into the contributions by the labor productivity gap and the employment rate gap, relative to the US in 2018.⁵ Most of the Asian countries display a huge per capita GDP gap with the US. This is predominantly explained by their inferior performance of labor productivity. Many countries in East Asia have employment rates higher than the US, with the effect of narrowing the gap. Figure 15 focuses on explaining a country's per capita GDP growth by its components: namely labor productivity growth; and the change in the employment rate for the period 2010–2018, respectively.⁶ For most countries, labor productivity explains a larger share of per capita GDP growth than employment.

In Muslim countries of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the employment rate is significantly less than the US, further reinforcing the poor economic performances of these countries (Figure 14). It is no coincidence they are among the countries with the lowest shares of female workers in total employment, at 16%, 21% and 29% in 2018, respectively, as shown in Figure 16. In many Asian countries the shares of female employment have increased over the four decades.

Figure 17 shows cross-country comparisons of employment rates in 1970, 2000, and 2018, based on the labor statistics of each country. Employment consists of employees, own-account workers, and contributing family workers. The fastest catch-up countries are also countries with the largest surge in employment rates over the past four decades: China, Korea, Cambodia and the ROC. Some of the countries in Group-A2 (Table 1) also experienced significant improvements in employment rates. While there are exceptions, generally countries that have failed to catch up also tend to make less vigorous improvements over the period, and therefore continue to have lower employment rates.

5: The gap of country x 's per capita GDP relative to the US is decomposed into the sum of the gap of labor productivity and employment rate with respect to the US, as in:

$$\underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GDP_x^t}{POP_x^t}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{GDP_{US}^t}{POP_{US}^t}\right)}_{\text{Gap of per capita GDP}} = \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GDP_x^t}{EMP_x^t}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{GDP_{US}^t}{EMP_{US}^t}\right)}_{\text{Gap of labor productivity}} + \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{EMP_x^t}{POP_x^t}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{EMP_{US}^t}{POP_{US}^t}\right)}_{\text{Gap of employment rate}}$$

where POP_x^t is population of country x in period t and EMP_x^t is the number of employment of country x in period t .

6: Country x 's per capita GDP is decomposed into the product of its labor productivity and employment rate, as in:

$$\underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GDP_x^t}{POP_x^t}\right)}_{\text{Per capita GDP}} = \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GDP_x^t}{EMP_x^t}\right)}_{\text{Labor productivity}} + \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{EMP_x^t}{POP_x^t}\right)}_{\text{Employment rate}} \quad \text{where } POP_x^t \text{ is population of country } x \text{ in period } t \text{ and } EMP_x^t \text{ is the number of employment of country } x \text{ in period } t.$$




Figure 14 Sources of Per Capita GDP Gap, Relative to the US
 —Percentage point differentials in per capita GDP at constant prices in 2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 15 Sources of Per Capita GDP Growth
 —Average annual growth rate of per capita GDP at constant prices in 2010–2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 16 Female Employment Share
 —Ratio of female workers to total employment in 1970, 2000, and 2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments; ILOSTAT database for GCC countries, and Australia; The EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat) for the EU 15.




Figure 17 Employment Rate
 —Ratio of employment to total population in 1970, 2000, and 2018

Sources: Employment and population data by national statistical offices in each country, including author adjustments.

Box 2 Demographic Dividend in Asia

The world's population is estimated to reach 7.6 billion in 2018, of which Asian countries account for 60%, according to United Nations (2019). China and India each account for 18.7% and 17.7% of the world's population, respectively. It has been observed that falling fertility rates and rising living standards go hand in hand, although the direction of causality is less certain. The evolution of the demographic structure implies dynamics in a society that are not captured by the overall population size or growth. As people's economic behavior, aspirations, and needs vary at different stages of life, changes in a country's age structure can have a significant impact on its economic growth via supply-side and demand-side impacts (see Cooley and Henriksen, 2018).

The growth rate of the world's population has slowed from its peak of around 2.0% in the 1970s to today's 1.1% per year. With falling fertility rates, the UN projects the world's population growth rate will decelerate to 0.50% per year by 2050 and further to 0.03% by 2100. Even so, the world population will still increase by one-third from today's 7.6 billion to 9.7 billion in 2050 and a further 12% to 10.9 billion by 2100. These estimates are based on the medium-fertility variant, but with only a small variation in fertility, particularly in the more populous countries, the total could be higher (10.6 billion by 2050 and 15.6 billion in 2100) or lower (8.9 billion in 2050 and 7.3 billion in 2100). Figure B2.1 depicts this shift in the distribution of the world population with the share from the more developed regions gradually declining from 17% in 2015 to 13% in 2050 and 11% in 2100, compared with 32% in 1950. Conversely, the share of the least developed countries is depicted as rising from today's 13% to a projected 19% in 2050 and 28% in 2100, up from 8% in 1950.

According to the projection, Asia's share will decline from its 60% today to 54% in 2050 and 43% in 2100, while Africa's share will rise from today's 17% to 26% and 39%, respectively. Figure B2.2 shows the current population size of individual Asian countries compared with the 1970 level and its 2050 projection. As can be seen from this chart, China's population is expected to stabilize around the current level. China has socially engineered the change with its one-child policy, which has made its current population 300–400 million lower than it would have been otherwise. In less than two decades, India is projected to overtake China as the most populous country in the world.

Figure B2.3 shows the demographic make-up of countries in 2018 (the population proportions of the under-15 and over-65 age groups, which together make up the dependent population). Ranking the countries by the share of old-age population filters the rich economies to the top end. These economies also have a relatively low share of the young-age group compared to less developed countries. This suggests that demographic transition tends to run parallel with economic progress, although the direction of causation is not certain. As countries move from high to low mortality and fertility rates, the demographic




Figure B2.1 Distribution of the World's Population in Different Regions in 1950–2100

Source: United Nations (2019).

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transition produces a “boom” generation that is larger than those immediately before and after it. As this boom generation gradually works through a nation’s age structure, it produces a demographic dividend of economic growth as people reach their prime.

Using demographic data since 1950 and UN projections up to 2100, Figures B2.4 and B2.5 track changes in the ratio of the working population (aged 15-64) to dependent population (aged under 14 and over 65) by country and by country group, respectively. The higher the ratio, the more favorable its demography for economic growth. Japan could have capitalized on the demographic dividend in the 1960s, when its GDP growth was over 10% on average per year for ten years. Similarly, China, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand are poised for the prospect of such demographic dividend in the 2000s and 2010s, whereas, based on projections, some ASEAN countries, such as Myanmar and Indonesia will have to wait for such opportunity until the 2020s and 2030s, and South Asian countries (except Sri Lanka) until the late 2030s and 2040s.

The reaping of this dividend, however, is far from automatic. A favorable demography can work wonders to produce a virtuous cycle of wealth creation only if it is combined with appropriate health, labor, financial, human capital, and growth-enhancing economic policies. The presence of these complementary factors cannot be taken for granted but needs to be cultivated in order to earn the demographic dividend. As the analysis of the Databook shows, the contribution of labor to economic growth has been smaller than those of capital and TFP for most countries (Figure 40 in Section 5.3). This means that aging in countries is not as impactful if fairly high growth rates of capital and TFP are maintained. Nevertheless, understanding the demographic shift and its implications is highly relevant for




Figure B2.2 Asian Countries’ Population Size and Projection in 1970, 2018, and 2050

Source: United Nations (2019).




Figure B2.3 Proportion of the Dependent Population in 2018

Sources: Population census and official national accounts in each country.

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


Figure B2.4 Demographic Dividend by Country in 1950–2100

Source: United Nations (2019).

economic projections, providing valuable foresight for economic policy making. In our projection of economic growth by 2030 (Box 7), the changes in demographic structure play an important role to forecast not only hours worked for the entire economy, but also quality changes in labor inputs.




Figure B2.5 Demographic Dividend by Country Group in 1950–2100

Source: United Nations (2019).

4 Expenditure

Highlights

- The Asia31 invested 34% of its GDP in 2018, compared with 21% for the US. East Asia has the highest investment ratio (38%) among the Asian regions (Figure 18), driven by China's higher investment share of 44% (Figure 19). The consumption ratio of the Asia31 has dropped to 50% of GDP in 2018 from 55% in 2000 (Figure 18 and Table 14).
- As a composition of investment, the expansions of IT and R&D capital are becoming more significant in some Asian countries. In region, the shares of IT and R&D investment for the Asia25 are 5.5% and 4.5% in 2018, respectively, compared to 17% and 15% of the US (Figure 25).
- Net export shares in GDP are remarkably large in Singapore and ROC, at 28.4% and 11.1% in 2018, respectively. In contrast, it peaked at 8.7% in 2007 in China and 12.2% in 2005 in Hong Kong. Since then, they have dropped 0.8% and 0.1% in 2018, respectively (Figure 26).
- The growth of household consumption is the main engine of demand-side economic growth, contributing 47% of the regional growth of the Asia31 in 2010–2018. Investment is another engine, contributing 38% of the Asia31 growth (Figure 20).

GDP is defined by three approaches in SNA: production by industry; expenditure on final demand; and income to factor inputs. In this chapter, the economic insights are drawn from analyzing the expenditure side of GDP.

4.1 Final Demands

Figure 18 shows comparisons of final demand shares of nominal GDP among country groups, covering (1) household consumption, including consumption of non-profit institutions serving households (NPISHs), (2) government consumption, (3) investment or, in national accounts terminology, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) plus changes in inventories, and (4) net exports (exports minus imports).⁷ One can see that country groups display distinctive features in their final demand composition, reflecting their development stage and economic makeup.⁸

Over the past four decades, the share of household consumption has been stable for mature economies. In economies undergoing rapid transformation, however, it is more volatile and largely trends downward (Figure 18 and Table 14). Within Asia, all regions except GCC display a decline in household consumption ratios. South Asia maintains the highest share, despite its fall from 76% in 1970 down to 64% in

7: The country comparisons are presented in Table 14 in Appendix 10 (p. 171). In theory, three approaches to measure GDP are accounting identities and should yield the same result, but in practice, they differ by statistical discrepancies. Based on our Metadata Survey 2020 on national accounts for APO member economies, Japan is an exceptional country that determines GDP from its expenditure-side measurement (the expenditure-side estimate is based on the commodity flow data, in which the data on production/shipment in the detail product classification are used as the controlled totals.). In other countries, GDP is estimated from the production side (value-added in industries). Some countries record statistical discrepancy as the difference in the estimates between production-based GDP and the sum of final expenditures. In this Databook, statistical discrepancy is mainly attributed to household consumption when data is recorded. Readers should keep in mind that it can have some impact on the share of final demand.

8: The constant-price estimates in this edition newly reflects the revisions on final demand prices in the APO Productivity Database 2020, in which the prices on government consumption, export, and import are revised to sustain a consistency with GDP prices and other related prices in some countries like Bhutan, Brunei, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam.




Figure 18 Final Demand Shares by Region

—Share of final demands with respect to GDP at current market prices in 1970, 2000, and 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: Final demand shares in country groups are computed by using the PPPs for GDP. Household consumption includes consumption of NPISHs. Investment includes GFCF plus changes in inventories.

2018. The rapid decreasing trends are also found in CLMV. In contrast, the US household consumption share has been climbing.⁹

Overall, Asian countries invest significantly more than the US and the EU15 as a share of GDP. In 2018 investment accounted for 21% of final demand in the US and the EU15, compared with 34% for the Asia31. East Asia has the highest investment ratio among the Asian regions in the entire period of our observation. Compared to other components of final demand, the contribution of net exports to the Asian economy has always been more volatile.

The regional averages disguise the great variation displayed by individual countries. Figure 19 shows the cross-country comparisons of final demand share in current market-price GDP in 2018. Countries are arranged in descending order of their household consumption shares. Although most countries fall to the right of the US, there are a handful of Asian countries that have a higher consumption ratio than the US. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka fell to the left of the US in 2018, regardless of much lower per capita GDP level in these countries, except Hong Kong.

Figure 20 shows the decomposition of the average annual economic growth by final demand for the period 2010–2018.¹⁰ While the growth of household consumption is the main engine of economic growth in many countries, investment growth contributes 38% of the growth of the Asia31. The large contribution of investment has continued in China at 44% in 2010–2018. Bhutan is another country with a strong

9: It is worth noting that the GDP share of government consumption in the EU15 was higher than the average of the Asia31 by 6.2 percentage points in 2018 (Table 14 in Appendix 10, p. 171). In fact, when it comes to welfare measurement, actual individual consumption, as opposed to household consumption, is preferred because the former takes into account expenditures by NPISHs and government expenditures on individual consumption goods and services (such as education and health) in addition to household consumption.

10: The Tornqvist quantity index is adopted for calculating the growth of real GDP. Using this index, the growth of real GDP into the products of contributions by final demands can be decomposed:

$$\underbrace{\ln \left(\frac{GDP^t}{GDP^{t-1}} \right)}_{\text{Real GDP growth}} = \sum_i \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{2} \right) \left(s_i^t + s_i^{t-1} \right)}_{\text{Contribution of final demand } i} \ln \left(\frac{Q_i^t}{Q_i^{t-1}} \right)$$

where Q_i^t is quantity of final demand i in period t and s_i^t is expenditure share of final demand i in period t . Thus, the real GDP growth may diverge from the official estimates or those presented in Table 10 (Appendix 10, p. 167).




Figure 19 Final Demand Shares in GDP by Country
—Share of final demands with respect to GDP at current market prices in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.
Note: Household consumption includes consumption of NPISHs. Investment includes GFCF plus changes in inventories.




Figure 20 Final Demand Contributions to Economic Growth
—Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP and contributions of final demands in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

driver of investment at 39% of average annual growth (6.0%) in 2010–2018. This is due to massive investment in hydropower plants, mainly financed by India.

4.2 Demand Compositions

The high consumption rate in these countries could be partly explained by the difference in demographic structure. Figure 21 shows that countries with a high proportion of dependent population (aged under 14 and over 65) tend to have a high household consumption share in their GDP. This is reflected by higher propensity to consume by individuals in the dependent population, and their savings-consumption choices. These countries, i.e., Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, have higher shares of dependent population with over 33% in 2018. The variation of consumption rates is also related to the income level. Countries with a low income will struggle to defer consumption. It is no coincidence that countries clustered on the left of Figure 19 tend to be those in the bottom income groups in terms of per capita GDP in Figure 14 in Section 3.3 (p. 30).

The decomposition of household consumption reveals a huge diversity of consumption patterns among individual countries, partly reflecting their income levels and partly the idiosyncratic characteristics of the society. Figure 22 illustrates the cross-country version of Engel’s Law, which states that basic necessities will account for a high proportion of household consumption for a lower per capita income group, and vice versa. More specifically, countries where food and non-alcoholic beverages account for a large




Figure 21 Dependent Population Ratio and Consumption Share
 —Share of dependent population to total population and consumption share in GDP at current market prices in 2018

Sources: Population data by national statistical office in each country; World Bank (2020c); official national accounts in each country with author estimates.
 Note: Dependent population is defined as persons aged under 14 and over 65.




Figure 22 Household Consumption by Purpose
—Shares of household consumption at current prices by purpose in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country.

Note: For data of Hong Kong, transportation includes communication; recreation and culture includes hotels; miscellaneous goods and services includes restaurants. For data of China, food and non-alcoholic beverages includes alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; transportation includes communication; recreation and culture includes education. For data of Vietnam, transportation includes communication. For Fiji, the Lao PDR, and Vietnam, the observation periods are 2009, 2005, and 2016, respectively.

proportion of consumption tend to have low income (i.e., in Group–D5 or Group–D6 in Table 2 in Section 6.1, p. 70). The other end of the spectrum is occupied by the rich Asian countries, namely, the Asian Tigers and Japan. Besides food and non-alcoholic beverages, housing/utilities and transportation are the other two large spending categories. In rich economies, these two categories account for larger shares in household consumption than food and non-alcoholic beverages. Idiosyncratic spending, such as education in Cambodia, Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam accounting for 5–6% of household consumption, and health in the US, accounting for 22% of consumption, are not reflected in other countries.

The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) differs considerably among Asian countries. Figure 23 shows the FDI inflows as a percentage of GFCF in 2018, for the Asian economies with the US and some EU countries for comparison. In one-third of the Asia31 (11 countries), the FDI inflows are over a 10% share of GFCF. In particular, they are outstanding in the two global cities of the Asian Tigers, Hong Kong (148% of GFCF) and Singapore (90%). The FDI inflows are extremely low in Japan at 0.8%, indicating that a domestic reform for lowering barriers to entry should be considered for the purpose of encouraging international investment.




Figure 23 FDI Inflows

— FDI inflows as a percentage of GFCF, an average of the ratios in 2018

Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *World Investment Report 2019*, and APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 24 FDI Inflow Ratio and Business Environment

— FDI inflows as a percentage of GFCF in 2018 and business environment score

Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *World Investment Report 2019*, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2014), and APO Productivity Database 2020.

It is an important policy target for low-income countries to create a business-enabling environment, just as it is important for middle-income countries to improve various business environments. Based on the EIU's (Economist Intelligence Unit, *The Economist*) ranking 2014–2018 (covering 82 countries in the world),¹¹ Singapore (1st) and Hong Kong (3rd) are in the top 10% of the covered countries. In contrast, Bangladesh (69th), Pakistan (74th), and Iran (81th) are in the bottom 10%. Figure 24 plots the business environment score and the FDI inflows ratio in the countries presented in Figure 23, excluding the

countries in which the FDI inflows ratio is over 30%. Nepal is not covered in EIU (2014). In Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, improving business environment is a necessary condition for attracting FDI. Although Japan is one of the countries with the lowest FDI ratio in Figure 23, this does not seem to be captured in rankings in business environment.

Figure 25 focuses on investment components, showing the nominal GFCF share of seven types of assets for Asia25 economies and regions in 2018.¹² For most countries, investment is still very much construction-based (i.e., dwellings, non-residential buildings, and other structures). However, the expansion of IT capital is becoming more significant in some countries like Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and Malaysia – even at the current price comparisons.¹³ The ROC, Japan, Korea, and the US invested in R&D by more than 14% of total investment in 2018. Among the Asian Tigers, however, Hong Kong had a smaller share of R&D in GFCF (4%) in 2018.

Figure 26 plots the long-term trend of net export share in GDP from 1970 to 2018. Net exports, which were previously a significant drag on Singapore and Korea in the 1970s, have improved their position rapidly. The shares of net exports in Singapore and ROC are unremarkably large, at 28.4% and 11.1% in




Figure 25 Investment Shares by Type of Asset

—Shares of GFCF at current purchaser's prices by type of produced assets in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country and APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: Numbers in parentheses of the assets are corresponding to the code of produced assets, defined in Table 4 in Appendix 3 (p. 154).

- The EIU's business rankings model examines 10 separate criteria or categories, covering the political environment, the macro-economic environment, market opportunities, policy towards free enterprise and competition, policy towards foreign investment, foreign trade and exchange controls, taxes, financing, the labor market and infrastructure. Each category contains a number of indicators that are assessed by the EIU for the last five years and the next five years. The number of indicators in each category varies from 5 (foreign trade and exchange regimes) to 16 (infrastructure); and there are 91 indicators in total. Each of the 91 indicators is scored on a scale from 1 (very bad for business) to 5 (very good for business).
- The investment data by type of assets includes our own estimates for the countries where data is not available. Although our GFCF estimates are constructed based on 11 classifications of assets (see Table 4 in Appendix 3, p. 154), they have been aggregated into five assets for the purposes of this table. The IT capital is defined as IT hardware, communications equipment, and computer software.
- The real-term comparisons are conducted at the flow and stock levels in Chapter 5. Box 4 discusses the IT and R&D capital stocks and its implications.

2018, respectively. In contrast, shares of net exports peaked at 8.7% in 2007 in China and 12.2% in 2005 in Hong Kong. Since then, they have declined to 0.8% and 0.1% in 2018, respectively. Japan had enjoyed a trade surplus for most of the period compared, but its trade balance turned negative amounting to -0.5% in 2011 deepening to -2.5% in 2014, due to the shutdown of its nuclear power plants resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.

As a decomposition of net exports, Figure 27 presents the export and import shares in GDP in 2018. In 2018 the shares in Singapore exports were at 178%, and 188% in Hong Kong, reflecting their port function in Asia. This explains why the total values of exports and imports are exceptionally high, relative to the size of GDP in these economies.¹⁴ About two-

thirds of countries realized a trade surplus. However, Nepal and Bhutan, whose currencies are tied to the Indian rupee, are suffering serious trade deficits by 41% and 25% in 2018, respectively.




Figure 26 Net Export Share in GDP of the Asian Tigers, China, and Japan
—Share of net exports with respect to GDP at current market prices in 1970–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 27 Export and Import Shares in GDP
—Shares of exports and imports with respect to GDP at current market prices in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

14: The 2008 SNA requires that the trade values should be recorded to reflect a change in ownership of goods, rather than accounting for goods moved for processing without incurring actual transactions. Singapore and Hong Kong already introduced the 2008 SNA. However, the revisions from the 1993 SNA on the export and import data were very minor.

Box 3 Task-wise International Division of Labor and Factory Asia

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some Asian countries experienced revolutionary changes in the pattern of international division of labor; the task-wise division of labor, or the second unbundling (Ando and Kimura, 2005; Baldwin, 2016).

In the past, the international division of labor was typically industry-wise. Production activities of one industry were mostly completed within a country's territory, and final products were traded. Each country tended to specialize in a set of specific industries, depending on its technological level and factor endowments. A developing country typically imported manufactured goods and exported primary products. Or, it imported machinery and exported garments. In a broad commodity classification, the trade pattern was mostly one-way; products of an industry were traded from a country to another, but not in both directions.

In the late 1980s, the international division of labor moved to a task-wise model, rather than industry-wise. A representative industry for this type of division of labor is machinery. A machine typically consists of many parts and components, and its production involves a number of tasks. Task-wise international division of labor was initiated in the operation of export processing zones and was gradually extended to more sophisticated production "networks."




Figure B3 Export and Import Shares of Machinery
—Average value shares in 1990–1999, 2000–2009, and 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: The arrows are colored by region in light green, brown, green, pink, and black for East Asia, South Asia, ASEAN6, CLMV, and other Asia, respectively.

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Figure B3 presents each Asian country's export/import shares occupied by machinery and transport equipment in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s. A striking contrast is observed here, between countries that participate in the task-wise international division of labor and those that do not. Japan and Korea are located way above the 45-degree line, which means their export shares are much larger than import shares. However, note that import shares themselves are high, in the range of 20% to 35%. Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, ROC, and China are close to the 45-degree line, around 40% to 70%. These countries are actively exporting and importing these products at the same time. Hong Kong and Singapore are also showing high export/import shares, though some portion of their trade may be entrepot, adding only logistics services.

This is somewhat of intra-industry trade (IIT) but is different from IIT typically observed in trade between developed countries; the latter is based on horizontal product differentiation like trade of yellow cars and blue cars. What we observe in Asia is the task-wise international division of labor with which a large portion of trade is occupied by back-and-forth trade of parts and components at different levels of processing. This type of trade is observed only in limited developing countries: most of the countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia, some Eastern European countries, Mexico, and Costa Rica. Particularly in Asia, a number of countries get involved in it, and production "networks" are developed. This is the indication of "Factory Asia."

For these Asian countries, export/import shares seem to decline a bit in the 2010s. Actually, even in the 2010s, parts and components trade was steadily growing in these countries, but trade in final products expanded faster (Obashi and Kimura, 2018). It means that these countries get richer and add their charm as a market. That is why the proportion of "network trade" out of total trade reduced.

Other developing countries in the world are still in the realm of industry-wise division of labor. South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal are way below the 45-degree line, around 20% in import shares. Although India shows some upward move in the 2010s, these countries do not yet participate in international production networks in machinery. Indonesia is also struggling with entering such networks.

5 Productivity

Highlights

- In labor productivity, based on GDP at constant basic prices per hour worked, the US has sustained a sizeable gap over even the highest Asian performers (Figure 30 and Table 17). In 2018, the productivity gap between the US and the Asian leader, Singapore, remained at 8% (Figure 29).
- In 2015–2018, the labor productivity of the Asia25 grew by 4.4% per year on average, slightly down from 4.8% in 2010–2015. China experienced a slowdown in labor productivity growth to 5.5% from 7.5% over the same periods. The main drivers of productivity resurgence in the Asia25 were Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India (Figure 32 and Table 18).
- TFP growth recovered to 1.8% in 2015–2018 in the Asia25, which improved from 1.2% in 2010–2015. The resurgence of TFP growth in South Asia was outstanding, increasing from 1.2% to 2.5% over the same periods. The main driver was India, in which the speed of TFP growth nearly doubled from 1.5% to 2.9% (Figure 37).
- The regional economic growth of the Asia25 has been predominantly explained by the contribution of capital input, representing 61% (59% for non-IT and 3% for IT capital) of economic growth achieved in 2010–2018. The role of TFP growth is also significant, contributing 28% of its regional economic growth in the same period, slightly higher than 20% in the US (Figure 40).
- Capital deepening is the key mechanism of labor productivity growth in the Asia25, accounting for 58% (56% for non-IT and 2% for IT capital) in 2010–2018. In the same period, the contributions of labor quality and TFP are 10% and 32%, respectively. In the ASEAN, where the growth of regional TFP in 2010–2018 was moderate, the contribution of labor quality was significant, contributing 58% of the regional improvement in labor productivity (Figure 48).

Labor productivity can be measured in several ways, depending on the definitions of output and labor input measures. Section 5.1 presents the labor productivity measure in terms of GDP per worker.¹⁵ As workers in high-performing Asian countries tend to work longer hours on average than those in the US, as shown in Figure 82 in Appendix 6 (p. 159), the worker-based labor productivity gaps in this instance cast the Asian countries in a particularly favorable light. Section 5.2 shifts the focus to alternative estimates of labor productivity measure, namely GDP per hour worked.

The sources of economic growth in each economy are further decomposed to factor inputs of labor, capital, and total factor productivity (TFP), based on the growth accounting framework.¹⁶ In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, capital input is included as another key factor of production¹⁷; and TFP estimates are presented for the Asia25 economies and the US.¹⁸ Finally, Section 5.5 presents the estimates of energy productivity,

15: GDP is valued at basic prices in this chapter, as opposed to GDP at market prices used in the previous chapters. GDP at basic prices is defined as GDP at market prices, minus net indirect taxes on products. As most Asian countries do not provide official estimates for GDP at basic prices in their national accounts, they are calculated based on available tax data. See Appendix 2 for the methods employed for our calculations.

16: The growth accounting approach is based on the microeconomic production theory and the nominal accounting balance of input and output of production. See OECD (2001) for a presentation of definitions, theoretical foundations, and a number of practical issues in measuring productivity.

17: The measurement of capital stock of produced assets, land stock, and capital services are presented in Appendixes 3–5, respectively.

18: In this edition of the Databook, the growth accounting framework was newly developed for Turkey, which became the APO's 21st member on March 11, 2020.

which is becoming an important policy target for pursuing sustainable growth of the Asian countries. The details of long-term estimates of growth accounting for the APO21 economies and regions are provided in the country profiles of Chapter 8.

5.1 Per-Worker Labor Productivity

Figure 28 presents the cross-country comparisons of per-worker labor productivity levels in 2018, measured as GDP per worker in US dollars as of 2018. On this measure, Singapore is the leading economy, 16% larger than the US level.¹⁹ Hong Kong and the ROC follow at some distance. Turkey, Japan, and Korea took the next tier, with productivity levels at 40–42% below the US. Iran and Malaysia followed. It is worth noting that Iran has the lowest employment rate in Asia, as presented in Figure 17 in Section 3.3 (p. 31), bringing about higher performance in labor productivity. Thereafter, many countries among the Asia group followed with labor productivity levels at less than 25% of the US, pulling down the average performance of the group to 21% for the Asia25, 23% for the ASEAN6, and 9% for CLMV. Bringing up the rear were China and India, with productivity levels that were 18% and 12% of the US level, respectively.

The growth comparison of per-worker labor productivity is presented in Table 16 in Appendix 10 (p. 173). In this measure, the regional performance has been steady at 4–6% since 2000. China has sustained rapid productivity growth in the past two decades. Its growth accelerated to an average of 11.4% per year in 2005–2010 from 9.3% per year in 2000–2005 and slowed to 5.6% in 2015–2018. This contrasts with India’s resurgence at 7.0%, 4.7%, and 6.1% over the same periods. Labor productivity growth in Bangladesh and Vietnam have become significant in recent years.




Figure 28 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level
—GDP at constant basic prices per worker in 2018, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

19: Cross-country level productivity comparisons are notoriously difficult to make, hence subject to much data uncertainty. Estimates should therefore be taken as indicative for broad groupings rather than precise ranking.

5.2 Per-Hour Labor Productivity

The per-worker based labor productivity gaps presented in Section 5.1 are most likely conservative estimates, since workers in high-performing Asian countries tend to work longer hours than those in the US, on average. To adjust for this discrepancy, total hours worked are constructed in the Asia QALI Database for the 25 Asian countries, although the quality of the estimates may vary considerably across countries.²⁰ Figure 29 shows how the productivity gap with the US in 2018 varies depending on which measure of labor productivity is used.²¹ The productivity gap with the US widens for all Asian countries except Japan when the differences in working hours are taken into account. The choice of labor productivity measure makes a significant difference for the previously high-performing countries relative to the US, such as Singapore (from 16% higher to 8% lower) and Hong Kong (from 9% lower to 25% lower).




Figure 29 Per-Worker and Per-Hour Labor Productivity Gap, Relative to the US

—Indices of GDP at constant basic prices per worker and hour in 2018, using 2017 PPP

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: Light green is used for the countries in which per-hour labor productivity is lower than per-worker labor productivity.

Based on GDP at constant basic prices per hour worked, US labor productivity has sustained a sizeable gap over even the Asian high performers, as presented in Figure 30 and Table 17 in Appendix 10 (p. 174). The gap between the US and the Asian leader, Singapore, has been narrowing slowly and the productivity gap of 8% still remains in 2018. Hong Kong and the ROC have improved by six and twelve times in this period and have overcome Japan in 2006 and 2010, respectively. They were ahead of Korea, despite Korea's effort in catching up with Japan by 2.7% per year on average over the entire observation period (1970–2018). If Korea can maintain this effort at the same pace, it would take 7 years to draw level with Japan.

20: Cross-country comparisons of hours worked are notoriously difficult, not least because harmonized data is rarely readily available. In the countries studied, three published their total hours worked as part of their official statistics, but not for the whole period studied in this report; and the publications may have been constructed based on different methodologies. It is therefore important to bear in mind the data limitations. See Appendix 6 for an explanation of the estimation procedure of total hours worked.

21: The labor productivity gap for country x is country x 's labor productivity divided by the US's labor productivity in Figure 29.




Figure 30 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level in the Long Run
 —GDP at constant basic prices per hour in 1970–2018, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

Unit: Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018).
 Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

The average growth rates of hourly labor productivity performances for the Asia25 economies and regions are compared in Figure 31. In the Asia25 as a region, the labor productivity growth has accelerated to 4.6% per year in the recent period 2010–2018, compared to the past two-decade averages of 3.9% in 1990–2010 and 2.6% in 1970–1990. Figure 32 and Table 18 in Appendix 10 (p. 175) focus on more recent productivity performances. As a region, labor productivity growth in the most recent period 2015–2018 was very strong at 4.4% per year. Although it is below the highest record of the regional productivity growth (5.6% in 2005–2010), which was accelerated by an extremely high performance of China (11.5%), it improved from 4.0% in the early 2010s. The main drivers of the recent productivity performances are Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India.




Figure 31 Labor Productivity Growth in the Long Run

—Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant basic prices per hour in 2010–2018, 1990–2010, and 1970–1990

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: The starting period for Australia is 1978.




Figure 32 Labor Productivity Growth in the Recent Periods

—Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant basic prices per hour in 2015–2018, 2010–2015, and 2005–2010

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 33 Hours Worked Growth in the Recent Periods
 —Average annual growth rate of hours worked in 2015–2018, 2010–2015, and 2005–2010

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Figure 33 presents the growth of hours worked for the Asia25 economies in 2015–2018, compared with those in 2010–2015 and 2005–2010. Over these sub-periods, hours worked growth in the Asia25 are stable as 0.7% in 2015–2018 and 2010–2015, up from 0.9% in 2005–2010. The change in growth rates varies widely by country. Singapore, Myanmar, and Brunei experienced a continuous slowdown in hours-worked growth over these sub-periods. In Contrast, the growth of hours worked recovered in 2015–2018 in Sri Lanka, Japan, Bhutan, from negative or zero growth in the 2010–2015.

Table 18 in Appendix 10 (p. 175) illustrates the growth rate of per-hour labor productivity since 1990. The growth patterns of individual countries generally follows their counterparts closely in per-worker productivity growth, as shown in Table 16 (p. 173). In some countries the two measures diverge greatly and are not at all consistent through the periods compared. This contrast was particularly stark in the first half of the 1990s, when Japan’s hourly productivity growth was 1.9% compared with 0.7% in per-worker productivity growth.

One can identify where countries are today in terms of their hourly productivity performance against a backdrop of Japan’s historical experience. Figure 34 traces the long-term path of Japan’s per-hour labor productivity for the period 1885–2018 along the green line, expressed as relative to Japan’s 2018 level (set equal to 1.0).²² A structural break is observed during World War II when output collapsed. Countries’ relative hourly productivity levels against Japan in 2018 are then mapped against Japan’s growth (as circles). Here, corresponding year can be located when Japan’s hourly productivity level was the closest to the country in question. Most Asian countries are clustered around Japan’s level between the 1960s and the

22: While mindful that level comparisons of productivity among countries and over periods are subject to a great degree of data uncertainty, they should provide a rough sketch of the productivity divergence in Asia.




Figure 34 Historical Labor Productivity Trend of Japan and Current Level of Asia

—Index of GDP at constant basic prices per hour worked for Japan in 1885–2018 and for Asian countries in 2018, using 2017 PPP

Sources: For historical data of Japan, the sources of GDP are Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974) during 1885–1954 and the JSNA by ESRI, Cabinet Office of Japan, during 1955–2018 (including author adjustments). Hours worked data is based on KEO Database, Keio University, during 1955–2018. During 1885–1954, the average hours worked per person are assumed to be constant. For the labor productivity level of Asian countries in 2018, it is based on the APO Productivity Database 2020.

early 1970s. Cambodia, with the lowest hourly productivity in 2018, sees levels corresponding to Japan in the middle 1920s. Even if they manage Japan's long-term productivity growth of 2.8% on average per year, this means it will take them about a century to catch up with the Asian leader's current position (Singapore, Hong Kong, the ROC, and Japan).

The productivity leaders are the Asian Tigers, of which Singapore, Hong Kong, and the ROC have already surpassed Japan. Figure 35 compares the time span taken by each country to raise its labor productivity from 30–70% of Japan's level today (unit of measurement on the y-axis of Figure 34). What Japan had achieved in the 21 years from 1970 to 1991, Hong Kong, the ROC, and Korea managed to achieve in 16, 15, and 22 years, respectively (Figure 35). Although the speed of catch-up for latecomers is increasing somewhat, most Asian countries will take a long time to catch up with the leaders, currently clustered near Japan's 1960–1970 levels (Figure 34).




Figure 35 Time Durations Taken to Improve Labor Productivity by Japan and the Asian Tigers

Source: See Figure 34.

5.3 Total Factor Productivity

Labor productivity in the previous sections is only a one-factor or partial-factor productivity measure and does not provide a full perspective of production efficiency. An observation of low labor productivity could suggest production inefficiency, but it could also reflect different capital intensities in the chosen production method, under the relative labor-capital price faced by the economy concerned. By observing movements in labor productivity alone, it is difficult to distinguish which is the case. In populous Asian economies, which are relatively plentiful in low-skilled labor, production lines may be deliberately organized in a way to utilize this abundant, and hence relatively cheap, resource. It follows that the chosen production method is most likely (low-skilled) labor-intensive and with little capital, manifested in low labor productivity and high capital productivity. Therefore, economists analyze TFP, which is GDP per unit of combined inputs, to arrive at an overall efficiency of a country's production.

Measuring capital input is a key factor for determining TFP. It is defined by capital services – the flow of services from productive capital stock, as recommended in the 2008 SNA.²³ The required basis for estimating capital services is the appropriate measure of capital stock. The SNA recommends constructing the national balance sheet accounts for official national accounts. However, this is not a common practice in the national accounts of many Asian countries.²⁴ Even where estimates of net capital stocks are available for the entire economy, assumptions and methodologies can differ considerably among countries. In response to this challenge, harmonized estimates for capital stocks and capital services have been constructed and compiled within the APO Productivity Database, built on the same methodology and assumptions. In this methodology, changes in the quality of capital are incorporated into the measurement of capital services in two ways: changes in the composition are captured by explicitly differentiating assets into 15 types; and an appropriate and harmonized deflator is used for IT capital to reflect the rapid quality change embodied in IT-related assets (see Appendix 3).²⁵

With these improvements, the APO Productivity Database 2020 estimates capital services, hours worked, labor qualities, and TFP for the Asia25 economies.²⁶ In addition, the regional growth accounts are developed for six country groups – Asia25, APO21, East Asia, South Asia, CLMV, and ASEAN6.²⁷ Cross-country comparisons of TFP growth for the Asia25 economies and regions and the US are shown in Figure 36 for the period 2010–2018, compared with the past two-decade averages in 1970–1990 and 1990–2010. Taking the US as the reference economy, with TFP growth of 0.4% on average per year in 2010–2018, 18 Asian economies achieved higher TFP growth than the US. The Asia25 sustained a steady speed of TFP growth at 1.5% per year in 2010–2018 and 1990–2010, up from 0.8% per year in 1970–1990. By country, there was a considerable decline in TFP growth in China (2.6% in 2010–2018 from 4.0% in 1990–2010), ROC (0.9% from 1.9% over the same periods), Korea (0.7% from 1.3%), Cambodia (–0.2% from 1.3%), Sri Lanka (–0.5% from 2.1%), Iran (–1.0% from 2.4%), and Lao PDR (–1.1% from 0.6%). In contrast, the TFP growth accelerated in CLMV from 0.0% to 0.9% over the same periods. This was driven by Vietnam, in which the speed of TFP growth accelerated from 0.2% to 1.6%.

23: See the chapter on capital services and the national accounts of the 2008 SNA (United Nations, 2009). The second edition of the *OECD Capital Manual* (2009) provides a comprehensive framework for constructing prices and quantities of capital services. In the APO Productivity Database 2020, the Törnqvist index is used for aggregating 15 types of capital inputs (11 types of produced assets provided in Table 4 in Appendix 3 and 4 types of land provided in Appendix 4). Inventory stocks and natural resources are not considered in the current database.

24: Based on our metadata survey, half of APO member economies do not develop the balance sheet accounts within the official national accounts; these countries are Bangladesh, the ROC, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (but the National Wealth Survey is available in the ROC for some selected years).

25: IT capital is defined as a composite asset of IT hardware (computers, electric computing equipment copying machines, and other office machineries), communications equipment, and computer software.




Figure 36 TFP Growth in the Long Run

— Average annual growth rate of total factor productivity in 2010–2018, 1990–2010, and 1970–1990

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

TFP growth rates in more recent periods are provided in Figure 37 and Table 19 (Appendix 10, p. 176) for the Asia25 economies. In the most recent period 2015–2018, many Asian countries recovered TFP growth, compared to those in the early 2010s. In the Asia25, TFP growth improved from 1.2% on average in 2010–2015 to 1.8% in 2015–2018. The recovery in South Asia from 1.2% to 2.5% over the same periods was outstanding. The main driver of the recent recovery of TFP growth in South Asia was India, in which the speed of TFP growth doubled from 1.5% to 2.9%.

The long-term trends of TFP index in our entire observation period are compared for the Asia25 economies in Figure 38. There is a wide range in TFP growth in the long run. While the TFPs of China and ROC more than tripled (3.6 times and 3.4 times, respectively) and those in Hong Kong and India more than doubled (2.4 times and 2.1 times, respectively) in the past half a century, ten countries failed to improve their TFP.

26: In measuring TFP, income generated from domestic production should be separated into labor and capital compensations. The national accounts readily provide the estimates of compensation of employees as a component of value added in many countries; compensation for the self-employed is not separately estimated but is combined with returns to capital in mixed income, except China, where labor remuneration in the national accounts includes labor income for the self-employed (Holz, 2006). The assumption on wages for self-employed and contributing family workers is presented in Appendix 6. See Box 5 for sensitivity of our assumptions to the TFP results.

27: In Databook, the country aggregations of capital and labor inputs are based on the estimates of PPP for capital and labor inputs, respectively, which are the updates of the estimates developed in Nomura (2018). In most Asian countries, the PPP for output underestimates the PPP for capital input, indicating the capital prices are higher than the output prices and overestimates the PPP for labor inputs, indicating the labor prices are lower than the output prices.




Figure 37 TFP Growth in the Recent Periods

—Average annual growth rate of total factor productivity in 2015–2018, 2010–2015, and 2005–2010

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Policy is of significance in identifying the drivers behind the rapid economic growth in the Asian countries. If growth has been driven by capital accumulation more than assimilation of existing technologies from the advanced economies, the Asian model may prove to be too expensive for many less well-off countries to emulate. According to our findings for the period 2010–2018 (Figures 39 and 40), it is true that capital accumulation plays a much more significant role in the economic growth of most Asian countries than in the US, explaining 62% of economic growth achieved in the Asia25. Capital accumulation appears to be a necessary step to economic growth, especially in the early and middle stages of development. In Japan and Hong Kong, however, TFP growth became the dominant driver in this period.

Figure 41 places our estimates among those of OECD (2020a) for 17 other OECD countries, to give readers a wider perspective for the two periods 2000–2010 and 2010–2018. For harmonized comparison with OECD’s TFP estimates, our estimates are measured excluding the impacts of land capital and labor quality changes, only in Figures 41 and 42.²⁸ Though growing at a more subdued pace, the contribution made by TFP in the slower-growing, mature economies should not be underestimated. Figure 42 plots per capita GDP levels in 2018 and the TFP contribution shares in the period 2010–2018, for the 25 Asian

28: The multi-factor productivity in the OECD Productivity Database (OECD, 2020a), referred to as TFP in this report, defines total input as the weighted average of the growth rates of total hours worked and capital services. Although our estimates are adjusted to be comparable with them, two differences in assumptions remain. First, capital services of residential buildings are included in our estimates of capital input in order to be consistent with output that includes the imputed cost of owner-occupied housing. Second, the compensation of capital is defined in our estimates as the residual of the value added and the compensation of labor (compensations for employees, self-employed persons, and contributing family workers), whereas the OECD defines it as the imputed value of capital services based on the assumptions of an ex-ante rate of returns on capital. Thus, although both apply the same Törnqvist index, the weights to aggregate labor and capital can differ. Other than these, our methodology and assumptions in measuring capital services are designed to be largely consistent with the OECD methodology; and the impact of the differences in assumptions on the volume estimates of capital services is judged to be limited.




Figure 38 TFP Index in the Long Run
—Index of total factor productivity in 1970–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

countries (as dots) with comparison of OECD countries (as white circles). There are no significant differences in the roles of TFP contribution to economic growth between the mature OECD economies and the middle-income Asian countries.




Figure 39 Sources of Economic Growth

—Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP and contributions of labor, capital, and TFP in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 40 Contribution Shares of Economic Growth

—Average contribution shares of labor, capital, and TFP in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 41 Comparison of Sources of Economic Growth with OECD Countries
 —Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP and contributions of labor, capital, and TFP in 2000–2010 and 2010–2018

Sources: APO Productivity Database 2020 for the Asia25 economies and the US. OECD Stat (Dataset: Multi-Factor Productivity) and OECD (2020a) for OECD countries (except Japan, Korea, and the US).
 Note: The impacts of labor quality changes are included in TFP; land stock is not included in capital inputs. The ending years for Ireland and Portugal are 2014 and 2017, respectively.




Figure 42 Comparison of TFP Contribution Shares with OECD Countries
 —Average contribution share of TFP in economic growth in 2010–2018

Sources: APO Productivity Database 2020 for the Asia25 economies and the US. OECD Stat (Dataset: Multi-Factor Productivity) and OECD (2020a) for OECD countries (except Japan, Korea, and the US). Note: The impacts of labor quality changes are included in TFP; land stock is not included in capital inputs. The ending years for Ireland and Portugal are 2014 and 2017, respectively.

Tracking the size and growth of IT capital has become a standard practice in productivity research, following attempts to establish the driving force behind productivity resurgence in developed economies. This started with the US in the 1990s. Unlike technological advancements in the past, which were largely confined to manufacturing, IT is a technology that can permeate the economy and bring about significant production gains in, for example, wholesale and retail, banking and finance, and transportation and telecommunications (service sectors that have traditionally struggled with slow productivity growth). Given the share of the service sector in the economy (Table 22 in Appendix 10, p. 183), the potential and implications for economic development and productivity gains therefore could be immense. A frequent question asked by policymakers and researchers is how best to capitalize on the productivity potential invited by the digital transformation. As with non-IT capital, it involves a process of accumulation and assimilation. IT capability becomes a factor which determines an economy’s long-term growth prospects.²⁹

Japan has been leading Asian countries in terms of IT capital contribution to economic growth. Japan’s shift in capital allocation took off in earnest in the mid-1990s with the contribution of IT capital to capital input growth rising from a low of 16% in 1993, to a high of over 40% in the late 1990s, as shown in Figure 43. This was a period when Japan’s overall investment growth slowed significantly after the economic collapse of the early 1990s. After years of excesses, Japan shifted away from non-IT to IT capital as a profitable investment. In contrast, the US started its shift toward IT capital much earlier than

29: The 2008 SNA formally acknowledges the IT sector’s importance to the modern economy and has made it more identifiable and separable in industry classification and asset type.




Figure 43 IT Capital Contribution Shares in Japan and the US
—IT capital contribution shares in annual growth rate of capital input in 1970–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

any Asian economy and over a longer period. Since 1981, IT capital has accounted for over 25% of US capital input growth, reaching a height of over 40% in the late-1990s and the late-2000s.³⁰

A similar allocation shift to IT capital is also found in the Asian Tigers (Figure 44).³¹ In the Asian Tigers, the contribution share of IT capital to total capital input peaked at about 30% at the turn of the millennium, from a share of 10% or below before 1995. China was a late-comer in terms of investing in IT capital with a surge in its contributions only taking off around 2000 and peaking at 18% in the early 2000s. There has not been as big a drive in IT pickups in India as in other Asian countries.




Figure 44 IT Capital Contribution Share in the Asian Tigers, China, and India
—IT capital contribution shares in annual growth rate of capital input in 1970–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

30: In recent years, the slowdown in total capital growth has concentrated more on non-IT capital, resulting in spikes in the contribution of IT capital in Japan and the US.

31: The quality of the data on investment for IT capital (IT hardware, communications equipment, and computer software) varies considerably among countries. See Appendix 3.

5.4 Sources of Labor Productivity Growth

Although TFP more accurately measures how efficiently an economy utilizes its factor inputs, labor productivity and its drivers are of interest because of the close link to GDP per capita. Within the same growth accounting framework, average per-hour labor productivity growth at the aggregate level can be broken down into effects of capital deepening (as measured by capital input per hour worked), which reflects the capital-labor substitution, labor quality changes (as measured by quality-adjusted labor input per hour worked), and TFP. In other words, these factors are key in fostering labor productivity.

Capital deepening existed in 2015–2018 – albeit to various degrees – in almost all of the countries compared (except Japan and Mongolia), as presented in Figure 45. In the Asia25, the speeds of capital deepening were stable at 5–6% per year in the 2000s. Experience of countries suggests that capital deepening is an accompanying process of rapid economic development. The relatively early starters (Japan and the Asian Tigers) underwent more rapid capital deepening than the other countries compared; and in the earlier, rather than the latter, period. The reverse is true for the emerging Asian economies, where concerted efforts were made to increase capital intensity in the latter period. China, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Vietnam, India, and Bangladesh moved up to occupy the top spots in 2015–2018.




Figure 45 Capital Deepening

—Average annual growth rate of capital input per hour worked in 2015–2018, 2010–2015, and 2005–2010

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 46 Capital Productivity Growth

—Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP per capital input in 2015–2018, 2010–2015, and 2005–2010

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

While labor productivity steadily improved for all countries as shown in Figure 32 in Section 5.2 (p. 49), the growth rate of capital productivity (as the other measure of partial productivity) remained negative for many countries regardless of the observation periods, shown in Figure 46. Although rates of capital deepening in China and Myanmar were outstanding, at 8.9% and 8.5% per year, on average in 2015–2018, their capital productivity experienced the sharpest decline of 3.4% and 4.3% per year, respectively.

Labor productivity growth can be decomposed into contributions from capital deepening, labor quality, and TFP growth. Capital deepening should raise labor productivity, all other things being equal. According to our findings for the period 2010–2018 (Figures 47 and 48), it remains the prime engine of labor productivity growth, explaining 58% (56% for non-IT and 2% for IT capital) in the Asia25. The contribution of improvement in labor quality is more moderate at 10% in the Asia25, than 32% of the TFP contribution. However, the role of labor quality changes is more significant in emerging Asian countries. In the ASEAN with almost zero growth of regional TFP in 2010–2018, the contribution of labor quality was the prime engine contributing 58% of the regional improvement in labor productivity. In South Asia, the TFP growth explains 32% of labor productivity improvement, which is larger than the contribution of labor quality change (24%).




Figure 47 Sources of Labor Productivity Growth
—Decompositions of average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP per hour in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 48 Contribution Shares of Labor Productivity Growth
—Contribution shares of capital deepening, labor quality, and TFP in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: The countries with a negative growth of labor productivity are excluded.

5.5 Energy Productivity

In the Asia31, to produce 44% of the world output in 2017, 45% of world energy was consumed and 52% of world CO₂ was emitted (Figure 49), compared to 17%, 12%, and 10% in the EU28. This implies that Asia has lower energy productivity (defined as a ratio of output per energy consumption) and higher carbon intensity of energy at the aggregate level, compared to the EU28. It is vital to improve energy productivity and carbon intensity in the growing economies of Asia in order to reduce CO₂ emissions in the world in the long run.




Figure 49 Asia in World Energy Consumption and CO₂ Emission
—Share of final energy consumption and CO₂ emission in 2017

Sources: IEA, *CO₂ Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2019*; IEA, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2019*; IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2019*.

There is considerable diversity in energy productivity among countries. Figure 50 compares energy productivity trends of Japan, China, the Asia31, and the EU15 in 1970–2017, relative to the US. Although Japan's energy productivity level is constantly higher in the entire period of our observation, it is almost equivalent to the EU15 from the late 2000s. The level of Chinese energy productivity was only 25% of that of the US in 1970. However, China succeeded to improve energy productivity along with the economic growth since the 1990s, closing the gap with the US to 32% in 2017.

The energy productivity measure reflects not only the difference in energy efficiencies of industries and households, but also the difference in industry and production structure of the economy. Thus, the energy productivity at the




Figure 50 Energy Productivity of Japan, China, and the EU, Relative to the US
—Index of GDP at constant market prices, using 2017 PPP, per energy consumption in 1970–2017

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; IEA, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2019*; IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2019*.

aggregate level is highly dependent on the development stage of the economy. Figure 51 places countries on the two partial productivity indicators of labor and energy, measured in 2017. Less-developed countries with lower labor productivity (such as the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) tend to have higher energy productivity. One of the effective strategies to improve labor productivity in such countries is to expand the manufacturing sector. This frequently follows the deterioration in energy productivity. As a next stage of economic growth, well-developed countries will be able to pay more attention to improving energy productivity by abolishing implicit or explicit subsidies on energy prices, especially in electricity prices, and levying heavier taxes on energy consumptions. The C-shape dynamics found between labor and energy productivities corresponds to the so-called Environmental Kuznets curve, as an inversed U-shape relationship between environmental quality (at the y-axis) and economic development (at the x-axis).

Figure 52 decomposes the sources of CO2 emission growth (from fuel combustion) in the Asian countries during 2000–2017, based on the so-called Kaya identity. The growth in CO2 emissions is decomposed to three components: changes in real GDP; carbon intensity of energy; and energy intensity of GDP (the inverse of energy productivity). In many countries, the production expansion (real GDP growth) is the most significant factor to explain the growth of CO2 emissions. With the exception of Singapore, energy productivity has improved in many Asian countries in this period. However, these improvements are not enough to offset an expansion of energy consumption in all Asian countries except Japan.

On the other hand, in many Asian economies, the carbon intensity of energy has increased, mainly due to an expansion of coal consumption. Japan achieved some improvement in energy efficiency in this period,




Figure 51 Labor Productivity and Energy Productivity
 —Per-hour labor productivity level and energy productivity level in 2017

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; IEA, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2019*; IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2019*; APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 52 Sources of CO2 Emission Growth

—Average annual growth rate of CO2 emission in 2000–2017

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; IEA, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries 2019*; IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2019*; IEA, *CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2019*.

but the carbon intensity of energy had to be increased due to a very low operation rate of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011.³² Singapore realized a significant improvement in carbon intensity of energy by the shift from oil to LNG in electricity power generation.³³ This helped offset the increases in CO2 emission accompanied by strong economic growth, regardless of deterioration in energy productivity. In this period, a decoupling in the growth of GDP and CO2 emission is apparent in a few developed countries, especially in the EU. However, this may be due mainly to the shift in energy-consuming production to the Asian countries, in which more energy was required, and more CO2 was emitted to produce the same output.

32: According to the FEPC (The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan), the rate of utilized capacity of nuclear power plants was 67% in the fiscal year 2010 (the share of nuclear in power generation was 29%), but after the disaster, 24% in 2011, 3.9% in 2012, 2.3% in 2013, 0.0% in 2014.

33: In Singapore, the share of natural gas in electricity power generation reached 95% in 2014 from 19% in 2000, compared to the decrease in the share of oil in power generation from 80% in 2000 to 0.7% in 2014 (IEA, *Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 2019*).

Box 4 An Alternative Path to a Fully Developed Economy?

The Databook presents the decomposition of capital stock, which includes the stock of IT and R&D capital. Figure B4 shows these stocks relative to GDP in 2018. R&D capital is regarded as the basis of scientific knowledge and crucial inputs for innovation. As shown in Figure B4, the ratio of R&D capital to GDP is particularly high in Korea, Japan, the ROC, and the US, followed by Singapore and China. Surprising are extremely low ratios of R&D capital to GDP in other Asian economies, which indicates that little intentional effort for innovation is made in other parts of Asia. There exists a big gap between economies that have reached the high-income level and those that have not. Our traditional understanding is that innovation capability backed by R&D capital in a well-organized national innovation system is essential for stepping up from upper middle-income to fully developed economies.

However, our IT capital data may be suggesting a different view. The IT capital here consists of IT hardware such as computers, communications equipment such as TVs, radios, and cellular phones, and computer software. The stock of this IT capital relative to GDP is much larger than that of R&D capital in most of the developing countries. The gap between developed and developing countries is much smaller. In Singapore and Thailand, the ratios are even higher than any other countries in the figure. In the case of Thailand, we actually observe an overtime shift in weights from communications equipment to IT hardware.




Figure B4 Stock of IT and R&D Capital, relative to GDP in 2018
 —Ratios of end-of-year capital stocks of IT and R&D to the basic-price GDP in 2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

The current developing countries are not conducting cutting-edge innovation at the technological frontier but are proactively engaged in the application of new technologies even though such activities are not counted as R&D investment. Although it may not yet be properly counted in GDP, the proliferation of new services is astounding, which includes social media, e-commerce, matching, service outsourcing, e-payment, fintech, and e-government. New technologies are also rejuvenating old industries such as agriculture, cottage industry, transportation, and tourism. These suggest that heavy R&D, and perhaps manufacturing-centric development, may not be the only way to step up to fully developed economies from now on.

Box 5 How Sensitive Are TFP Estimates to Assumptions?

TFP computations, based on the growth accounting framework, depend on data that is often difficult to observe. One difficulty is calculating the compensation for the self-employed and unpaid family workers. Appendix 6 presents the assumption on measuring the labor compensation for total employment in the Asia QALI Database 2020. The future review on this assumption affects TFP estimates directly through the revision of factor income shares, and indirectly through the estimates of the ex-post rate of return, and thus the aggregate measure of capital services (Appendix 5).




Figure B5.1 Labor Income Share for Employees in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; Asia QALI Database 2020.

The right panel of Figure B5.1 presents the labor income share (the ratio of compensation of employees to the basic-price GDP) based on the official national accounts (including author adjustments in basic-price GDP for some countries) in the Asia25 economies and the US in 2018. The left panel of the figure illustrates the




Figure B5.2 Sensitivity of TFP Estimates by the Change of Labor Share
—Average annual growth rates of total factor productivity in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

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employee share to total employment. There is a significant divergence in labor income share for employees among the Asian countries. This does not necessarily reflect differences in the number of employees in total employment. Although Malaysia and Turkey have a high employee share of 74% and 73%, the labor income share is only 35% and 34% in 2018, respectively.

Figure B5.2 illustrates the sensitivity of TFP estimates by changing the factor income share during the period from 2010 to 2018. In general, the growth rate of capital input is higher than that of labor input, therefore the higher income share of labor results in higher estimates of TFP growth. In other words, labor productivity (Figure 32 in Section 5.2) is improved much faster over a given period than capital productivity (Figure 46 in Section 5.4), the growth of which frequently tends to be negative. The TFP estimate reflects the improvement of labor productivity more when the labor share increases. In Vietnam, with TFP growth of 1.6% on average during the period 2010–2018, the true estimate could be 2.1% if the current labor share were underestimated by 10%.

6 Industry Perspective

Highlights

- While Asian countries are diversifying away from agriculture, the sector still dominates employment, accounting for 31% of total employment in 2018 in the Asia25, down from 61% in 1980. Its share in total value added decreased more moderately, from 17% to 9% over the same period. Shifting out of agriculture into more efficient sectors will boost economy-wide productivity (Figure 60 and Table 22).
- Manufacturing is a significant sector, accounting for over 20% of total value added in nine Asian countries in 2018 (Table 22). It is particularly prominent at 29% in China, where 2.7% of TFP growth was measured in 2015–2018 (Figure 37). Manufacturing is dominated by machinery and equipment in most Asian economies, while Bangladesh and Cambodia concentrate on light manufacturing, such as textiles and the food industry (Figures 55 and 67).
- In labor productivity growth by region, contribution of the manufacturing sector is significant at 34% in East Asia in 2010–2018, but still moderate in CLMV at 18% and South Asia at 12% (Figure 69). In South Asia, 62% of the labor productivity growth is explained by improvement in the service sector, compared to 29% in East Asia and 33% in CLMV (Figure 70).

Industry decomposition gives insight into the source of a country's economic dynamics which, in turn, determines its overall performance and characteristics, its strengths, and its vulnerabilities. On one hand, a broad industry base reflects diversification and sophistication in the economy, and in turn is more resourceful in weathering economic shocks. On the other hand, reliance on a narrow industry base leaves an economy more vulnerable to shocks and more susceptible to volatility. The different composition of economic activities among countries is also one of the main sources of the huge gap in average labor productivity at the aggregate level. By analyzing the industry structure of the Asian economies, one can clearly trace the path of economic development and identify countries' respective stages based on their characteristics.³⁴

6.1 Output and Employment

Table 1 in Section 3.2 (p. 28) introduced a country grouping according to stages of development from the point of the view of long-run economic growth from 1970 (as measured by per capita GDP relative to the US). Table 2 regroups countries based on the same set of criteria as in Table 1, but applies it to 2018 income levels and focuses on more recent catch up to the US from 2010.

Countries at the lower rungs of the development ladder tend to have a greater agriculture sector as a share of value added.³⁵ Figure 53 shows the industry composition of the Asian economies and regions in 2018,³⁶ and indicates a broad, negative correlation between the share of the agriculture sector and the relative per

34: Constructing the industry origins of labor productivity growth requires confronting a large volume of data from different sources. Issues of data inconsistency arising from fragmentation of national statistical frameworks can present enormous hurdles to researchers in this field. The industry data in this chapter is mainly based on official national accounts. Where back data is not available, series are spliced together using different benchmarks and growth rates. Data inconsistencies in terms of concepts, coverage, and data sources have not been fully treated although levels of breakdown are deliberately chosen to minimize the potential impact of these data inconsistencies. Readers should bear these caveats in mind in interpreting the results.

Table 2 Country Groups Based on the Current Economic Level and the Pace of Catching Up
—Level and average annual growth rate of per capita GDP at constant market prices, using 2017 PPP

Per capita GDP level in 2018, relative to the US	Average annual rate of catch-up to the US during 2010–2018					
	(C6) <-1%	(C5) -1% ≤ -< 0%	(C4) 0% ≤ -< 1%	(C3) 1% ≤ -< 2%	(C2) 2% ≤ -< 3%	(C1) 3% ≤
(D1) 100% ≤	Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar		UAE	Singapore		
(D2) 70% ≤ - < 100%		Australia, Bahrain, EU15, EU28, Saudi Arabia	Hong Kong	ROC		
(D3) 40% ≤ - < 70%	Oman	Japan	Korea	Malaysia		Turkey
(D4) 20% ≤ - < 40%	Iran			Fiji, Thailand		China
(D5) 10% ≤ - < 20%				Lao PDR	Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka	Bhutan, Mongolia, Vietnam
(D6) < 10%			Pakistan		Cambodia, Nepal	Bangladesh, India, Myanmar

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: The annual catch-up rates in column are based on the estimates in 2010–2018.

capita GDP against the US.³⁷ The changes in industry shares of value added are presented in Table 22 in Appendix 10 (p. 183).

To foster productivity in less-developed countries, it is important to adopt existing technologies from the advanced economies. In this view of assimilation, manufacturing is a key sector in driving countries to make a leap in economic development. It accounts for 20% more of total value added in nine of the Asian countries compared in Figure 53. Figure 54 compares our estimates of TFP growth during 2010–2018 and the shares of manufacturing in 2018. A positive correlation between them, which was observed in the past decades, is less clear in the 2010s. Regardless of larger share of manufacturing, TFP growth is stagnated in Korea and Thailand.

Figure 55 shows the breakdown of the manufacturing sector, comprising nine sub-industries, for 17 selected Asian countries and the US in 2018.³⁸ Countries are sorted based on the size of the share of

35: In Chapter 5, GDP is adjusted to be valued at basic prices (if the official estimates at basic prices are not available, they are our estimates). However, the definition of GDP by industry differs among countries in this chapter due to data availability. The industry-level GDP is valued at factor cost for Fiji and Pakistan; at basic prices for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Korea, the Lao PDR, Mongolia, Nepal, Singapore and Vietnam; at producers' prices for Iran, the ROC and the Philippines; and at market prices for Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.

36: The nine industries are 1–agriculture; 2–mining; 3–manufacturing; 4–electricity, gas, and water supply; 5–construction; 6–wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; 7–transport, storage, and communications; 8–finance, real estate, and business activities; and 9–community, social, and personal services. Cambodia, Iran, and Nepal use the International Standard Industry Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) Rev.3. Other Asian economies already have switched to the ISIC Rev.4. See Appendix 10 in Databook 2018 for the concordances between the industry classification used in the Databook and the ISIC Rev.3 and Rev.4.

37: The regional averages as industry share of value added are based on a country's industry GDP, using the PPPs for GDP for the whole economy without consideration of the differences in relative prices of industry GDP among countries.

38: Manufacturing consists of nine sub-industries: 3.1–food products, beverages, and tobacco products; 3.2–textiles, wearing apparel, and leather products; 3.3–wood and wood products; 3.4–paper, paper products, printing, and publishing; 3.5–coke, refined petroleum products, chemicals, rubber, and plastic products; 3.6–other non-metallic mineral products; 3.7–basic metals; 3.8–machinery and equipment; and 3.9–other manufacturing.




Figure 53 Industry Shares of Value Added
—Shares of industry GDP in aggregate GDP at current prices in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

machinery and equipment in manufacturing GDP. The dominance of machinery and equipment in Asian manufacturing is apparent. At the other end are countries dominated by light manufacturing; e.g., the food products, beverages, and tobacco products sector.

Figure 56 shows how the share of the agriculture industry in total value added dropped over time in the Asian economies with per capita GDP lower than 40% of the US level in 2018. This could reflect the actual decline in agricultural output and/or the relatively rapid expansion in other sectors. Despite the broad spread, the downward trend is unmistakable. The share of the agriculture sector displays a long-term declining trend in all countries, albeit at different paces and at different starting times.

Despite the relative decline of agriculture's share in total value added, employment in the sector for Asia still accounted for 31% of total employment in 2018. Figure 57 shows industry shares in total employment by country and region, ranking them by size of employment in the agriculture sector.




Figure 54 Manufacturing GDP Share and TFP Growth
 —GDP share of manufacturing in 2018 and average annual TFP growth rate in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; APO Productivity Database 2020.
 Note: Countries with negative TFP growth are excluded.




Figure 55 Industry Shares of Value Added in Manufacturing
 —Shares of sub-industry GDP in aggregate GDP at current prices in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 56 Trend of Value-added Share in Agriculture

—Share of agriculture sector GDP in aggregate GDP at current prices in 1970–2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: Countries are grouped according to the levels of per capita income in 2018, relative to the US, defined in Table 2 (p. 70).

Figure 58 traces the historical trajectory of Japan's employment share of agriculture for the period 1885–2018 and the countries' levels in 2018, mapped against Japan's experience (as circles). Large shares of agriculture employment – over 30% in 9 countries – correspond to Japan's level at the end of the 1950s and the onset of high economic growth. This may indicate room for improving labor productivity and per capita income, if more productive industries are developed and jobs are created.

The trend of employment share over time (Figure 59) suggests that the relative decline in the share of agriculture in total value added has been accompanied by a downward trend in its share in total employment.³⁹ This trend is unmistakable in most of the countries plotted in Figure 59.⁴⁰ Between 1970 and 2018, the employment share in agriculture dropped from 81% to 25% in China and from 77% to 32% in Thailand.

Comparisons of the value-added and employment shares reveal some interesting facts. Agriculture is the only industry sector that consistently has a disproportionately higher employment share than justified by its share in value added across all economies in Asia, except Fiji. This suggests that agriculture is still highly labor-intensive and/or there may be a high level of underemployment in the sector, both of which imply that the labor productivity level is low compared to other industry sectors.⁴¹ Thus, countries with a sizeable agriculture sector often have low per capita GDP. In these cases, shifting out of agriculture will

39: Nepal's employment-by-industry figures are constructed by interpolating benchmark data taken from its labor force survey, as well as its population census. Figure 59 indicates that its share of agriculture has increased since 2001. This reflects the employment share of agriculture at 61% in the population census of 2001 and its share of 70% in the labor force survey of 2008.

40: However, the decline in a share does not always reflect an actual fall in employment for the agriculture sector; rather, it could reflect total employment rising faster than employment in agriculture. Countries that have been experiencing a consistent fall in actual employment in the agriculture sector are, for example, the ROC, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea, whereas in Cambodia, India, Iran, Nepal, and Pakistan, actual employment has been rising. Other countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam have no established trend in employment growth. China, however, has seen actual employment in agriculture falling since the turn of the millennium.

41: Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2004) and Caselli (2005) demonstrate the negative correlation between employment share of agriculture and GDP per worker. They show that the agriculture sector was relatively large in less well-off countries and agricultural labor productivity was lower than that in other sectors.




Figure 57 Industry Shares of Employment
—Shares of number of employment by industry in 2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments.

help boost economy-wide labor productivity. The US is an exception, where its agricultural value-added share and employment share are similar at 1%, as shown in Figure 60; suggesting that labor productivity in this sector is higher than that experienced in Asian countries.⁴² The reverse is true for the sector of finance, real estate, and business activities, which often generate a much greater value-added share than suggested by its employment share. In 2018, the sector accounted for 33% of total value added generated by 21% of employment in the US, and 15% and 3% in the Asia25, respectively (see Figures 53 and 57).

When the number of underemployed workers (known as labor surplus) in each country is estimated, based on the simple assumption that the employment share is equivalent to the value-added share of agriculture in the status of zero labor surplus,⁴³ the number of labor surplus reaches 378 million persons for

42: Jorgenson, Nomura, and Samuels (2016) indicates agriculture sector is one of the industries, which realized a high TFP growth constantly in the US (1.0% on average per year in 1970–2012), compared to its stagnation in Japan’s agriculture (–0.1%), reflecting differences in the scale of individual production units, as well as massive public investments (including research and development) in new agricultural technology in the US.

43: In this calculation the mining sector is excluded in the totals in both of employment and value added.




Figure 58 Historical Employment Share of Agriculture in Japan and Current Level of Asia

—Shares of number of employment in agriculture for Japan in 1885–2018 and for Asian countries in 2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments. The sources of historical data of Japan are Ohkawa, Takamatsu, and Yamamoto (1974) during 1885–1954 and population censuses since 1920.




Figure 59 Trends of Employment Share in Agriculture
 —Share of number of employment in agriculture in 1970–2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments.
 Note: Countries are grouped according to the levels of per capita income in 2018, relative to the US, defined in Table 2 (p. 70).



Figure 60 Value Added and Employment Shares of Agriculture
—Shares of industry GDP in aggregate GDP at current prices and number of employment in 2018

Sources: Official national accounts, population census and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments.

the Asia25 in 2018. Figure 61 presents the country contributions and regional totals (right chart) of the estimated labor surplus.

It is the manufacturing sector that largely absorbs workers who have been displaced from the agriculture sector, especially in the initial stages of economic development. Figure 62 traces the trajectory of growth rates of GDP and employment in combination with manufacturing for Asian countries and the US over the past five decades. Each dot represents the average annual growth rate in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The growth rate in the 2010s (2010–2018) is illustrated by an arrow. If manufacturing GDP and employment grow at the same rate, a dot will be on a 45-degree line through the origin running from the




Figure 61 Labor Surplus
—Number and ratio of labor surplus in 2018

Sources: Our estimates.

lower left to upper right quadrants. In Japan, despite positive gains in manufacturing GDP, the overall growth in manufacturing employment was negative – except during the 1980s.

In Korea and the ROC, expansion of manufacturing output could allow for increases of employment in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 62.1). However, since the 1990s manufacturing has not been an absorption sector of employment, regardless of the sound expansion of production in this sector. The experiences of Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand are closer to the 45-degree line through the origin, which implies well-balanced growth of output and employment in the manufacturing sector. The job creation role of manufacturing has remained in these countries, but it is diminishing rapidly (Figure 62.3).




Figure 62.1: East Asia




Figure 62.2: South Asia




Figure 62.3: ASEAN6




Figure 62.4: CLMV and Other Asian

Figure 62 Job Creation in Manufacturing

— Average annual growth rates of constant-price GDP and number of employment in 1970–2018

Sources: Population census and labor force survey and official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: Each dot represents the average annual growth rate in manufacturing (mnf) in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. The arrows indicate the rate in the 2010s (2010–2018).

6.2 Industry Growth

Industry origins of economic growth by country and region for the period 2010–2018 are shown in Figure 63. China and India have been the two main drivers among the Asian economies, accounting for 44% and 22% during 2015–2018, respectively, as shown in Figure 7 in Section 3.1 (p. 25). However, looking at the industry composition, the origins of economic growth in China and India are quite different. China’s economic growth has been fueled by industry sector expansion; whereas India’s economic growth has been




Figure 63 Industry Origins of Economic Growth
—Industry decomposition of average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

led by service sector expansion. This also indicates that the nature of growth in China may have started shifting more toward services in recent years.

Figure 64 contrasts industry contributions to economic growth among regions.⁴⁴ Even within such a short period, one can see that the industry structure of growth is changing. The first striking feature is the dominance of manufacturing in Asian countries. Between 2010 and 2018, its contribution to economic growth in the Asia25 was 27% compared to 8% in the US. This, however, masks a divergence within Asia. In the earlier period, manufacturing accounted for 33% of growth in East Asia but 16% in South Asia, although the differential is narrowing somewhat.

In 2010–2018, manufacturing has sustained its significance in ROC, China, and Korea, contributing 52%, 34%, and 30% to economic growth, respectively, as shown in Figure 65.⁴⁵ Its contribution is modest in Singapore at 17%. In Hong Kong, it has been a drag on economic growth in the past decade or so.

The service sector plays an equal, if not more important, role in Asian economic growth. Services made the substantial contribution to economic growth in all Asian countries (Figure 66). The story behind India's recent growth has been one of services. Modern information and communication technology have allowed India to take an unusual path in its economic development, bypassing a stage when manufacturing steers growth. Within the service sector, contribution is quite evenly spread among the sub-sectors, more recently the iron/steel and motor vehicle sectors have been intensively developed. For further improvement in per capita GDP and to capitalize on the demographic dividend (see Box 2), expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing may be required in India for greater job creation.

Economic growth in the Asian Tigers was also dominated by the service sector, albeit more so in Hong Kong and Singapore than in the ROC and Korea, where manufacturing remained a significant force. The service sector accounted for 47% of growth in the ROC for the period 2010–2018, 65% in Korea, 80% in




Figure 64 Industry Origins of Regional Economic Growth

—Contribution shares of industry GDP growth in aggregate GDP by region in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

44: Asian averages are calculated using the Törnqvist index to aggregate the growth rates of industry GDP of each country based on the two-period average of each country's shares of industry GDP to the gross regional products as weights.

45: The Törnqvist quantity index is adopted for calculating the growth of real GDP. Using this index, the growth of real GDP into the products of contributions by industries can be decomposed:

$$\frac{\ln(GDP^t/GDP^{t-1})}{\text{Real GDP growth}} = \sum_j (1/2) (s_j^t + s_j^{t-1}) \ln(Q_j^t/Q_j^{t-1}) \quad \text{where } Q_j^t \text{ is real GDP of an industry } j \text{ in period } t \text{ and } s_j^t \text{ is the nominal GDP share of an industry } j \text{ in period } t.$$




Figure 65 Contribution of Manufacturing to Economic Growth
—Average annual contributions and contribution shares in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 66 Contribution of Service Sector to Economic Growth
—Average annual contributions and contribution shares in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Singapore, and 92% in Hong Kong, counterbalancing zero contribution by manufacturing (Figures 65 and 66).

For some Asian countries, agriculture is still the principal sector. The five countries in which the agriculture sector has the largest share in total value added are Nepal, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Lao PDR, and Bhutan, as shown in Figure 53. For the period 2010–2018, agriculture in Nepal had the highest contribution to economic growth among all Asian countries, accounting for 21% of growth (Figure 63). Figure 67 illustrates the sub-industry origins of average annual growth of manufacturing GDP for selected Asian countries in 2010–2018.⁴⁶ Manufacturing in Asia has been dominated by 3-8 (machinery and equipment), but the expansion of 3-2 (textiles, wearing apparel, and leather products) has a significant impact in Bangladesh and Cambodia.

46: The Törnqvist quantity index is adopted for calculating the growth of real GDP of manufacturing. Using this index, the growth of real GDP of manufacturing into the products of contributions by sub-industries of manufacturing can be decomposed:

$$\ln(GDP^t/GDP^{t-1}) = \sum_j (1/2) (s_j^t + s_j^{t-1}) \ln(Q_j^t/Q_j^{t-1})$$

Real GDP growth of manufacturing = Contribution of a sub-industry *j*
nominal GDP share of a sub-industry *j* in period *t*.




Figure 67 Industry Origins of Output Growth in Manufacturing
—Sub-industry contributions in average annual growth rate of constant-price manufacturing GDP in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

6.3 Labor Productivity by Industry

This section analyzes the industry sources of labor productivity growth in Asia.⁴⁷ Figure 68 shows the industry origins of average labor productivity growth per year in 2010–2018.⁴⁸ Positive labor productivity growth was achieved across all sectors for the Asia25. If one focuses on the regional economy, the findings highlight the fact that service industries no longer hamper an economy's productivity performance but are

47: The data presented in this chapter is subject to greater uncertainty than those in previous chapters and the quality across countries is also more varied. Employment data of the less developed countries often lacks frequency as well as industry details. Neither does the industry classification of employment data necessarily correspond to those of industry output data. Consequently, the quality of labor productivity estimates at the industry level is compromised. Furthermore, estimates of the manufacturing sector should be of better quality than those of the service sector as many countries have occasional manufacturing censuses, but do not have a similar census covering the service sector.

48: Not all Asian countries are included, as employment by industry sector is not available for some countries. Labor productivity growth in Table 24 is defined simply as per-worker GDP at constant prices by industry (v_i). The industry decomposition of labor productivity growth for the whole economy (v) in Figure 68 (industry contribution in Table 24) is based on the equation $v = \sum_j \bar{w}_j v_j^*$ where the weight is the two-period average of value-added shares. In this decomposition, the number of workers as a denominator of labor productivity (v_j^*) is adjusted, weighting the reciprocal of the ratio of real per-worker GDP by industry to its industry average. Thus, the industry contribution ($\bar{w}_j v_j^*$) is emphasized more in industries in which the per-worker GDP is higher than the industry average, in comparison with the impact ($\bar{w}_j v_j$) of using the non-adjusted measure of labor productivity.




Figure 68 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth
 —Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP per worker and industry contributions in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

as capable as manufacturing in achieving productivity growth. In fact, there are no significant differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in the Asia25; i.e., manufacturing (at 4.5% on average per year), agriculture (5.4%), construction (5.0%), electricity (4.3%), and transport, storage, and communications (3.5%), as provided in Table 24 in Appendix 10 (p. 185).

The manufacturing sector has been a major driving force behind productivity growth in most Asian countries, as shown in Figure 69. Contributions from manufacturing were 98% in Japan, 71% in the ROC, and




Figure 69 Contribution of Manufacturing to Labor Productivity Growth

—Average contribution of manufacturing in growth of constant-price GDP per worker in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.




Figure 70 Contribution of Service Sector to Labor Productivity Growth

—Average contribution of service sector in growth of constant-price GDP per worker in 2010–2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

41% in Korea in 2010–2018. In CLMV and South Asia, the contribution of manufacturing in their improvement in regional labor productivity is still moderate at 18% and 12%, respectively in the same period.

Traditionally, it has been difficult for the service sector to realize productivity growth, but modern advancements in information and communication technology have changed this. Many IT-intensive users are in this sector, which is capable of capturing the productivity benefits arising from IT utilization (see Box 4). The growing importance of these services is observed when explaining the productivity growth in Western economies of recent decades. In Asia, the contribution from services matches that of manufacturing. Among the four industries in the service sector, three are potentially IT-employed industries: wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; transport, storage, and communications; and finance, real estate, and business activities.

Figure 70 presents the contribution of services in labor productivity growth by country in 2010–2018. Services were contributing at least one-third or more to labor productivity growth in most Asian countries. By region, contribution of services in labor productivity improvement is significant at 62% in South Asia, compared to 29% in East Asia and 33% in CLMV. The contribution was predominant in Hong Kong, Pakistan, Fiji, and Nepal.

Box 6 Premature Deindustrialization

Deindustrialization, or the shrinkage of the manufacturing sector, has been a major concern in advanced economies for reasons Rodrik (2016) calls “premature deindustrialization.” He claims that many developing economies in recent periods are starting lose their share of the manufacturing sector without experiencing full industrialization. Premature deindustrialization may harm developing economies during their economic development because manufacturing is a dynamic sector, typically at the center of sustained economic growth and technological progress (Figure 54). The sector also has created massive jobs for relatively poor people (Figure 62). Additionally, it generates flows of labor from rural to urban, and from informal to formal sectors, as well as nurturing human capital. Early servicification of the economy without a mature manufacturing sector may jeopardize a smooth transition from developing to developed economies.

Rodrik points out that premature deindustrialization is serious particularly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. How about in Asia? Figure B6.1 plots GDP shares of the manufacturing sector in Asian economies, placing the peak of each country’s inverse U shape at the center. A typical image of the up and down is drawn by the US and Japan with peaks above 30% in 1946 and 1970 respectively. The peaks in manufacturing GDP are faster than those in manufacturing employment shares, which are 1970 in the US and 1976 in Japan. China, the ROC, and Korea also reached their peaks above 30% in 1978, 1986, and 2011, respectively, and




Figure B6.1 Country Peaks in Manufacturing GDP Share
—GDP share of manufacturing in 1970–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; APO Productivity Database 2020.
Note: The lines present the trends based on the three-year moving averages.

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remain high. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand show a similar pattern with the peaks in 2000, 2004, and 2010, respectively.

The Philippines somehow reached its peak in 1973 and recently holds around 20%. Indonesia is also just above 20%. Although these are respectable figures, more room for industrialization may be possible. Cambodia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Vietnam are struggling below 20%. Obviously, these countries are not fully industrialized yet, needing further effort to promote the sector.

On the other hand, the IMF (2018, Chapter 3) suggests that service sectors can potentially drive economy-wide productivity growth; and the decline in manufacturing jobs has contributed little to the rise in labor income inequality in advanced economies. Figure B6.2 indicates that less and middle-income Asian countries, with low and stagnated shares of manufacturing GDP, seemingly improved their per capita income level. However, it is quite uncertain if these countries will continue to grow by skipping the intermediate stage of mature industrialization.




Figure B6.2 Manufacturing GDP Share and Per Capita GDP

—Five-year moving averages of shares of manufacturing GDP and per capita GDP in 1970–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; APO Productivity Database 2020.

7 Real Income

Highlights

- Real GDP could systematically underestimate (or overestimate) growth in real income if terms of trade improve (or deteriorate) in some resource-rich countries, where trading gain has made it possible to sustain a rise in purchasing power with little real GDP growth in countries (Figure 73 and Table 25). The positive trading gain effects which oil-rich countries experienced in the 2000s were negative in 2010–2018: e.g., –1.6 percentage points in Kuwait and –0.9 percentage points in Saudi Arabia. (Figure 72).
- Net primary income from abroad as a percentage of GDP has risen strongly in the Philippines, from 1.5% in 1990 to 32.4% in 2018. In Bangladesh, it increased from 1.9% to its peak of 8.5% in 2012 (Figure 71).
- Seven resource-rich countries have been enjoying a trading gain over 1.2% per annum in 2000–2018. Among them, Myanmar and Lao PDR managed to achieve growth in labor productivity. In contrast, export-oriented, high-productivity Asian countries have been facing a deteriorating trading gain position as a price of their own success (Figure 74).

The constant-price GDP captures real production, not real income. An improvement in the terms of trade, which is defined as the relative price of a country's exports to imports, explicitly raises real income and, in turn, welfare (see Diewert and Morrison, 1986 and Kohli, 2004). In many ways, a favorable change in the terms of trade is synonymous with technological progress, making it possible to get more for less. That is, for a given trade balance position, a country can either import more for what it exports, or export less for what it imports.⁴⁹

7.1 Real Income and Terms of Trade

By focusing on production, the real GDP concept does not capture the beneficial effect of the improvement in the terms of trade. In contrast, real income focuses on an economy's consumption possibilities, and in turn captures the impact of a change in the relative price of exports to imports. Real income growth attributed to changes in the terms of trade can be significant when there are large fluctuations in import and export prices and the economy is highly exposed to international trade, as is the case with many Asian economies shown in Figure 27 in Section 4.2 (p. 42).

The distinction between real income and real GDP lies in the differences between the corresponding deflators. Real GDP is calculated from a GDP deflator aggregating prices of household consumption, government consumption, investment, exports, and imports,⁵⁰ while real income is calculated from the prices of domestic expenditure, consisting of household consumption, government consumption, and investment. Therefore, real income can be understood as the amount of domestic expenditure that can be purchased with the current income flow.⁵¹ As such, real income captures the purchasing power of the income flow. Furthermore, the Databook adopts the concept of gross national income (GNI) instead of

49: In this edition of Databook, the real income estimates are newly developed for Lao PDR and are extended backwardly until 1970 for Brunei, Nepal, and Mongolia, reflecting the revision on export and import prices in the APO Productivity Database 2020 (see footnote 8).

50: The weight for import price changes is negative. Thus, if import prices decrease, this tends to raise the GDP deflator.

51: This definition of real income is the same as in Kohli (2004 and 2006). An alternative definition is nominal GDP deflated by the price of household consumption.

GDP in its estimation of real income, to consider net income transfer from abroad. Applying the method proposed by Diewert and Morrison (1986), the annual growth rate of real income can be fully attributed to three components: annual growth rate of real GDP; real income growth attributed to changes in prices of exports and imports (referred to as the trading gain);⁵² and the effect of net income transfer.⁵³

Figure 71 plots the time series of net primary income from abroad as a percentage of GDP for some selected countries. The role of net primary income from abroad has been shifting from negative to positive in Hong Kong, with the transition taking place in the mid-1990s leading up to the handover of Hong Kong from British rule to China in 1997. Since then, net primary income from abroad has




Figure 71 Effect of Net Income Transfer on GDP
—Share of net income transfer in GDP at current market prices in 1970–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 72 Trading Gain Effect
—Average annual contribution to real income growth in 2000–2010 and 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.




Figure 73 Real Income and GDP Growth
 —Average annual growth rate of constant-price GDP and real income in 2000–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

been positive. Net primary income from abroad has risen strongly in the Philippines, rising from 1.5% in 1990 to 32.4% in 2018, providing a long-term significant contribution to the purchasing power of Filipinos, with remittances from many overseas workers. A similar, but moderate, trend can be found in Bangladesh. Singapore’s net primary income from abroad displayed larger fluctuations in the 1980s and the 2000s, and its negative share has expanded in the 2010s.

The price changes of crude oil in the recent decade have a great impact on trading gains in Asian countries. Figure 72 compares the trading gain effects in the periods 2000–2010 and 2010–2018. The positive trading gain effects that oil-rich countries experienced in the 2000s were negative in the period 2010–2018: e.g., –1.6 percentage points in Kuwait and –0.9 percentage points in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, the

52: The term “trading gain” is used by some authors (Kohli, 2006). This term is adopted in this report.

53: Real income growth can be decomposed into two components as follows:

$$\underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GNI^t}{GNI^{t-1}}\right) - \ln\left(\frac{P_D^t}{P_D^{t-1}}\right)}_{\text{Real income growth}} = \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GNI^t/GDP^t}{GNI^{t-1}/GDP^{t-1}}\right)}_{\text{Income transfer effect}} + \underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{GDP^t/GDP^{t-1}}{GDP^t/GDP^{t-1}}\right) - (1/2) \sum_i (s_i^t + s_i^{t-1}) \ln(P_i^t/P_i^{t-1})}_{\text{Real GDP growth}} +$$

$$\underbrace{(1/2) (s_X^t + s_X^{t-1}) \left(\ln(P_X^t/P_X^{t-1}) - \ln(P_D^t/P_D^{t-1}) \right) - (1/2) (s_M^t + s_M^{t-1}) \left(\ln(P_M^t/P_M^{t-1}) - \ln(P_D^t/P_D^{t-1}) \right)}_{\text{Real income growth attributed to changes in the terms of trade (=trading gain)}}$$

where P_i^t is price of final demand i in period t and s_i^t is expenditure share of final demand i in period t . D is domestic expenditure, X is export, and M is import. Note that the real GDP growth based on this formulation may differ from that used in other chapters, since the implicit Törnqvist quantity index is adopted for calculating it.

trading gain effects in Korea and Hong Kong turned positive at 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points per year, respectively.

Over a long period of time the trading gain effect is, on average, small, but over a shorter period could be very significant. Combining both the trading gain effect and net primary income from abroad, real income growth for most of the countries compared fell within the margin of $\pm 25\%$ of real GDP growth in the long run, as shown in Figure 73 and Table 25 in Appendix 10 (p. 186). In larger economies, as the US, the EU15, China, India, and Japan, real income growth was almost equivalent to the real GDP growth on average in 2000–2018. Brunei, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia appear to be the outliers in this period.

7.2 Trading Gain and Productivity Growth

When the trading gain is highly favorable, it can breed a sense of complacency with productivity performances suffering as a result. Resource-rich economies are susceptible to this pitfall because they are poised to reap some extremely positive trading gains when commodity prices turn in their favor over a sustained period. Just as commodity prices can rise, so too can they fall. This is when countries' real income growth could suffer if fundamentals for real GDP growth are weak.




Figure 74 Trading Gain Effect and Labor Productivity Growth

—Average annual rates of trading gain and the growth of constant-price GDP per hour worked in 2000–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; APO Productivity Database 2020.



Figure 75 Trading Gain Effect and Value-added Share in Mining Sector
 —Average annual rates of trading gain in 2000–2018 and the changes of mining GDP share from 2000 to 2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments; APO Productivity Database 2020.

Figure 74 plots the labor productivity growth and the trading gain effect in 2000–2018. In general, a resource-rich country can suffer from “Dutch disease,” which is a phenomenon in which a country’s currency is pushed up by the commodity boom, making other parts of its economy less competitive and potentially increasing the country’s dependence on natural resources.⁵⁴ This is how resource abundance can easily lead to resource dependence.

Figure 75 illustrates trading gain effects and changes in value-added shares of the mining sector from 2000 to 2018 in some selected countries. It indicates that large trade gainers typically have dominant mining sectors, such as petroleum and natural gas. Provided resource prices continually rise, these countries continue to gain from the positive terms-of-trade effects. However, if resource prices fall, or natural reserves are depleted, then the story of the Dutch disease may appear. Richness in natural resources may become a curse if they do not have competitive industries other than mining. A way to counteract Dutch disease is broad-based, robust productivity growth and industry diversification. Figure 75 shows some of the trading gainers (i.e., the GCC countries) actively reduced their share of the mining sector over time, which could reflect the intention of developing industries other than mining. However, Figure 74 shows that labor productivity growth rates in these countries remained low, or even negative. Even if they wanted to start industrialization, their high income and strong local currency would not allow them to easily

54: The term was originated by *The Economist* in 1977 (*The Economist*, 26 November 1977, “The Dutch Disease.”) to describe the overall decline of the manufacturing and the subsequent economic crisis in the 1960s in the Netherlands after the discovery of the large natural gas field in the North Sea in 1959.

develop a manufacturing sector or an internationally competitive service industry. Another concern is their heavy dependence on foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled.

On the other side of coin are the resource/energy-importing economies. Most of these suffered from negative trading gain effects, losing a part of their economic growth due to resource price hikes, particularly in the 2000s (Table 25 in Appendix 10, p. 186). However, it has strengthened their competitiveness in manufacturing and other productive activities for the future. Figure 74 also shows that many Asian countries have succeeded in achieving high growth of labor productivity while having to accept a deteriorating trading gain over the long run. These countries are typically resource importers whose voracious demand for commodities pushes up their import prices. Meanwhile, export prices tend to fall because of their achievement in productivity improvement, resulting in unfavorable movements in terms of trade. This is particularly the case in countries where economic growth is highly dependent on export promotion. In such instances, a negative trading gain is partially a side-effect of productivity success. Although the trading gain effect partly negates their real GDP growth, they are better positioned than before their development took off, and without productivity improvements.

Box 7 Forecasting Asian Economic Growth

The growth accounting in the Databook evaluates the quality of economic growth in each country and region in Asia. The similar framework can be applied to forecast the economic growth, based on future scenarios on population and technology. This Box presents the estimates of our mid-term projections on economic growth and labor productivity for 25 Asian economies through 2030. Our projections reflect the economic growth of the first and second quarters of 2020 (see Box 1), where available.

Our scenario on population is based on the projection in United Nations (2019), in which the annual projections are provided by gender and age, as presented in Box 2. This is divided into estimates in different categories of education attainment, based on the projections developed in Wittgenstein Centre Data (Lutz, Butz, and KC, 2014), in each class of gender and age. The employment rate in each class of population by gender, age, and education is developed in the Asia QALI Database 2020 (Appendix 6). The employment rates in the recent period 2015–2018 are assumed to be constant for the future in each class of population. Using these population and the employment rates, the employment by gender, age, and education is estimated for the period 2019–2030.

The rate of employment in each class is divided into estimates in different categories of employment status, i.e., own-account workers, contributing family workers, and employees, based on the current composition in 2018, which is provided in the Asia QALI Database. In the future scenario of employee share, it is assumed to gradually increase by 1–3% per year until 2030, based on the past trend in each country. Based on these scenarios, the projections of employment rates cross-classified by gender, age, education, and employment status are developed through 2030 in each country. The estimated average growth rates of total employment per year are presented in Figure B7.1 for the two periods 2018–2020 and 2020–2030.




Figure B7.1 Projection of Change in Total Employment until 2030

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate).

Source: Our estimates based on United Nations (2019), Lutz, Butz, and KC (2014), and Asia QALI Database 2020.

Based on this future scenario of employment, hours worked and labor quality are projected through 2030. In each country, the average hours worked per worker are benchmarked at the elementary level of employment by the recent estimates in 2018 (in the Asia QALI Database). These are assumed to be slightly decreased based on past trends. The relative wage structure cross-classified by gender, age, education, and status is also provided in 2018 by the Asia QALI Database. Based on these data, labor quality changes are estimated through 2030. The estimates of average annual growth rates of labor quality in each country are presented in Figure B7.2. In some countries such as Indonesia, Mongolia, and Thailand, the quality changes are expected to decrease considerably in the 2020s from the past achievement in 2010–2018, when labor quality growth was exceptionally high, reflecting the rapid changes in employment status and education attainment. In the Asia25, the labor quality

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


Figure B7.2 Projection of Labor Quality Change until 2030

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate).
Source: Our estimates based on Asia QALI Database 2020.

changes are estimated as stable in the 2020s, with the deteriorations in the Asian Tigers and the ASEAN expected to be offset by the improvements in China and South Asia.

There is a significant uncertainty in future capital accumulation. As a baseline scenario in our projection, GFCF shares in Asian countries are assumed to follow the long-term trend of Japan. The dotted line in Figure B7.3 presents the past GFCF share since 1885; and the line presents the ten-year moving average. The current levels of GFCF shares in Asian countries are plotted in the years in which the per-hour labor productivities are equivalent between them and Japan (see Figure 34 in Section 5.2). Based on these historical trends, the future GFCF rates are assumed in each country. The investment this year is estimated by GDP and determines the beginning-of-the-period capital stock level for next year, which provides capital services to be used in next year's production.

Another uncertain source of economic growth is TFP. As a base line scenario, the TFP growth in 2010–2018 estimated in APO Productivity Database 2020 is used to provide benchmark estimates at present. In some countries, however, the past achievements reflect events that will not be repeated in the future. In these cases, benchmark estimates of TFP growth are set arbitrarily. In each Asian country, the future change in TFP is assumed to follow the long-term trend of a leading country in each region. From the first quarter of 2019 to the second quarter of 2020, including the impacts of COVID-19 pandemic (see Box 1), the actual GDP growth is observed in the quarterly national accounts (QNA) in Asia countries. The TFP growth in 2018–2020 is adjusted so the projection of economic growth is equivalent to the actual GDP estimates in QNA. The benchmark estimate of labor share is provided in the APO Productivity Database 2020 (see Appendix 6 and Box 5) and is assumed to be time-invariant in each country.

The baseline estimates of economic growth are presented in Figure B7.4. In the Asia25, the recent economic growth in 2010–2018 (5.4% per year on average) is projected to decrease considerably to 1.8% in 2018–2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020; and projected to recover to 2.9% in 2020–2030. The main country-source of this slowdown of Asian growth is the deceleration of Chinese economic growth, which is projected to decrease from 7.0% to 3.0% and 3.1%, respectively. South Asia is expected to improve economic performance through 2030, from 0.9% in 2018–2020 to 4.1% in 2020–2030. Although the projected regional growth of South Asia in the 2020s is much higher than that in East Asia (2.3%), the growth rate was revised (down) considerably from the estimates (5.7%) presented in the *Databook 2019*. In the ASEAN, although CLMV is projected to have the highest growth pace among regions through 2030 (4.7%), as the ASEAN's regional growth is projected to slow to 3.2% in the 2020s, which was also revised downwardly from 4.3% in the *Databook 2019*.

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


Figure B7.3 Historical GFCF Shares of Japan and Current Level of Asia
 —Shares of GFCF in GDP at market prices for Japan in 1885–2018 and for Asian countries in 2018

Source: Our estimates based on APO Productivity Database 2020.

In terms of per-hour labor productivity growth, the current rate of improvement (4.8% per year in 2010–2018) is projected to slow to 1.2% in 2018–2020, with recovery to 2.7% in 2020–2030 in the Asia25, as shown in Figure B7.5. In low-income countries like Nepal, Lao PDR, and Cambodia, and high-income countries like Japan and ROC, the rate of improved labor productivity is expected to accelerate in the 2020s, compared with their achievements in 2010–2018.

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


Figure B7.4 Projection of Economic Growths until 2030

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate).

Source: Our estimates based on APO Productivity Database 2020 and Asia QALI Database 2020.




Figure B7.5 Projection of Per-Hour Labor Productivity Growths until 2030

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate).

Source: Our estimates based on APO Productivity Database 2020 and Asia QALI Database 2020.



8 Country Profiles

Bangladesh

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	736	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	63,574	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	270	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	38.8 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	4.5	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	31.1 %	
(exchange rate based)	1.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	5.6 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	10.4	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	31.2 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	4.3	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.6 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	8.5	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	13.8 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	19.9	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	19.0 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	127.6	g-CO ₂ per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	39.3 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	-0.5	3.8	4.2	5.7	6.5	7.5	6.9	7.8	7.8	2.4	7.8	-3.1	4.9
Labor input growth	2.5	2.4	3.3	2.5	2.9	3.3	3.4	4.4	2.2	3.0	2.4	3.6	3.3
Labor quality growth	1.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	2.2	1.9	0.9	4.5	0.4	0.8	-0.2	1.8	1.8
Hours worked growth	1.4	2.0	2.9	2.2	0.8	1.4	2.4	-0.1	1.8	2.2	2.6	1.9	1.5
IT capital input growth	9.4	12.2	14.8	14.3	21.2	19.4	22.7	18.8	16.7	13.8	13.7	13.8	12.0
Non-IT capital input growth	2.1	4.9	6.3	7.8	7.5	7.4	7.0	7.4	7.7	8.1	8.2	8.0	6.5
Per-worker labor productivity growth	-2.0	1.3	1.9	3.6	4.9	6.2	6.8	5.7	6.0	0.3	5.8	-5.1	3.3
Per-hour labor productivity growth	-2.0	1.7	1.3	3.5	5.7	6.1	4.5	7.9	6.0	0.1	5.3	-5.0	3.4
Capital productivity growth	-2.1	-5.0	-6.4	-7.8	-7.7	-7.6	-7.3	-7.6	-7.9	-5.9	-0.5	-11.2	-1.8
TFP growth	-2.9	0.1	-0.7	0.3	0.7	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.1	-3.8	1.9	-9.5	-0.5

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Cambodia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	71	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	9,688	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	25	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	61.0	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	4.5	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	47.0	%
(exchange rate based)	1.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	4.6	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	6.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	24.1	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	2.8	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.1	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	4.5	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	28.1	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	9.1	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	16.4	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	177.7	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	38.6	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	-5.3	3.8	6.1	7.6	5.3	7.3	5.7	7.4	8.8	1.8	4.8	-1.2	3.0
Labor input growth	1.2	2.7	4.3	5.0	4.1	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.4	3.0	3.2	2.8	2.2
Labor quality growth	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.9	1.4	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.9
Hours worked growth	0.4	2.3	3.8	4.1	2.7	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.7	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.3
IT capital input growth	5.4	7.9	22.1	17.8	11.5	9.1	10.7	9.6	7.0	7.5	7.8	7.2	6.2
Non-IT capital input growth	1.3	0.4	4.2	8.3	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.8	6.3	6.5	6.1	5.0
Per-worker labor productivity growth	-5.7	1.5	2.8	3.9	3.1	4.8	3.2	4.8	6.3	1.0	3.9	-1.9	2.8
Per-hour labor productivity growth	-5.7	1.5	2.3	3.5	2.7	4.5	2.8	4.6	6.1	0.9	3.8	-1.9	2.7
Capital productivity growth	-0.1	0.0	-3.9	-8.3	-6.9	-6.7	-6.8	-6.6	-6.7	-4.5	-1.7	-7.4	-2.1
TFP growth	-6.5	2.3	1.8	0.8	-0.2	2.6	0.9	2.7	4.1	-2.9	-0.1	-5.7	-0.7

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

ROC

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	1,202	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	11,724	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	608	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	49.7 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	51.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	42.9 %	
(exchange rate based)	25.8	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	13.1 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	99.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	22.2 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	47.7	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	8.5 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	88.1	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	1.7 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	16.3	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	33.2 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	235.7	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	4.9 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	10.5	9.5	6.8	4.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.6	1.6	2.7	0.5	0.6
Labor input growth	4.4	2.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	0.5	0.1	0.2	1.4	0.2	0.6	-0.3	-0.5
Labor quality growth	1.1	0.9	1.1	1.7	1.1	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.8
Hours worked growth	3.3	2.0	1.1	0.3	1.2	-0.2	-0.7	-0.7	0.8	-0.5	0.0	-1.0	-1.3
IT capital input growth	18.9	17.0	20.0	4.8	2.9	2.9	3.3	3.1	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.5
Non-IT capital input growth	10.1	7.7	7.0	2.8	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.0
Per-worker labor productivity growth	7.2	7.1	5.5	3.2	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.5	1.9	2.3	3.3	1.3	1.7
Per-hour labor productivity growth	7.2	7.5	5.7	3.7	1.7	3.2	3.7	4.0	1.8	2.1	2.6	1.5	1.9
Capital productivity growth	-10.3	-8.0	-7.6	-3.0	-1.7	-1.7	-1.9	-1.8	-1.5	0.3	1.4	-0.8	-0.3
TFP growth	3.3	4.4	2.2	1.6	0.9	1.8	1.9	2.2	1.1	0.8	1.7	0.0	0.4

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Fiji

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	13	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	347	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	6	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	39.3	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	14.3	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	31.3	%
(exchange rate based)	6.3	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	10.6	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	29.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	19.7	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	15.7	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	9.4	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	38.4	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	17.0	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	n.a.	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	14.4	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	245.6	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	7.5	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.7	2.2	2.4	1.4	3.8	3.8	2.5	5.3	3.5	0.6	2.9	-1.7	1.4
Labor input growth	5.5	4.4	4.0	1.7	2.9	3.8	8.2	1.2	1.9	1.2	0.3	2.1	1.9
Labor quality growth	2.3	2.2	2.0	0.8	1.0	2.0	4.9	1.1	-0.1	0.1	-0.7	0.9	0.9
Hours worked growth	3.2	2.1	2.0	0.8	1.9	1.8	3.2	0.1	1.9	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.0
IT capital input growth	6.5	13.6	2.7	4.9	7.7	10.8	10.3	10.9	11.1	8.5	10.4	6.6	1.4
Non-IT capital input growth	4.7	2.1	2.7	0.6	1.2	2.4	1.9	2.4	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.2
Per-worker labor productivity growth	1.5	-0.3	0.6	0.3	2.5	2.4	1.2	4.3	1.7	-0.3	2.0	-2.6	0.6
Per-hour labor productivity growth	1.4	0.1	0.4	0.5	1.9	2.0	-0.7	5.2	1.6	-0.5	1.9	-2.9	0.4
Capital productivity growth	-4.6	-2.3	-2.6	-0.7	-1.4	-2.7	-2.1	-2.6	-3.3	-2.5	-0.4	-4.6	-0.8
TFP growth	-0.4	-1.2	-0.9	0.2	1.8	0.7	-1.8	3.2	0.7	-1.8	0.7	-4.3	-0.7

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Hong Kong

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	468	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	3,829	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	363	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	51.4	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	62.8	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	49.8	%
(exchange rate based)	48.7	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	12.4	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	117.1	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	21.7	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	54.0	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	9.1	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	137.2	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	0.1	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	46.4	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	1.0	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	101.2	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	0.2	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	8.9	6.7	4.4	3.9	2.8	3.1	2.4	3.7	3.0	-3.6	-1.2	-6.0	0.8
Labor input growth	4.5	2.6	3.3	1.2	1.5	1.2	0.3	0.8	2.7	-0.7	-0.9	-0.4	-0.7
Labor quality growth	0.8	1.6	1.3	0.5	1.0	0.8	0.7	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Hours worked growth	3.7	1.0	2.0	0.7	0.5	0.4	-0.4	-0.5	2.1	-1.2	-1.4	-0.9	-1.2
IT capital input growth	16.9	18.4	17.6	7.7	3.2	-1.7	-2.7	-2.5	0.0	2.2	2.1	2.3	3.0
Non-IT capital input growth	6.7	5.3	4.8	2.5	1.1	0.8	0.3	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.4
Per-worker labor productivity growth	5.0	4.8	2.6	3.1	1.6	2.4	2.5	2.8	2.0	-3.2	-0.8	-5.6	1.6
Per-hour labor productivity growth	5.2	5.7	2.4	3.2	2.3	2.7	2.9	4.1	1.0	-2.4	0.2	-5.1	2.0
Capital productivity growth	-6.9	-5.7	-5.5	-2.9	-1.3	-0.6	0.0	-0.8	-1.0	-4.8	-2.5	-7.1	0.2
TFP growth	3.2	2.5	0.0	1.9	1.4	2.1	2.3	2.9	1.1	-3.8	-1.2	-6.3	0.9

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

India

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	9,051	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	514,668	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	2,755	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	38.0 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	6.7	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	25.6 %	
(exchange rate based)	2.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	6.2 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	15.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	31.2 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	7.4	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	3.6 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	16.3	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	16.1 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	12.9	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	13.6 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	283.6	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	45.1 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection		
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	3.0	4.9	4.9	7.5	6.6	6.9	7.7	5.5	7.4	-2.4	4.7	-9.5	3.6
Labor input growth	3.0	3.1	2.7	3.0	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.2	1.5	3.1	3.0	3.3	3.0
Labor quality growth	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.1	0.7	1.1	0.5	0.5	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.8
Hours worked growth	2.4	2.0	1.7	1.4	0.9	0.8	0.5	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2
IT capital input growth	8.9	15.7	16.3	15.7	12.9	10.9	10.0	11.0	11.6	9.4	10.0	8.8	4.7
Non-IT capital input growth	3.7	4.7	5.1	7.1	7.6	7.0	6.9	7.1	7.0	6.8	7.0	6.7	5.0
Per-worker labor productivity growth	0.5	3.5	3.7	5.9	5.6	6.1	7.1	6.0	5.2	-3.8	3.4	-10.9	2.4
Per-hour labor productivity growth	0.5	3.4	3.6	5.7	5.5	6.0	7.0	6.0	5.2	-3.8	3.4	-10.9	2.4
Capital productivity growth	-3.7	-4.8	-5.3	-7.3	-7.7	-7.1	-6.9	-7.1	-7.1	-9.3	-2.3	-16.3	-1.3
TFP growth	-0.3	1.8	1.7	2.4	2.0	2.9	3.5	2.9	2.3	-7.1	0.0	-14.3	-0.2

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Indonesia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	3,126	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	125,537	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	1,045	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	47.7 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	11.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	39.5 %	
(exchange rate based)	4.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	8.8 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	23.9	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	34.7 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	12.1	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.1 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	39.1	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	13.3 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	16.4	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	20.7 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	174.1	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	28.9 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	8.0	6.1	4.1	5.1	5.2	5.0	5.0	4.9	5.0	1.8	4.8	-1.3	2.2
Labor input growth	5.9	5.8	6.3	5.1	5.8	4.2	7.5	3.8	1.5	5.3	6.4	4.2	3.5
Labor quality growth	1.9	2.4	4.2	2.8	4.5	2.0	3.9	0.8	1.2	3.8	4.1	3.5	3.0
Hours worked growth	4.0	3.4	2.1	2.3	1.3	2.2	3.5	3.0	0.2	1.5	2.2	0.7	0.5
IT capital input growth	22.0	18.5	12.2	13.7	14.9	12.4	14.4	11.6	11.1	9.1	9.7	8.5	4.1
Non-IT capital input growth	7.3	7.4	7.1	4.7	6.4	6.3	6.6	6.3	6.1	5.8	5.9	5.8	4.6
Per-worker labor productivity growth	4.6	2.2	2.4	3.2	3.4	2.0	0.9	2.3	2.8	1.0	4.0	-2.1	1.6
Per-hour labor productivity growth	4.0	2.7	2.1	2.8	3.9	2.7	1.4	2.0	4.8	0.3	2.6	-2.0	1.7
Capital productivity growth	-7.3	-7.5	-7.2	-4.8	-6.5	-6.4	-6.7	-6.4	-6.2	-4.1	-1.1	-7.1	-2.3
TFP growth	1.1	-0.8	-2.8	0.2	-1.0	-0.5	-2.1	-0.3	0.9	-3.9	-1.3	-6.5	-1.9

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Iran

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	1,349	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	23,738	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	629	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	28.8	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	16.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	15.8	%
(exchange rate based)	7.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	9.8	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	56.5	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	25.1	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	24.7	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	5.4	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	47.7	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	8.1	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	7.2	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	16.7	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	406.4	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	18.1	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	3.3	2.6	4.1	6.5	1.6	4.4	13.1	4.2	-4.0	-6.9	-4.7	-9.1	0.9
Labor input growth	3.5	3.6	4.4	3.3	2.2	1.5	2.9	3.8	-2.4	3.9	5.5	2.3	2.1
Labor quality growth	0.9	1.0	1.6	1.9	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	-0.3	1.6	2.0	1.2	1.3
Hours worked growth	2.6	2.6	2.8	1.4	1.2	1.4	2.7	3.7	-2.0	2.3	3.5	1.1	0.9
IT capital input growth	6.1	12.1	10.1	19.9	8.4	2.9	1.5	3.6	3.6	11.7	15.0	8.4	0.4
Non-IT capital input growth	7.5	2.0	0.9	3.9	2.6	2.2	1.8	2.5	2.3	4.3	4.6	4.0	2.4
Per-worker labor productivity growth	0.8	0.1	1.2	4.6	-0.2	1.9	10.6	0.9	-5.8	-8.3	-6.1	-10.4	-0.2
Per-hour labor productivity growth	0.7	0.0	1.3	5.1	0.4	3.0	10.5	0.6	-2.0	-9.2	-8.2	-10.2	0.0
Capital productivity growth	-7.5	-2.0	-1.0	-4.1	-2.7	-2.1	-1.6	-2.4	-2.4	-11.4	-9.6	-13.2	-1.5
TFP growth	-2.7	-0.1	2.2	2.5	-1.0	2.4	11.1	1.4	-5.1	-11.2	-9.7	-12.8	-1.4

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Japan

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	5,326	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	65,940	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	4,955	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	52.1	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	42.1	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	44.0	%
(exchange rate based)	39.2	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	13.3	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	76.2	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	24.3	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	43.4	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	12.3	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	136.6	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	1.2	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	17.1	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	20.7	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	226.0	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	3.9	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.6	4.6	1.3	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.5	2.2	0.3	-1.9	0.7	-4.6	0.6
Labor input growth	1.7	1.8	0.0	0.1	0.6	1.2	0.3	1.7	1.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5
Labor quality growth	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4
Hours worked growth	0.2	0.7	-0.7	-0.6	0.3	0.8	0.0	1.2	1.4	-0.7	-0.6	-0.8	-0.9
IT capital input growth	12.3	16.0	8.2	4.1	1.0	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.6	-1.0
Non-IT capital input growth	5.4	3.9	2.0	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.1
Per-worker labor productivity growth	3.9	3.6	1.0	0.8	0.4	-0.1	0.1	1.2	-1.8	-1.4	1.2	-4.0	1.2
Per-hour labor productivity growth	4.4	3.8	2.0	1.3	0.7	0.1	0.6	1.0	-1.1	-1.2	1.3	-3.7	1.5
Capital productivity growth	-5.7	-4.6	-2.5	-0.6	-0.1	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.5	-2.2	0.4	-4.7	0.6
TFP growth	1.2	1.6	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.2	0.2	1.0	-0.7	-1.9	0.7	-4.4	0.9

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Korea

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	2,218	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	27,448	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	1,720	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	53.2 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	43.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	41.8 %	
(exchange rate based)	33.3	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	13.2 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	73.9	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	31.3 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	36.1	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	7.8 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	135.9	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	2.0 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	10.8	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	29.2 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	303.9	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	5.0 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection		
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	9.1	9.8	6.8	4.8	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.1	2.7	0.5	2.0	-1.0	0.4
Labor input growth	4.1	5.7	3.1	2.2	1.3	-0.6	0.2	-0.3	-1.8	1.2	2.9	-0.6	-0.7
Labor quality growth	0.9	3.1	2.1	2.2	1.1	1.0	1.2	0.9	1.0	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.8
Hours worked growth	3.3	2.7	0.9	0.1	0.2	-1.7	-1.0	-1.2	-2.8	0.6	2.7	-1.4	-1.5
IT capital input growth	20.7	20.4	17.7	6.9	2.7	3.3	2.6	3.6	3.8	2.5	2.6	2.4	0.1
Non-IT capital input growth	9.8	8.7	7.3	5.1	3.4	3.4	2.9	3.6	3.7	2.8	2.9	2.7	1.8
Per-worker labor productivity growth	5.3	6.7	5.4	3.5	1.6	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.4	1.8	3.2	0.4	1.8
Per-hour labor productivity growth	5.3	6.7	6.0	4.6	2.8	4.5	3.8	4.4	5.5	-0.1	-0.6	0.4	1.9
Capital productivity growth	-9.9	-9.1	-7.9	-5.2	-3.3	-3.4	-2.9	-3.6	-3.7	-2.3	-0.8	-3.7	-1.3
TFP growth	1.3	2.0	1.6	1.0	0.7	1.5	1.2	1.6	1.8	-1.4	-0.9	-2.0	-0.1

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Lao PDR

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	57	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	3,605	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	18	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	50.5	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	7.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	47.9	%
(exchange rate based)	2.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	5.9	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	14.2	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	36.9	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	6.5	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	7.0	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	12.3	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	23.0	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	n.a.	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	8.1	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	71.2	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection			
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25	
GDP growth	1.5	2.9	6.0	5.8	4.3	6.7	5.4	8.0	6.8	0.8	5.6	-4.0	2.8	
Labor input growth	1.1	3.0	3.6	3.7	2.5	2.0	1.8	1.7	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.3	
Labor quality growth	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.8	
Hours worked growth	0.7	2.5	2.9	2.7	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.6	2.3	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.5	
IT capital input growth	5.4	14.6	13.1	11.5	9.0	6.7	4.1	1.8	14.2	14.0	19.0	9.0	1.7	
Non-IT capital input growth	3.1	5.3	8.0	5.3	8.0	8.7	9.1	8.3	8.7	9.2	10.1	8.3	6.4	
Per-worker labor productivity growth	0.5	0.2	3.1	3.4	2.5	4.8	3.6	6.3	4.6	-0.1	4.7	-4.9	2.1	
Per-hour labor productivity growth	0.8	0.3	3.1	3.1	2.4	4.9	3.6	6.4	4.6	0.0	4.8	-4.7	2.3	
Capital productivity growth	-3.0	-5.4	-8.1	-5.4	-8.0	-8.6	-8.8	-7.9	-8.9	-8.6	-4.9	-12.4	-3.4	
TFP growth	-0.7	-1.6	-0.1	1.3	-1.1	1.3	-0.1	3.0	1.0	-4.8	-0.6	-9.1	-1.0	

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Malaysia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	886	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	15,280	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	359	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	47.2 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	27.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	38.7 %	
(exchange rate based)	11.1	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	10.0	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	55.4	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	23.6 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	25.6	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	10.8 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	52.4	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	7.6 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	13.4	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	21.8 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	260.3	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	10.1 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection		
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	7.7	5.9	7.2	5.1	4.9	4.6	4.5	4.9	4.3	-0.9	4.2	-5.9	2.3
Labor input growth	4.9	5.4	5.8	4.4	3.1	1.7	1.6	2.4	1.0	4.0	4.9	3.0	2.7
Labor quality growth	1.7	2.0	2.5	2.0	0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.9	-1.1	2.4	3.2	1.6	1.7
Hours worked growth	3.2	3.3	3.3	2.4	2.5	1.7	1.5	1.6	2.1	1.5	1.6	1.4	1.0
IT capital input growth	13.5	19.6	22.7	16.8	9.3	5.4	5.9	5.2	4.9	4.6	3.8	5.3	2.5
Non-IT capital input growth	7.6	7.2	8.3	3.1	4.9	4.8	5.1	4.7	4.6	4.0	4.0	4.1	2.6
Per-worker labor productivity growth	4.5	2.6	3.9	2.5	2.1	2.9	3.8	2.8	2.0	-2.5	2.5	-7.6	1.1
Per-hour labor productivity growth	4.5	2.6	3.9	2.6	2.4	2.8	3.0	3.3	2.1	-2.4	2.6	-7.3	1.3
Capital productivity growth	-7.5	-7.3	-8.6	-3.8	-5.1	-4.8	-5.1	-4.7	-4.6	-4.9	0.3	-10.1	-0.3
TFP growth	1.1	-0.7	-0.5	1.0	0.5	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.0	-4.9	-0.1	-9.7	-0.3

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Mongolia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	39	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	1,253	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	13	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	39.0	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	12.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	46.6	%
(exchange rate based)	4.1	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	12.2	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	28.0	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	43.2	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	14.8	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.8	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	28.9	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	12.1	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	9.3	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	10.6	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	586.6	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	26.7	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	6.0	5.2	0.9	6.3	7.8	4.4	1.4	5.3	6.5	0.1	6.9	-6.7	4.4
Labor input growth	6.1	4.7	-2.5	4.3	6.2	5.2	4.5	6.5	4.7	3.7	2.9	4.4	4.5
Labor quality growth	4.3	1.2	-2.8	1.8	3.8	2.3	4.7	-1.1	3.3	2.3	2.0	2.6	2.4
Hours worked growth	1.8	3.6	0.3	2.5	2.4	2.9	-0.3	7.6	1.4	1.4	0.9	1.9	2.1
IT capital input growth	7.5	13.4	8.6	17.8	7.4	1.2	-8.2	0.7	11.1	10.5	15.1	5.9	3.0
Non-IT capital input growth	6.0	6.0	-0.1	3.6	5.5	1.9	0.0	1.5	4.1	5.9	7.1	4.7	3.5
Per-worker labor productivity growth	4.1	1.6	0.6	3.9	5.4	1.6	1.7	-2.3	5.4	-1.7	5.4	-8.9	2.1
Per-hour labor productivity growth	4.1	1.6	0.6	3.9	5.3	1.5	1.7	-2.4	5.1	-1.3	6.0	-8.6	2.3
Capital productivity growth	-5.9	-6.0	0.0	-3.8	-5.5	-1.8	0.2	-1.4	-4.2	-5.9	-0.4	-11.4	1.0
TFP growth	-0.1	-0.4	1.6	2.5	2.0	1.4	0.0	2.1	2.1	-5.1	1.1	-11.3	0.6

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Nepal

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	109	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	11,685	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	32	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	42.5	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	4.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	45.9	%
(exchange rate based)	1.2	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	4.9	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	8.0	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	61.7	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	4.4	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	3.2	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	11.6	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	27.0	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	6.6	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	5.6	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	115.2	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	67.7	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection			
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25	
GDP growth	3.3	4.4	4.0	3.8	5.0	7.1	7.9	6.5	6.8	2.4	7.6	-2.7	5.9	
Labor input growth	3.5	4.5	5.7	3.0	1.7	3.2	2.3	3.3	3.9	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.5	
Labor quality growth	0.4	3.1	3.4	1.9	-0.1	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	
Hours worked growth	3.1	1.4	2.3	1.2	1.8	3.1	2.5	3.2	3.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.2	
IT capital input growth	2.1	8.9	11.7	12.2	14.9	13.4	12.5	14.4	13.3	10.6	12.5	8.7	7.3	
Non-IT capital input growth	4.2	6.9	6.1	4.9	5.9	7.2	6.3	7.2	8.0	8.4	8.9	7.9	6.7	
Per-worker labor productivity growth	0.1	3.4	1.7	2.5	2.9	3.7	4.9	3.0	3.1	-0.4	4.8	-5.6	3.0	
Per-hour labor productivity growth	0.2	3.0	1.6	2.4	2.9	3.6	4.9	2.9	2.9	-0.6	4.6	-5.8	2.7	
Capital productivity growth	-4.1	-6.8	-6.1	-4.9	-6.0	-7.3	-6.4	-7.3	-8.1	-6.0	-1.4	-10.6	-0.8	
TFP growth	-0.4	-0.9	-1.9	-0.4	1.1	1.6	3.3	1.0	0.6	-4.9	0.1	-9.8	-0.7	

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Pakistan

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	1,029	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	63,107	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	284	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	30.8	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	5.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	21.1	%
(exchange rate based)	1.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	5.1	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	15.5	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	16.7	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	8.0	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.7	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	9.8	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	24.4	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	10.3	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	13.0	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	197.7	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	39.3	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection		
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.2	6.4	4.8	3.8	4.3	5.2	4.9	5.1	5.5	0.8	5.8	-4.3	3.2
Labor input growth	4.6	3.5	3.2	3.9	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	4.7	5.3	4.1	3.9
Labor quality growth	1.9	1.0	1.3	0.9	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.6	0.9	2.2	2.1
Hours worked growth	2.7	2.5	1.9	3.0	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	3.1	4.4	1.9	1.8
IT capital input growth	3.8	14.3	5.8	13.3	6.6	9.6	7.9	10.4	10.5	9.3	9.9	8.7	6.1
Non-IT capital input growth	4.7	6.1	5.5	2.7	1.7	2.9	2.3	2.9	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.2
Per-worker labor productivity growth	1.4	3.8	2.8	0.5	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.5	3.0	-1.2	3.8	-6.2	1.4
Per-hour labor productivity growth	1.5	3.9	2.9	0.8	3.3	4.1	3.8	4.1	4.5	-2.4	1.4	-6.2	1.4
Capital productivity growth	-4.7	-6.1	-5.5	-2.8	-1.7	-2.9	-2.4	-3.0	-3.5	-3.1	1.9	-8.1	0.0
TFP growth	-0.4	1.6	0.4	0.5	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.2	-3.5	1.2	-8.2	-0.3

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Philippines

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	889	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	42,577	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	331	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	40.4	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	8.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	38.3	%
(exchange rate based)	3.1	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	6.0	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	19.6	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	26.9	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	9.1	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	7.7	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	16.8	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	9.3	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	23.5	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	19.1	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	161.0	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	24.7	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	5.8	2.6	3.7	4.7	5.9	6.5	7.8	5.7	6.2	-0.1	5.9	-6.0	4.1
Labor input growth	5.3	5.1	3.5	3.5	3.7	5.0	9.3	0.3	5.5	2.9	1.5	4.3	4.0
Labor quality growth	1.3	2.0	1.6	1.0	1.4	1.6	3.2	1.6	0.0	1.7	1.2	2.1	2.0
Hours worked growth	4.0	3.1	2.0	2.6	2.3	3.4	6.1	-1.2	5.4	1.3	0.3	2.2	2.1
IT capital input growth	5.7	9.4	14.9	9.6	11.5	18.2	18.8	19.1	16.6	12.7	14.0	11.4	8.0
Non-IT capital input growth	6.5	3.9	4.1	3.1	5.3	6.9	6.5	7.2	6.9	6.5	6.8	6.2	4.7
Per-worker labor productivity growth	1.8	-0.2	1.6	1.9	3.9	3.4	-1.6	7.6	4.1	-2.3	3.6	-8.2	2.1
Per-hour labor productivity growth	1.7	-0.5	1.7	2.1	3.6	3.1	1.7	6.9	0.8	-1.3	5.6	-8.2	2.1
Capital productivity growth	-6.4	-4.0	-4.5	-3.4	-5.5	-7.3	-6.9	-7.6	-7.3	-6.8	-1.2	-12.4	-0.7
TFP growth	-0.2	-1.8	-0.4	1.2	1.2	0.2	-0.2	1.1	-0.4	-5.2	1.1	-11.5	-0.4

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Singapore

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	568	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	3,575	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	373	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	63.4	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	100.7	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	47.9	%
(exchange rate based)	66.2	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	11.0	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	149.1	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	25.5	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	66.5	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	29.2	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	139.8	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	0.0	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	20.8	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	21.9	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	92.5	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	0.5	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	8.4	7.1	7.4	6.0	4.6	4.4	4.2	5.2	3.9	-1.9	0.7	-4.4	0.6
Labor input growth	6.0	6.3	6.5	5.0	2.8	0.9	1.8	-0.2	1.2	1.3	1.9	0.8	0.3
Labor quality growth	1.1	2.2	3.0	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.2	2.0	1.0	0.0	-0.1	0.0	0.8
Hours worked growth	4.9	4.1	3.6	3.4	1.6	-0.2	1.6	-2.2	0.2	1.4	1.9	0.8	-0.5
IT capital input growth	10.5	21.9	13.9	10.1	12.9	13.5	10.5	16.4	13.7	10.5	9.0	12.1	9.3
Non-IT capital input growth	8.4	6.8	6.3	3.4	3.6	2.7	3.3	2.5	2.4	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.0
Per-worker labor productivity growth	3.2	3.7	4.3	2.3	2.6	3.9	2.6	5.8	3.1	-2.9	-0.3	-5.4	0.9
Per-hour labor productivity growth	3.5	3.1	3.8	2.6	3.0	4.6	2.6	7.5	3.7	-3.2	-1.2	-5.2	1.1
Capital productivity growth	-8.3	-7.6	-6.9	-3.9	-4.3	-3.7	-3.9	-3.7	-3.5	-3.7	-0.9	-6.5	-0.3
TFP growth	1.2	0.2	0.6	1.6	0.9	1.9	1.2	3.2	1.3	-3.5	-1.0	-5.9	0.0

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Sri Lanka

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	279	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	8,015	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	88	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	37.0	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	12.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	33.9	%
(exchange rate based)	4.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	11.5	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	31.9	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	29.9	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	16.6	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	2.7	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	30.6	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	8.6	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	24.7	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	17.3	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	92.1	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	25.5	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.1	4.1	5.2	5.4	4.4	3.0	0.0	7.1	2.0	-1.2	2.3	-4.6	1.8
Labor input growth	2.4	2.9	3.3	1.4	1.3	2.1	4.0	4.4	-2.1	1.8	2.1	1.4	1.4
Labor quality growth	0.6	1.2	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.3	2.6	1.2	0.1	1.0	1.3	0.6	0.7
Hours worked growth	1.8	1.7	2.3	0.7	0.3	0.8	1.4	3.2	-2.2	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7
IT capital input growth	12.8	3.8	11.4	16.8	3.2	3.0	2.1	3.7	3.3	4.0	3.9	4.0	1.0
Non-IT capital input growth	4.4	3.8	2.4	4.9	6.7	5.9	5.8	6.0	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.6	3.9
Per-worker labor productivity growth	2.7	2.5	3.0	4.0	4.4	2.2	-1.5	3.8	4.4	-2.1	1.3	-5.6	0.9
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.3	2.4	2.9	4.7	4.1	2.2	-1.4	3.8	4.2	-2.0	1.5	-5.4	1.1
Capital productivity growth	-4.4	-3.8	-2.5	-5.2	-6.6	-5.8	-5.7	-5.9	-5.7	-6.9	-3.5	-10.2	-2.1
TFP growth	0.6	0.7	2.3	1.9	-0.5	-1.5	-5.1	1.6	-1.1	-5.5	-2.2	-8.8	-1.3

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Thailand

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	1,296	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	38,234	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	512	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	56.1	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	19.0	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	48.0	%
(exchange rate based)	7.5	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	8.9	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	30.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	25.9	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	14.2	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	18.3	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	33.6	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	8.1	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	11.4	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	26.7	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	215.7	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	31.8	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	7.1	7.7	4.6	4.6	3.1	2.8	1.7	3.0	3.7	-1.7	2.3	-5.7	1.5
Labor input growth	7.0	6.6	5.2	4.1	1.8	1.7	1.6	2.9	0.4	1.7	2.0	1.3	1.7
Labor quality growth	2.5	3.8	4.5	3.4	2.9	1.6	1.5	3.2	0.2	2.1	2.0	2.3	1.4
Hours worked growth	4.5	2.8	0.7	0.7	-1.1	0.0	0.1	-0.3	0.3	-0.5	0.0	-1.0	0.3
IT capital input growth	9.2	18.4	12.5	13.9	9.5	3.0	3.5	2.5	3.0	3.3	2.9	3.7	2.0
Non-IT capital input growth	4.8	6.4	6.7	1.9	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.2
Per-worker labor productivity growth	3.0	4.2	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.7	4.4	4.4	2.3	-0.9	3.0	-4.9	1.0
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.0	4.7	3.7	3.8	4.5	3.9	3.5	4.6	3.8	-1.2	2.3	-4.7	1.2
Capital productivity growth	-4.7	-6.7	-7.0	-2.6	-3.1	-2.6	-2.5	-2.5	-2.7	-3.7	0.4	-7.7	0.3
TFP growth	0.7	0.9	-1.9	1.2	0.7	1.7	1.4	1.5	2.2	-3.5	0.4	-7.4	0.1

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Turkey

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	2,487	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	28,909	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	771	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	35.3 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	30.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	28.9 %	
(exchange rate based)	9.4	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	8.6 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	77.5	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	29.6 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	38.0	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	4.2 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	90.4	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	6.5 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	19.9	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	21.3 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	180.9	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	18.4 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.7	4.5	3.8	4.3	6.6	6.2	2.5	9.3	6.9	-1.1	0.9	-3.1	2.2
Labor input growth	3.9	4.0	2.1	4.1	4.0	2.9	3.7	3.2	1.8	2.5	3.0	2.0	1.7
Labor quality growth	1.1	1.0	1.5	2.1	1.8	1.5	2.2	0.8	1.4	0.8	0.3	1.2	0.8
Hours worked growth	2.8	3.1	0.6	1.9	2.2	1.5	1.5	2.5	0.4	1.7	2.7	0.7	0.9
IT capital input growth	2.2	15.7	15.4	8.8	9.3	6.7	4.1	7.5	8.4	8.3	11.3	5.4	-1.3
Non-IT capital input growth	5.7	4.2	4.9	5.3	5.8	5.9	6.3	5.6	5.8	6.3	6.8	5.7	3.7
Per-worker labor productivity growth	2.1	1.9	3.2	2.7	3.6	3.7	0.4	5.8	5.0	-2.0	-0.1	-3.9	1.2
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.0	1.5	3.1	2.3	4.4	4.8	1.0	6.8	6.5	-2.8	-1.7	-3.9	1.3
Capital productivity growth	-5.6	-4.3	-5.1	-5.3	-5.8	-5.9	-6.2	-5.6	-5.8	-7.4	-6.0	-8.8	-1.4
TFP growth	-0.5	0.3	-0.5	-0.6	1.4	1.5	-2.7	4.6	2.6	-5.9	-4.5	-7.4	-0.7

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Vietnam

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	766	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	54,734	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	249	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	57.8 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	8.1	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	47.4 %	
(exchange rate based)	2.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	8.7 Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	12.7	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	27.5 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	5.9	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	5.6 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	10.0	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	16.3 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	10.0	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	17.8 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	298.7	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	37.7 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	3.5	3.3	7.4	6.9	6.0	7.1	5.3	7.3	8.6	4.1	6.8	1.4	4.0
Labor input growth	3.2	3.7	2.9	4.7	1.9	2.3	2.3	0.4	4.2	1.7	1.4	2.1	2.4
Labor quality growth	1.1	1.1	0.6	2.7	1.3	1.6	2.4	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.8	1.1	1.1
Hours worked growth	2.0	2.6	2.3	2.0	0.6	0.7	-0.1	-1.0	3.1	0.8	0.6	1.0	1.3
IT capital input growth	7.1	13.5	13.2	18.6	14.5	13.1	14.0	16.1	9.1	1.7	0.8	2.7	3.1
Non-IT capital input growth	5.9	4.5	9.7	9.7	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.6	7.1	6.8	6.7	6.9	6.2
Per-worker labor productivity growth	-0.1	0.1	5.2	4.5	4.8	6.2	4.5	6.6	7.6	3.0	5.6	0.3	2.6
Per-hour labor productivity growth	1.4	0.7	5.0	4.9	5.5	6.4	5.5	8.4	5.4	3.3	6.2	0.4	2.7
Capital productivity growth	-5.9	-4.5	-9.7	-9.9	-7.0	-7.0	-7.1	-7.0	-7.1	-2.5	0.3	-5.3	-2.1
TFP growth	-1.3	-1.0	1.0	-0.6	1.6	2.6	0.8	3.9	3.0	0.0	3.0	-2.9	-0.2

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

APO21

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	31,965	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	1,117,468	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	15,405	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	40.8 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	11.7	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	n.a. %	
(exchange rate based)	5.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	n.a. Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	27.8	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	28.5 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	13.2	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	7.2 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	31.6	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	9.7 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	14.5	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	19.1 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	35.2 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.7	5.1	3.7	4.3	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.4	-1.1	3.0	-5.1	2.3
Labor input growth	3.1	3.3	2.7	2.9	2.4	2.0	2.6	1.8	1.6	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.4
Labor quality growth	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.4	0.9	1.4	0.9	0.5	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.4
Hours worked growth	2.4	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.0	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.1	1.0
IT capital input growth	12.2	16.2	9.9	5.9	4.3	3.6	3.2	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.2	3.9	2.8
Non-IT capital input growth	5.6	4.6	4.0	3.4	4.1	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.5	5.0	5.1	4.9	3.6
Per-worker labor productivity growth	2.2	2.9	2.1	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.4	4.0	2.7	-2.2	1.9	-6.2	1.2
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.3	3.0	2.1	2.7	3.3	3.6	3.5	4.3	3.0	-2.4	1.5	-6.2	1.3
Capital productivity growth	-5.7	-5.0	-4.3	-3.5	-4.1	-4.2	-4.1	-4.3	-4.4	-6.3	-2.3	-10.2	-1.5
TFP growth	0.4	1.1	0.3	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.4	2.1	1.0	-4.5	-0.5	-8.5	-0.4

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Asia25

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	53,326	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	1,916,344	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	29,075	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	45.7 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	12.7	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	n.a. %	
(exchange rate based)	6.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	n.a. Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	27.0	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	34.7 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	12.7	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	5.5 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	33.5	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	8.8 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	12.2	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	23.4 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	31.4 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	4.8	5.5	4.6	6.1	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.3	4.7	0.5	4.1	-3.1	2.7
Labor input growth	3.1	3.2	2.6	2.2	1.1	0.4	0.9	0.5	-0.3	2.1	2.9	1.3	1.0
Labor quality growth	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.5	-0.3	0.2	-0.1	-1.1	1.6	2.4	0.9	0.7
Hours worked growth	2.6	2.5	1.6	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.3
IT capital input growth	12.2	16.2	10.2	8.0	6.4	5.3	5.1	5.2	5.6	5.9	6.0	5.7	4.4
Non-IT capital input growth	5.7	5.0	4.9	5.6	6.9	6.6	6.8	6.7	6.4	6.8	6.9	6.7	5.1
Per-worker labor productivity growth	2.1	3.0	3.3	5.0	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.8	3.7	-0.1	3.5	-3.7	2.2
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.2	3.0	3.0	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.5	5.0	3.6	0.1	3.6	-3.5	2.4
Capital productivity growth	-5.8	-5.3	-5.1	-5.8	-6.8	-6.5	-6.6	-6.5	-6.3	-6.6	-3.1	-10.1	-2.6
TFP growth	0.3	1.4	0.9	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.6	2.2	1.7	-3.3	-0.2	-6.5	0.1

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

East Asia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	30,392	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	886,054	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	21,267	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	55.1	%
Per capita GDP in 2018	18.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	n.a.	%
(exchange rate based)	13.2	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	n.a.	Years
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	33.4	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	38.5	%
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	15.6	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	5.3	%
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	47.2	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	5.8	%
Energy productivity levels in 2017	11.1	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	27.6	%
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	22.9	%

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	projection			
										2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	5.2	6.0	4.6	6.3	5.2	4.5	4.5	5.0	3.9	1.8	4.4	-0.8	2.5
Labor input growth	3.0	3.1	2.3	1.5	0.2	-0.8	-0.4	-0.4	-1.7	1.4	2.7	0.2	-0.1
Labor quality growth	0.5	0.3	0.8	0.8	-0.1	-1.0	-0.3	-0.6	-2.1	2.1	3.5	0.7	0.6
Hours worked growth	2.5	2.8	1.4	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.4	-0.7	-0.9	-0.5	-0.8
IT capital input growth	12.7	16.3	9.9	7.2	5.1	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.5	5.6	5.6	5.5	4.2
Non-IT capital input growth	6.0	5.1	4.7	6.0	7.4	7.0	7.3	7.1	6.6	6.9	6.9	6.8	5.2
Per-worker labor productivity growth	2.5	3.2	3.6	5.8	4.9	4.3	4.3	4.8	3.8	1.9	4.5	-0.7	2.9
Per-hour labor productivity growth	2.6	3.3	3.2	5.5	4.9	4.3	4.6	4.8	3.4	2.5	5.2	-0.3	3.3
Capital productivity growth	-6.2	-5.6	-4.9	-6.1	-7.2	-6.7	-7.0	-6.8	-6.4	-5.5	-2.9	-8.0	-3.0
TFP growth	0.7	1.9	1.2	2.7	2.0	2.1	1.8	2.3	2.2	-1.6	0.3	-3.4	0.7

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

South Asia

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	11,213	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	661,442	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	3,431	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	37.3 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	6.3	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	n.a. %	
(exchange rate based)	1.9	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	n.a. Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	16.3	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	30.2 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	7.7	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	3.7 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	15.0	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	16.6 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	13.8	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	13.9 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	44.1 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2015	2015	2016	2017	projection			
	-80	-90	-2000	-10	-18	-18	-16	-17	-18	2018-20	2018-19	2019-20	2020-25
GDP growth	2.8	5.0	4.8	6.8	6.3	6.6	7.2	5.6	7.1	-1.7	5.0	-8.4	3.7
Labor input growth	3.1	3.1	2.9	3.0	2.2	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.7	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.2
Labor quality growth	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.3	1.3	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.6	1.6	1.4	1.9	1.8
Hours worked growth	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.6	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.3
IT capital input growth	7.5	14.2	14.1	15.4	12.6	11.1	10.4	11.3	11.7	7.3	7.4	7.1	5.4
Non-IT capital input growth	3.8	4.9	5.2	6.5	7.1	6.7	6.6	6.8	6.8	7.3	7.4	7.2	5.4
Per-worker labor productivity growth	0.4	3.4	3.4	5.0	5.1	5.6	6.4	5.6	4.9	-3.2	3.5	-9.9	2.3
Per-hour labor productivity growth	0.4	3.3	3.3	4.9	5.2	5.7	6.2	5.9	5.0	-3.3	3.2	-9.9	2.3
Capital productivity growth	-3.8	-4.9	-5.3	-6.7	-7.2	-6.8	-6.6	-6.9	-6.9	-9.2	-2.7	-15.8	-1.9
TFP growth	-0.6	1.6	1.3	1.9	1.7	2.5	2.9	2.5	2.1	-6.4	0.3	-13.1	-0.2

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity




Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level




Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

ASEAN

Key Indicators

GDP in 2018	7,872	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Number of employment in 2018	315,854	Thousands Persons
(exchange rate based)	2,970	Billions of US dollars (as of 2018)	Employment rate in 2018	48.9 %	
Per capita GDP in 2018	12.2	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Female employment share in 2018	n.a. %	
(exchange rate based)	4.6	Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)	Average schooling years of workers in 2018	n.a. Years	
Per-worker labor productivity level in 2018	24.3	Thousands of US dollars per worker (as of 2018)	Investment share in 2018	29.7 %	
Per-hour labor productivity level in 2018	11.4	US dollars per hour worked (as of 2018)	ICT investment share in GFCF in 2018	8.7 %	
Capital stock per hour worked in 2018	27.9	US dollars (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in GDP in 2018	11.0 %	
Energy productivity levels in 2017	15.1	Thousands of US dollars per toe (as of 2018)	Manufacturing share in GDP in 2018	21.0 %	
Carbon intensity of GDP in 2017	n.a.	g-CO2 per US dollar (as of 2018)	Agriculture share in employment in 2018	31.1 %	

(%: average annual growth rate)	1970-80	1980-90	1990-2000	2000-10	2010-18	2015-18	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-20	projection			
											2018-19	2019-20	2020-25	
GDP growth	6.7	5.5	4.9	5.2	4.9	4.9	4.6	4.9	5.2	0.6	4.4	-3.2	2.4	
Labor input growth	4.4	4.8	4.4	4.4	3.3	3.0	4.8	1.7	2.6	3.1	3.2	3.0	2.8	
Labor quality growth	0.9	1.8	2.4	2.3	2.3	1.4	2.3	0.9	0.9	2.1	1.9	2.2	2.0	
Hours worked growth	3.4	3.0	2.0	2.1	1.1	1.7	2.5	0.8	1.7	1.0	1.2	0.8	0.9	
IT capital input growth	9.6	17.5	13.9	13.0	11.6	8.9	8.6	9.5	8.7	5.6	5.7	5.6	4.2	
Non-IT capital input growth	6.3	6.3	6.8	3.9	5.3	5.5	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.9	6.0	5.9	4.5	
Per-worker labor productivity growth	3.3	2.1	3.0	3.0	3.4	3.1	1.8	4.1	3.4	-0.4	3.4	-4.1	1.5	
Per-hour labor productivity growth	3.2	2.5	2.9	3.1	3.9	3.4	2.5	4.3	3.6	-0.4	3.1	-4.0	1.6	
Capital productivity growth	-6.3	-6.5	-7.0	-4.3	-5.6	-5.6	-5.7	-5.5	-5.5	-5.7	-2.0	-9.5	-2.4	
TFP growth	1.1	-0.4	-1.0	0.8	0.3	0.6	-0.4	1.2	1.0	-3.5	0.2	-7.3	-0.9	

Production




Figure 1 Per Capita GDP




Figure 2 Industry Origins of Economic Growth

Labor




Figure 3 Labor Inputs




Figure 4 Demographic Dividend

Productivity



Figure 5 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level



Figure 6 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level




Figure 7 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth




Figure 8 Productivity Indicators




Figure 9 Decomposition of Economic Growth




Figure 10 Decomposition of Labor Productivity Growth

Appendix

A.1 National Accounts in Asia

Understanding data comparability is essential for the construction of an international database and requires continuous effort and expert knowledge. Broadly speaking, cross-country data inconsistency can arise from variations in one or more of the three aspects of a statistic: definition, coverage, and methodology. The international definitions and guidelines work to standardize countries' measurement efforts. However, country data can deviate from the international best practice and vary in terms of omissions and coverage achieved. Countries can also vary in their estimation methodology and assumptions in benchmark and/or annual revisions. This may account for part of the differences observed in the data, as well as interfere with comparisons of countries' underlying economic performance.

Between March and June in 2020, the APO Productivity Database project conducted the Metadata Survey 2020 on the national accounts and other statistical data required for international comparisons of productivity among the APO member economies. Since most of the economic performance indicators in




Figure 76 Implementation of the 1968, 1993, and 2008 SNA

Sources: APO Metadata Survey 2020 and our investigation at KEO.

this report are GDP-related, the surveys put much emphasis on discerning countries' GDP compilation practices. The 2008 SNA is used as the standard, noting how countries' practices deviate from it. Since there are differences between the 2008 SNA and its predecessors (1993 SNA or 1968 SNA) in some concepts and coverage, it is important to know in which year the data series definitions and classification started to switch over. This allows identification in breaks in the time series. Figure 76 presents the current situation in compilations and data availability of the backward estimates based on the 1968 SNA, the 1993 SNA, and the 2008 SNA (including the plan for introducing the 2008 SNA), based on our Meta-data Survey 2020 and our research at KEO. For example, this chart indicates that Japan started to publish national accounts based on the 1968 SNA in 1978 (at present, backward estimates based on the 1968 SNA are available from 1955), national accounts based on the 1993 SNA in 2000 (backward estimates based on the 1993 SNA are available from 1980 to 2014), and national accounts based on the 2008 SNA in 2016 (backward estimates based on the 2008 SNA are available from 1994 to present).

As Figure 76 suggests, countries differ in their year of introduction, the extent of implementation, and the availability of backward estimates. In the Asia25, 16 economies are currently 2008 SNA compliant (partially or fully). The starting year of the official 2008 or 1993 SNA compliant time series varies a great deal across countries, reflecting the differences in the availability of backward estimates. Countries may have adopted the 2008/1993 SNA as the framework for their national accounts, but the extent of compliance in terms of coverage may also vary. The APO Productivity Database tries to reconcile the national accounts variations, to provide harmonized estimates for international comparison. See Appendix 2 for details of the adjustments.

A.2 GDP Harmonization

The Databook incorporates some significant revisions to the national accounts. Recent developments for upgrading their national accounts based on the 2008 SNA have resulted in Sri Lanka as of March 2016, Japan and Turkey as of December 2016, and Iran as of August 2017. As discussed in Appendix 1, 16 economies of the Asia25 are 2008 SNA-compliant and others are 1993 SNA-compliant, although it should be noted that the extent of compliance in terms of coverage may vary. The different statuses of SNA adaptations among economies explain the huge variations of data definitions and coverage in national accounts, calling for data harmonization to better perform comparative productivity analyses.

This edition largely follows the concepts and definitions of the 2008 SNA and tries to reconcile the national accounts variations, in particular on the difference in the treatment of research and development (R&D), military weapon systems, software investment, and financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM).⁵⁵ In order to create long-time series data, it is necessary to use the past estimates based on the 1968/1993 SNA, with exceptions in the ROC, Korea, and Singapore, who already published the backward estimates based on the 2008 SNA from the 1950s or 1960. In addition, some additional adjustments are necessary to harmonize the long-term estimates of GDP. Procedures for these adjustments are explained below.

55: The introductions of the 2008 SNA are usually conducted with the benchmark revisions. Thus, in some countries there are large revisions in data due to the uses of the newly available survey (e.g., a new survey on services) or of the new benchmark data (e.g., a new development of the supply and use table), not largely due to the revisions from the 1993 SNA. The information required to reconcile the different benchmark-year series is collected for through our questionnaire to the national experts in our project or based on our investigation at KEO.

1) FISIM

FISIM is an indirect measure of the value of financial intermediation services provided. It represents a significant part of the income of the finance sector. The 1993 SNA (United Nations, 1993) recommends that FISIM should be allocated to users (to individual industries and final demands). This contrasts with the 1968 SNA, where the imputed banking services were allocated exclusively to the business sector. The common practice was to create a notional industry that buys the entire service as an intermediate expense and generates an equivalent negative value added. As such, the imputed banking services have no impact on GDP. Therefore, the 1993/2008 SNA recommendation, if fully implemented, will impact industry GDP and the overall GDP for the total economy (by the part of FISIM allocated to final demands).

Among the 21 APO member economies, three countries – Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Nepal – do not allocate FISIM to final demands in their official national accounts, because of them not following the 1993/2008 SNA recommendation. Thus, the GDP values in these countries are smaller than others. In addition, in the countries whose national accounts follow the 1993/2008 SNA's recommendation on FISIM, the available data sometimes does not cover the entire periods of our observations. To harmonize the GDP concept among countries and over periods, final demands of FISIM are estimated for those countries in the APO Productivity Database, using available estimates of value added in Imputed Bank Service Charge (IBSC) or financial intermediation (in instances where IBSC data is not available). The ratios of value added of IBSC or financial intermediation on FISIM allocated to final demand are assumed to be identical with the average ratios observed in the countries in which data is available. Figure 77 describes the countries, years, and methods to adjust FISIM in the official national accounts. As described, in instances where both value-added data are not available, the trend of the FISIM share on GDP is applied to extrapolate past estimates (although the impacts on GDP are minor).




Figure 77 Adjustment of FISIM

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Figure 78 plots per capita GDP levels in 2018 and the FISIM share in GDP as an average in 2000–2018 (including both of the original estimates in the official national accounts and our estimates). In countries where GDP are adjusted, the proportions by which author adjustments for FISIM increases GDP stand at 0.7–1.2% for Nepal and the Lao PDR and less than 0.4% GDP in others.

2) Software

The 2008 SNA recommends the capitalization of intellectual property products (IPP), which changes not only GDP but also capital input. One of the IPP capitalized in the Databook is computer software, which includes pre-packaged software, custom software, and own-account software. Among the Asia25 economies, 17 economies have capitalized all three types of software. Another three countries exclude own-account software in their capitalization, and in one country only custom software is capitalized (others still do not capitalize software in their national accounts). In the APO Productivity Database, tentative adjustments have been made to harmonize data to include all software.

3) Valuables

Valuables are defined as “goods of considerable value that are not used primarily for purposes of production or consumption but are held as stores of value over time” (United Nations, 1993, para. 10.7). They are held under the expectation that their prices will not deteriorate and will rise in the long run. Valuables consist of precious stones and metals such as diamonds; artwork such as paintings and sculptures; and other valuables such as jewelry made from stones and metals. In a small number of countries, such as India, Iran, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Bhutan, net acquisitions of valuables are recorded as a part




Figure 78 FISIM Share in GDP

—Average share of FISIM Production in GDP at current market prices in 2000–2018

Sources: Official national accounts in each country and author estimates.

of gross capital formation. For example, the SNA in India has included it since 1999. The current decision is to harmonize the data by excluding net acquisition of valuables from GDP in the Databook.

4) Consumption of Fixed Capital of Assets Owned by Government

As of February 2012, Thailand officially switched to the 1993 SNA, and its national accounts became compatible with the 1993 framework for the first time. In this series, government consumption includes the consumption of fixed capital (CFC) owned by the government since 1990. To construct the long time-series data in the Databook series, the past data based on the 1968 SNA has been adjusted to be consistent with the new series. In the Databook, government capital stock and its CFC for the period 1970–1989 are estimated and the past government consumption and GDP are adjusted accordingly. A similar adjustment on the CFC of the assets owned by government was conducted for Bangladesh (for the period 1970–1995), Malaysia (1970–1999), and Mongolia (1970–2004).

5) R&D

The R&D is capitalized in the Databook series by following the 2008 SNA recommendations. In the countries that still do not follow the 2008 SNA, the R&D expenditures are not allocated to GFCF (but to intermediate uses). To harmonize the GDP concept among countries and over periods, the R&D investment is estimated for those countries in APO Productivity Database. As a preferable approach, the data on the R&D expenditure are collected based on the official surveys in each country, to estimate the R&D investment. Figure 79 describes the countries, years, and methods to estimate R&D investment and adds it to GFCF in the official national accounts. If the data on R&D expenditures are not available, as a crude estimate, the trend of R&D investment shares on GFCF or GDP are applied to extrapolate past estimates.




Figure 79 Adjustment of R&D

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

6) GDP at basic prices

GDP can be valued using different price concepts: factor cost, basic prices, and market prices. If the price concept is not standardized across countries, it will interfere with the international comparisons. All the countries covered in this Databook officially report GDP at market prices (or at purchasers' prices), but this is not true for GDP at factor cost and GDP at basic prices. International comparisons in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are based on GDP at market prices. However, by valuing output and input at the prices that producers actually pay and receive, GDP at basic prices is a more appropriate measure of countries' output for international comparisons of TFP and industry performance, as it is a measure from the producers' perspective. Hence, Chapter 5 on productivity performance is based on GDP at basic prices, including our estimates.

These concepts of GDP differ in the treatment of indirect tax and subsidies (and import duties). The difference between GDP at basic prices and GDP at market prices is “taxes on products” minus “subsidies on products.” “Taxes on products” are the indirect taxes payable on goods and services mainly when they are produced, sold, and imported, and “subsidies on products” are subsidies payable on goods and services mainly when they are produced, sold, and imported. Since GDP at basic prices is available for some economies, such as Hong Kong, India, Korea, Mongolia, Nepal, Singapore, and Sri Lanka, a GDP at basic prices calculation, needs to be constructed for all other countries. To obtain GDP at basic prices, “taxes on products” and “duties on imports” are subtracted from GDP at market prices, which are available for all the countries studied, and “subsidies on products” is added. The main data sources for estimating “taxes on products” and “subsidies on products” are tax data in national accounts, the IMF's Government Finance Statistics, and the input-output tables in each country (Table 3).

Readers should bear these caveats in mind when interpreting the results in Chapter 6, since the definition of GDP by industry differs among countries due to data availability. GDP is valued at: factor cost for Fiji, and Pakistan; basic prices for Bangladesh, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India, Korea, the Lao PDR, Mongolia, Nepal, Singapore, and Vietnam; producers' prices for Iran, the ROC, and the Philippines; and market prices for Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey. In this sense, the industry data should be treated as a work in progress as it is difficult to advise on data uncertainty. These issues will be examined in the future.

Table 3 Input-Output Tables and Supply and Use Tables in Asia

Input-Output Tables and Supply and Use Tables	
Bangladesh	1981/1982, 1986/1987, 1992/1993, 1993/1994, 2000, 2005/2006, 2010/2011
Cambodia	2003**, 2005*, 2010–2017*
ROC	Benchmark (1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2011) Extended (1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004) Annual (2006–2017)
Fiji	1972, 1981, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011
India	1993/1994, 1998/1999, 2003/2004, 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/2014, 2014/2015, 2015/2016
Indonesia	1971, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Iran	1962, 1973, 1974, 1986, 1988, 1991, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2011
Japan	1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2011, 2015
Korea	Benchmark (1960, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015) Updated (1973, 1978, 1983, 1986–1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2006–2015)
Lao PDR	2012, 2010–2017*
Malaysia	1978, 1983, 1987, 1991, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015
Mongolia	1963, 1966, 1970, 1977, 1983, 1987, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2010
Pakistan	1975/1976, 1984/1985, 1989/1990, 1999/2000
Philippines	1961, 1965, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1985, 1988, 1994, 2000, 2006, 2012
Singapore	1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015
Sri Lanka	2006
Thailand	1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2010
Turkey	1973, 1979, 1985, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2012
Vietnam	1989, 1996, 2000, 2007, 2012
China	1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012
Bhutan	2007
Brunei	2005, 2010, 2010–2017*

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: These SUT/IOT are collected and used in development of APO Productivity Database 2020. The Databook 2020 newly reflects the SUT/IOT of Brunei for 2005, the ROC for in 2016, India for 2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2014/2015, and 2015/2016, Iran for 2011, Korea for 2016 and 2017, Malaysia for 2015, Singapore for 2015, and Turkey for 1973, 1979, 1985, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2002, and 2012. *ADB (2018), **Kobayashi et al. (2012).

A.3 Capital Stock of Produced Assets

About half of APO member economies publish estimates of capital stocks in their systems of national accounts. Even where estimates are available, users must be mindful of differences in methodologies and assumptions used to estimate capital stock and its consumption, as well as a large diversity in the treatment of quality adjustment in price statistics among countries. In the APO Productivity Database 2020, a harmonized framework is applied in estimating capital stock and capital services, covering the Asia25 economies and the US as a reference country. The geometric approach is used to measure capital stock. The standard parameters on geometric depreciation rates are assumed in Table 4, by the country groups (D1–D6) that are defined in Table 2 in Section 6.1 (p. 70).

Quality changes in the aggregate measure of capital input can originate from two kinds of sources, namely the composition change by type of asset, and the quality improvement in each type of asset. To take the composition change of assets into account, the current database classifies 11 types of assets (Table 4) and four types of land stock. For countries in which detailed investment data is not available from national accounts, the 11 types of investment data are estimated based on the benchmark and/or annual SUT/IOT and our own estimates on the commodity flow of domestic production and export/import of assets. Thus, readers are cautioned about data uncertainty and should expect that the decomposition of contributions of capital services into IT and non-IT capital may be considerably revised for some countries, when more reliable data sources for estimation become available. The SUT/IOT used in our measurement is listed in Table 3 in Appendix 3. In our estimates on investment by type of asset, the Databook 2020 newly reflects the SUT/IOT estimates described in Table 3.

It is well known that prices of constant-quality IT capital have been falling rapidly. For cross-country comparisons, it has been noted that there is great diversity in the treatment of quality adjustment in price statistics among countries. Cross-country comparisons will be significantly biased if some countries adjust their deflators for quality change while others do not. Price harmonization is sometimes used to control for methodological differences in the compilation of price indexes, under the assumption that individual countries' price data fails to capture quality improvements. If the relative price of IT to non-IT capital in the countries compared is set equal to the IT to non-IT prices relative in the reference country, the harmonized price is formulated as: $\Delta \ln \bar{P}_{IT}^X = \Delta \ln P_{nIT}^X + (\Delta \ln P_{IT}^{ref} - \Delta \ln P_{nIT}^{ref})$, where the superscript X denotes the country included in the comparisons, P_{IT} is the price of IT capital, and P_{nIT} is the price of non-IT capital. The price of IT capital in country X , \bar{P}_{IT}^X , is computed by the observed prices P_{IT}^{ref} and P_{nIT}^{ref} in the reference country and P_{nIT}^X in X . Schreyer (2002) and Schreyer, Bignon, and Dupont (2003) applied price harmonization to OECD capital services, with the US as a reference country, since the possible error due to using a harmonized price index would be smaller than the bias arising from comparing capital services based on national deflators.

In the Databook series, the same price harmonization method is applied to adjust the quality improvement for IT hardware and communications equipment in countries where the appropriate

Table 4 Classification of Produced Assets and Assumptions of Depreciation Rates

asset code	δ					
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6
1. IT hardware	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294	0.294
2. Communications equipment	0.246	0.246	0.246	0.246	0.246	0.246
3. Transportation equipment	0.219	0.219	0.162	0.138	0.138	0.138
4. Other machinery and equipment and weapon systems	0.178	0.178	0.138	0.117	0.117	0.117
5. Dwellings	0.049	0.049	0.041	0.037	0.033	0.033
6. Non-residential buildings	0.084	0.084	0.062	0.056	0.050	0.045
7. Other structures	0.026	0.026	0.019	0.018	0.017	0.016
8. Cultivated biological resources	0.215	0.215	0.202	0.161	0.145	0.131
9. Research and development (R&D)	0.190	0.190	0.180	0.162	0.162	0.162
10. Computer software	0.330	0.330	0.330	0.330	0.330	0.330
11. Other intellectual property products	0.270	0.270	0.270	0.270	0.270	0.270

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: See Table 2 in Section 6.1 (p. 70) for the country groups (D1–D6).

quality-adjusted price data is not available, with Japan's prices as a reference country. A similar procedure was applied in cases where the prices for some assets were not available, to estimate missing data based on the relative price of these assets to total GFCF.

Figure 80 presents the estimated capital-output ratio (stock coefficient) that is defined by the ratio of the beginning-of-period net capital stock (all types of produced assets owned by private and public institutions) to the basic-price GDP at current prices. Bhutan has the highest capital-output ratio among the Asia25 economies, at 4.3 in 2018, reflecting the industry structure skewing to electricity (hydropower). Compared to the 1980 level in each country, all Asian countries except Cambodia, Mongolia, Iran, and Pakistan have an increasing trend of capital-output ratio.




Figure 80 Capital-Output Ratio (Produced Assets)

—Ratio of the beginning-of-period net capital stock to basic-price GDP at current prices in 1980, 2000, and 2018

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

A.4 Land Stock

Land is an important factor of production not only in the agriculture sector, but also in manufacturing and service sectors. In densely populated countries, land occupies a large share of nominal capital stock. Regardless of its importance, land has not been considered as capital in the Databook due to data availability. In Asia, only Japan and Korea publish the estimates of land stocks in their national balance sheets of the national accounts. At KEO, the land database has been developed since 2016 and these estimates have been involved in the growth accounting frameworks since the Databook 2019. The current land database used in this edition covers the Asia25 economies. Table 5 defines the types of land use. In this edition, four types of land for economical use (land code: L1100, L1211, L1212, and L1213) from the land database are treated as non-produced assets (asset code: 12–15).

The land stock data consists of the estimates at current and constant prices by four types of land uses. The data on land area (m²) is available in FAOSTAT for agricultural use (asset code 12) and in national data resources for non-agricultural use (code: 13-15). For countries in which the data of national land area for residential use (code 15) is not available, they are estimated based on multiple approaches using available information and our estimates; e.g., number of households, average area per unit of household, population/household density in rural and urban areas, stock estimates of dwellings (see Appendix 3), and per capita GDP, and so on. If land for industrial use (code 13) is not available from national surveys like the manufacturing census, it is estimated based on our estimates of productivity of industry-use land and the manufacturing GDP. Similarly, land for commercial use (code 14) is estimated based on our estimates of productivity of commercial-use land and the service-sector GDP, if it is not available in national data resources.

Table 5 Classification of Land

asset code	type of land classification
	L0000 Total land
	L1000 Land for economical use
12	L1100 Land for agricultural use
	L1200 Land for non-agricultural use
	L1210 Land for building use
13	L1211 Land for industrial use
14	L1212 Land for commercial use
15	L1213 Land for residential use
	L1220 Land for other use
	L2000 Land for forest use
	L3000 Land for inland water use

Source: Land database and APO Productivity Database 2020.

Note: See Table 4 in Appendix 3 for the classification of produced assets (1-11).

For countries in which the land stocks at current prices are not available, the samples of land price data are collected to estimate the current-price land stocks. The land price data are available mainly in the urban area and are collected from market data and survey results such as *The World Land Value Survey* (Japan Association of Real Estate Appraisers: JAREA), *Report on Survey of Urban Land Prices in the Developing World* (International Housing Coalition: IHC), and *Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania* (Japan External Trade Organization: JETRO). With our assumptions on the price gaps between urban and rural areas in each country, these survey prices of urban land area are discounted to estimate the national level averages. On the land prices for agricultural use, the national level average price




Figure 81 Capital-Output Ratio (Produced Assets and Land)
 —Ratio of the beginning-of-period net capital stock to basic-price GDP at current prices in 2018

Sources: Land database and APO Productivity Database 2020.

is estimated in each country based on our estimates of the discounted present value of future rents, which are based on our estimates of mixed income in agriculture sector and the rate of return (see Appendix 5).

Although further efforts to improve the estimates are required, Figure 81 presents our current estimates of the ratios of total capital stock to basic-price GDP and the land shares of total capital stocks (at right axis) in 2018. When including land stocks, the country order of capital-output ratios is considerably revised from Figure 80, which is based on only produced assets. In ROC, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the estimated land shares exceed 70% of total capital stock, which are almost twice of 37% in Japan and 31% in the US. As the capital-output ratios are over 5 in Asian Tigers and Japan, the consideration of land stocks is expected to eliminate a bias to underestimate TFP growth.

A.5 Capital Services

In the analysis of production and productivity, capital service provides an appropriate concept of capital as a factor of production. The fundamental assumption in measuring capital services is proportionality between the (productive) capital stock and capital services in each type of asset. Thus, the growth rates of capital services can differ from that of capital stock only at the aggregate level. For aggregating different types of capital, the user costs of capital by type of asset are required. This Appendix outlines the methodology of the user cost of capital estimation and presents the estimated results of endogenous rate of return for Asian countries in the APO Productivity Database 2020.

The user cost of capital of a new asset (with type of asset denoted as k of the period t), $u_{t,0}^k$, is defined as $q_{t-1,0}^k \{r_t + (1 + \pi_t^k) \delta_{t,0}^k - \pi_t^k\}$, where r_t , $\delta_{t,0}^k$, and $q_{t,0}^k$ are the expected nominal rate of return, cross-section depreciation rate, and asset price, respectively. The asset-specific inflation rate π_t^k is defined as $(q_{t,0}^k / q_{t-1,0}^k - 1)$. The OECD assumes the country-specific ex-ante real rate of return r^* that is constant for the whole period, and defines the nominal rate of return as $r_t = (1 + r^*)(1 + \rho_t) - 1$, where ρ_t represents the expected overall inflation rate, defined by a five-year centered moving average of the rate of change of the CPI (see Schreyer, Bignon, and Dupont, 2003).

One of the main difficulties in applying the ex-ante approach for measuring user cost of capital is obtaining proper estimates for real rates of return, which can differ considerably among countries and over time. On the other hand, the ex-post approach originated by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) allows an estimation based on observed data. Assuming constant returns to scale and competitive markets, capital compensation can be derived from the summation of the capital service cost V_t^k for each asset, which is defined as the product of the user cost of capital and the productive capital stock (i.e., $V_t = \sum_k V_t^k = \sum_k u_{t,0}^k \delta_t^k$). Based on this identity and the n -equations of user cost of capital, the $n+1$ variables of $u_{t,0}^k$ and r_t are simultaneously determined, using the observed capital compensation V_t as the total sum of V_t^k that is not observable in each asset. Note that the depreciation rate $\delta_{t,0}^k$ is not independent of the estimated r_t .

The estimated results of the ex-post real rate of return based on $r_t^* = (1 + r_t) / (1 + \rho_t) - 1$ for the Asia25 economies and the US are presented Table 6, as the five-year averages in the entire observation period 1970–2018. In 2015–2018, the real rate of return ranged from 3.7–5.4% in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore to 20% in Myanmar and Pakistan. Using these ex-post estimates, the aggregate capital services are measured in this report. The difference caused by the ex-ante and ex-post approaches may provide a modest difference in the growth measure of capital services, regardless of the substantial differences in the rates of return and capital compensations.

Table 6 Average Ex-Post Real Rate of Return in Asia

	1970–1974	1975–1979	1980–1984	1985–1989	1990–1994	1995–1999	2000–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014	2015–2018
Bangladesh	10.5	10.1	8.7	18.9	20.1	17.3	17.1	15.1	15.1	16.6
Bhutan	–1.0	4.1	–3.6	2.0	–0.9	2.2	6.1	3.5	1.1	4.4
Brunei	62.8	116.0	142.5	62.4	34.4	20.9	29.6	37.0	28.8	13.3
Cambodia	9.3	9.6	1.1	–27.8	–23.3	17.6	17.5	13.2	19.4	16.7
China	20.8	13.2	10.4	6.8	4.7	7.1	10.6	10.6	5.7	3.9
ROC	11.8	11.1	11.4	16.0	4.4	6.0	6.3	3.9	6.6	5.2
Fiji	10.2	12.1	8.2	9.0	17.5	10.4	9.8	10.8	11.0	15.8
Hong Kong	14.2	13.1	0.8	7.7	0.5	2.9	7.8	6.5	3.9	4.6
India	3.7	7.7	2.7	3.5	2.6	4.7	9.1	7.7	4.6	8.1
Indonesia	25.1	23.4	25.4	20.2	16.6	8.2	10.2	12.2	11.7	9.4
Iran	19.2	12.4	2.1	–1.5	–1.5	–0.3	13.8	16.8	10.2	15.8
Japan	–1.0	–2.3	2.2	5.2	1.9	1.3	2.5	3.4	2.4	3.7
Korea	11.7	7.6	4.9	11.9	3.5	1.0	4.9	5.5	3.9	5.4
Lao PDR	2.7	–10.1	–16.3	–12.1	6.5	–13.1	1.7	12.5	14.5	16.9
Malaysia	23.4	23.8	16.3	14.1	14.3	13.0	15.6	19.8	19.7	16.0
Mongolia	9.9	9.3	8.2	13.0	–42.3	–5.5	9.9	16.5	12.0	16.1
Myanmar	38.5	55.6	53.8	33.7	29.5	33.3	35.4	31.8	45.5	19.6
Nepal	13.8	10.7	6.7	6.8	5.6	7.0	11.4	10.3	4.7	6.4
Pakistan	16.7	13.4	14.4	18.1	13.0	17.3	24.7	16.4	18.7	19.5
Philippines	9.3	11.8	5.5	6.3	7.1	9.8	13.8	11.7	16.0	17.3
Singapore	6.0	8.4	6.9	7.6	5.6	4.3	4.8	7.5	3.6	3.9
Sri Lanka	23.8	25.8	7.9	6.8	4.8	6.7	8.9	10.2	20.3	18.0
Thailand	10.3	8.4	7.2	11.7	9.8	5.3	9.6	10.5	10.2	10.2
Turkey	27.3	10.1	–2.7	–5.7	–19.1	–22.6	–5.4	12.9	12.0	7.8
Vietnam	27.6	22.2	12.2	–42.8	5.0	17.5	18.1	9.3	8.4	10.8
US	7.0	4.1	3.5	7.2	5.7	9.2	8.1	6.4	8.3	9.3

Unit: Percentage.

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

A.6 Hours Worked and Labor Compensation

Labor volume can be measured in three units: number of persons in employment; number of filled jobs; and hours actually worked. Given the variations in working patterns and employment legislation both over time and across countries, hours worked, if accurately measured, offers the most time-consistent and somewhat internationally comparable unit measuring the volume in each of different types of labor. This is the primary underlying reason for the importance of choosing hours actually worked in productivity analysis, but, due to the difficulty in accurately estimating average hours actually worked, it is not always available or comparable across countries. The variety of data sources, definitions, and methodologies available in estimating these labor market variables often leads to a fragmentation of labor market statistics of an individual country concerned, dubious data quality, and incomparability across countries. Here follows an attempt to outline some of these intricate measurement issues.

Data on labor volume comes from two main statistical surveys on establishment and household, with respective strengths and weaknesses. Establishment surveys are surveys of firms with stratified sample frames by the size of establishments. The concentration of total employment in a relatively small number of establishments means that this sampling strategy is cost-effective in delivering high precision labor market estimates with a small sampling error. Questionnaires are designed to be close to the concepts used in company administration. This has both strengths and weaknesses. Data collected is of high quality and accuracy. On the other hand, changes in legislation and regulation could be a source of instability to the definitions, and in turn of the data collected. Furthermore, data that companies do not collect for administrative purpose, such as unpaid hours and worker characteristics, are unavailable. This greatly limits the varieties of labor market data that can be collected through establishments.⁵⁶ Information on hours is on

56: Employment as measured is necessarily based on jobs rather than on persons employed, as persons holding multiple jobs with different establishments cannot be identified and will be counted more than once.

paid hours rather than hours actually worked. Certain categories of employment, most notably the self-employed, are not covered. Sometimes small firms, informal employment (occupies more than 50% in some developing Asian countries) or the public sector is also excluded. Because of these limitations, labor market data from establishment surveys often requires a raft of adjustments for omissions and definition modifications during the compilation process.

Household-based labor force surveys (LFS), in contrast, have full coverage of the economy, although they sometimes incorporate age or geographic exclusions and may have imperfect coverage of the armed forces and other institutional households. Nonetheless, they provide valuable data on certain employment groups such as the self-employed and unpaid family workers, and on the rate of multiple job holding. Employment status in LFS is independently determined and is not subject to the criteria used in company records. Most countries follow the International Labour Organization (ILO) definitions. As LFS are surveys from the socio-economic perspective, they also provide rich data on worker characteristics that are relevant to productivity analysis.⁵⁷

The common practice of statistical offices has been to combine information from both establishment and household surveys, with a view of making use of the most reliable aspects of each of the surveys. This seems to be the most promising avenue forward in improving the quality and consistency of data on labor input. However, statistical offices could still differ a great deal in their methodologies, especially in estimating the annual average hours worked per job/person, depending on their starting points, namely LFS data or enterprise data. All these must be considered in international comparisons of productivity.

Figure 82 presents a cross-country comparison of average annual hours worked per worker for 2010–2018, relative to the level of the US, based on the Asia QALI Database in Appendix 7. It indicates that workers in Asian countries tend to work much longer hours than those in the US and Europe. In many of the countries sampled, the difference in annual hours worked per person relative to the US is more than 10% of the US level.⁵⁸ Prolonged working hours are observed in




Figure 82 Hours Worked Per Worker, Relative to the US

—Average annual hours worked per worker in 2010–2018

Sources: Official national accounts and labor force survey in each country, including author adjustments, for Asian countries and OECD Stat for the EU15.

57: The major weakness of the LFS, however, is data precision. By relying on the recollection of the respondents, their response also depends on perception. Response errors could, therefore, arise from confusion of concepts and imprecise recollection of the respondents concerning work patterns and pay during the reference week. Another source of error originates from proxy response, which relies on the proxy's perception and knowledge of another household's member. A high level of proxy responses could, therefore, reduce the reliability of data collected.

58: Shorter hours worked in Nepal is due to frequent general strikes called "Banda", which are mainly led by some political parties. According to the Nepal Human Rights Commission, Banda were called 821 times in various regions in 2009, and economic activities were closed during Banda.




Figure 83 Availability of COE Estimates

Sources: Official national accounts and SUT/IOT in each country.

Note: Hatched areas show the periods in which only the data mingled with operating surplus or mixed income is available.

Asian countries regardless of their stage of development, spanning low-income countries such as Bangladesh and Cambodia to high-income countries such as Singapore and Korea. An exception is Japan. Workers in Japan are likely to work much shorter hours than those in other Asian countries. However, compared with the EU15, hours worked by workers in Japan are still about 13% greater.

The labor share, which is defined as the ratio of labor compensation of total employment to GDP at basic prices, is one of the key factors to determine TFP growth. The estimates on the compensation of employees (COE), however, are not fully available in the official national accounts in Asian countries. Figure 83 summarizes the availability of the COE estimates in the official national accounts and the input-output tables in each country (Table 3 in Appendix 3). Currently the national accounts in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam do not fully publish the COE estimates. In addition, in some countries like Cambodia and Iran, the estimates are not fully available for the entire period of our observation of 1970–2018. In such cases, the COE is estimated or extrapolated by the estimates based on the Asia QALI Database.

The compensation for the self-employed and contributing family workers is not separately estimated in the national accounts but is combined with returns to capital in mixed income. The APO Productivity Database 2020 uses the estimates in the Asia QALI Database (Appendix 7), in which a region-common assumption is applied, with the exceptions for countries where reliable data are available. The assumption used in Asia QALI is that the wage differential ratio (WDR) in hourly wages of non-employees to employees in each elementary group of labor inputs is set at 0.5 for Japan, 0.3 for the Asian Tigers, and 0.5 for CLMV (except Myanmar), Iran and Turkey, and 0.2 for other countries in the Asia QALI Database 2020.

A.7 Quality-adjusted Labor Inputs

In productivity analysis, labor inputs are expected to be quality adjusted to reflect workforce heterogeneity, as recommended in the SNA 2008 (United Nations, 2009). To adjust total hours worked for quality would require information on worker characteristics to differentiate the workforce into different types, which are then weighed by their marginal productivity and approximated by their respective shares of total compensation. In the stage of high economic growth, labor quality growth can be a significant factor as well as the increase in hours worked, improvement in education attainment of workers, and a shift from the self-employed (e.g., in agriculture or informal service sectors) to employees (e.g. in manufacturing or formal service sectors).

Deriving a quality adjusted labor input (QALI) measure is a data-demanding exercise. Even if LFS provides the required information, researchers often run into the consistency issues discussed in Appendix 6, as well as sample size problems as they break down the workforce into fine categories. Covering the Asia25 economies, the data on employment and wage/incomes has been collected by type of labor categories since 2013 at KEO, based mainly on LFS and Population Census, as listed in Table 7. The developed data is called as Asia QALI. This data consists of number of workers, hours worked per worker, and hourly wages, which are cross-classified by gender, education attainment, age, and employment status. The first report on development of Asia QALI for South Asian countries was published in Nomura and Akashi (2017). Since then further examinations and extensions have been conducted at KEO and the Asia QALI Database 2020 covers the Asia25 economies. This latest data is used to provide the estimates of total hours worked, labor qualities, and QALI in the APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 7 Sources of Labor Data

Sources of Labor Data	
Bangladesh	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey
Bhutan	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Labour Market Information Bulletin,
Brunei	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey
Cambodia	General Population Census, Inter-Censal Population Survey, Labor Force Survey, Socio-Economic Survey
China	China Statistical Yearbook, China Labor Statistical Yearbook, Population Census, 1% National Population Sample Survey
ROC	Population and Housing Census, Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics in Taiwan Area, Manpower Utilization Survey
Fiji	Census of Population and Housing, Employment and Unemployment Survey, Annual Employment Survey
Hong Kong	Population Census, Population By-Census, General Household Survey, Annual Earnings and Hours Survey
India	Census of India, Employment and Unemployment Survey, National Sample Survey
Indonesia	Population and Housing Census, Labor Force Situation in Indonesia, Laborer Situation in Indonesia
Iran	National Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Iran Salary Report
Japan	Population Census, Labor Force Survey, Census of Manufacture, Basic Survey on Wage Structure, Monthly Labour Survey, Japan's System of National Accounts
Korea	Population and Housing Census, Economically Active Population Survey, Employment Structure Survey, Wage Structure Survey
Lao PDR	Population Census, Labour Force Survey, Urban Labour Force Survey, ADB Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific
Malaysia	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Salaries & Wages Survey
Mongolia	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Survey on Wages and Salaries, A Pilot Time Use Survey
Myanmar	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Salary Survey Report, Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania
Nepal	Population and Housing Census, Labor Force Survey
Pakistan	Population Census, Labour Force Survey, Census of Manufacturing Industries
Philippines	Labor Force Survey
Singapore	Population Census, Labor Force Survey, Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics, General Household Survey
Sri Lanka	Census of Population and Housing, Labour Force Survey
Thailand	Population and Housing Census, Labor Force Survey
Turkey	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force Survey, Income and Living Conditions Survey
Vietnam	Population and Housing Census, Labour Force and Employment Survey, Living Standards Survey, Vietnam Statistical Data in the 20th Century, Vietnam Economy 1986–1991

Source: Asia QALI Database 2020.




Figure 84 Average Schooling Years of Workers

Source: Asia QALI Database 2020.

Figure 84 presents the time-series comparisons of the average schooling years observed in terms of workers since 1970, as a more intuitive indicator based on the Asia QALI Database. Japan is the leading country (13.3 years), followed by Korea (13.2 years), the ROC (13.1 years), Hong Kong (12.4 years) and Mongolia (12.2 years). The reverse reflects the differences in employment rate of highly educated persons, e.g. higher rate of unemployment of educated persons in Korea. Although there is a significant range in 2018 from 4.4 years (Bhutan) to 13.3 years (Japan), the average years have increased since 1970 in almost all economies in Asia.

A.8 Purchasing Power Parities

Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are indispensable inputs into economic research and policy analysis involving cross-country comparisons of macroeconomic aggregates. They affect a double conversion of macroeconomic measures, estimated in national currencies and price levels, into comparable cross-country volume measures. These are expressed in a common currency and at a uniform price level. PPPs are price relatives that show the ratio of the prices in national currencies of single or composite goods




Figure 85 Revisions of PPP for GDP in the ICP 2017 and 2011 Rounds

—Ratios of the 2017 PPP to the 2011 PPP (extrapolated for 2017) and the 2011 PPP to the 2005 PPP (extrapolated for 2011).

Sources: World Bank, *World Development Indicators* 2020.

and services in different countries. They are compiled within the International Comparisons Program (ICP). Comparisons are made from the expenditure side of GDP. To this end, the ICP compiles PPPs by holding worldwide surveys at regular intervals (currently, every six years) to collect comparable price and expenditure data for the entire range of final goods and services that make up the final expenditures on GDP. In April 2020, the new benchmark PPP estimates were published by the ICP 2017 round (World Bank, 2020a).

Chapter 3 mainly provides the cross-country comparison of economic volumes. To obtain comparable volume measures, the Databook uses the constant PPP approach, which relies not on a time series of PPPs, but on one of the benchmark estimates. This edition of Databook newly uses the benchmark estimates by the ICP 2017 round. The use of this approach creates national series for volumes at the prices of a common reference year (i.e., 2018), and deflates these by the PPP for a fixed year (i.e., 2017).

The left chart of Figure 85 shows the revisions of PPPs in Asian countries at the ICP 2017 round, in comparison with the ICP 2011 round, which has provided the benchmark estimate for the past Databook series in 2014–2019. And the revision at the ICP 2011 round from the ICP 2005 round is presented in the right chart. The 2017 benchmark PPP for 17 Asian economies is more than 5% higher than suggested by their extrapolated equivalents from the 2011 benchmark. The upward revision on PPP revises to reduce the relative sizes of these economies in cross-country level comparison. Compared to the revision on the ICP 2011 round from the 2005 round (in the right chart of Figure 85), the upward revisions by the ICP 2017 round have a property to partly offset the past downward revisions on PPP by the 2011

round. The cross-country level comparison has to face a larger opportunity to be revised, compared to the cross-country growth comparison. The readers should bear in mind these circumstances.

A.9 Other Data

For China, multiple data sources have been used; GDP for the whole economy, industry GDP, final demands, employment, and income data are taken from *China Statistical Yearbook* (and *China National Income 1952–1995* for our backward estimates before 1969); time-series data of GFCF by type of asset during 1952–2018 at current and constant prices are estimated at KEO based on *Statistics on Investment in Fixed Assets of China 1950–2000*, *China Statistical Yearbook, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012*, *Input–Output Tables of China*, *Manufacturing Census in China*, and the import data from China Customs Statistics.⁵⁹

The data source for the EU15 and the EU28 is the OECD.Stat (<http://stats.oecd.org/>) and the Eurostat (<http://ec.europa.eu/>). The data for the US, Australia, Bhutan, and Turkey is taken from the website of the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (<http://www.bea.gov>), the Australian Bureau of Statistics (<http://www.abs.gov.au/>), the National Statistics Bureau of Bhutan (<http://www.nsb.gov.bt/>) and UNDESA (2016), and the Turkish Statistical Institute (<http://www.turkstat.gov.tr>), respectively.

The exchange rates used in the Databook series are adjusted rates, called the Analysis of Main Aggregate (UNSD database) rates, in the UNSD National Accounts Main Aggregate Database. The AMA rates coincide with IMF rates except for some periods in countries with official fixed exchange rates and high inflation, when there could be a serious disparity between real GDP growth and growth converted to US dollars based on IMF rates. In such cases, the AMA adjusts the IMF-based rates by multiplying the growth rate of the GDP deflator relative to the US.

Tax data of member economies are supplemented by the IMF's Government Finance Statistics. From its tax revenue data, "taxes on goods and services" and "taxes on imports" are used for calculating taxes on products. From its expenditure data, "subsidies" are taken. Data taken from Government Finance Statistics play a key role in adjusting GDP at market prices to GDP at basic prices. The data for energy consumptions and CO2 emissions is based on IEA's *CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion*, *Energy Balances of OECD Countries*, and *Energy Balances of non-OECD Countries*.

59: Holz (2006) provides a useful reference on Chinese official statistics. The project appreciates Meng Ruoyan (Keio University) for her supports on Chinese data.

A.10 Supplementary Tables

Table 8 GDP using Exchange Rate

—GDP at current market prices, using annual average exchange rate

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Japan	208 100.0	Japan	1,087 100.0	Japan	3,128 100.0	Japan	4,888 100.0	China	6,087 100.0	China	13,608 100.0
China	93 44.7	China	306 28.2	China	395 12.6	China	1,211 24.8	Japan	5,700 93.6	Japan	4,955 36.4
India	64 30.5	India	190 17.5	India	335 10.7	Korea	576 11.8	India	1,671 27.4	India	2,755 20.2
Turkey	24 11.7	Saudi Arabia	165 15.2	Korea	283 9.1	India	482 9.9	Korea	1,144 18.8	Korea	1,720 12.6
Iran	11 5.4	Iran	97 9.0	Turkey	204 6.5	ROC	331 6.8	Turkey	772 12.7	Indonesia	1,045 7.7
Pakistan	10 4.9	Turkey	92 8.5	ROC	166 5.3	Turkey	273 5.6	Indonesia	756 12.4	Saudi Arabia	796 5.8
Indonesia	10 4.8	Indonesia	80 7.3	Indonesia	127 4.1	Saudi Arabia	191 3.9	Saudi Arabia	533 8.8	Turkey	771 5.7
Bangladesh	9.9 4.7	Korea	65 6.0	Saudi Arabia	119 3.8	Hong Kong	172 3.5	Iran	514 8.5	Iran	629 4.6
Korea	9.0 4.3	UAE	44 4.1	Iran	95 3.0	Indonesia	168 3.4	ROC	444 7.3	ROC	608 4.5
Thailand	7.3 3.5	ROC	42 3.9	Thailand	89 2.8	Thailand	127 2.6	Thailand	342 5.6	Thailand	512 3.8
Philippines	6.8 3.3	Thailand	33 3.1	Hong Kong	77 2.5	Iran	112 2.3	UAE	298 4.9	UAE	429 3.2
ROC	5.8 2.8	Philippines	33 3.0	UAE	51 1.6	UAE	106 2.2	Malaysia	255 4.2	Singapore	373 2.7
Saudi Arabia	5.4 2.6	Kuwait	30 2.7	Philippines	47 1.5	Singapore	96 2.0	Singapore	240 3.9	Hong Kong	363 2.7
Malaysia	3.9 1.9	Hong Kong	29 2.7	Pakistan	46 1.5	Malaysia	95 1.9	Hong Kong	229 3.8	Malaysia	359 2.6
Hong Kong	3.8 1.8	Malaysia	25 2.3	Malaysia	45 1.4	Philippines	81 1.7	Philippines	200 3.3	Philippines	331 2.4
Kuwait	3.0 1.4	Pakistan	24 2.2	Singapore	39 1.2	Pakistan	79 1.6	Pakistan	175 2.9	Pakistan	284 2.1
Sri Lanka	2.8 1.4	Bangladesh	19 1.7	Bangladesh	31 1.0	Bangladesh	51 1.1	Qatar	128 2.1	Bangladesh	270 2.0
Myanmar	2.7 1.3	Singapore	12 1.1	Kuwait	19 0.6	Kuwait	38 0.8	Kuwait	118 1.9	Vietnam	249 1.8
Singapore	1.9 0.9	Qatar	7.9 0.7	Oman	12 0.4	Vietnam	33 0.7	Vietnam	117 1.9	Qatar	197 1.4
Vietnam	1.2 0.6	Oman	6.3 0.6	Sri Lanka	9.4 0.3	Oman	20 0.4	Bangladesh	115 1.9	Kuwait	145 1.1
Nepal	1.1 0.5	Brunei	6.2 0.6	Qatar	7.5 0.2	Sri Lanka	19 0.4	Oman	58 0.9	Sri Lanka	88 0.6
UAE	1.1 0.5	Myanmar	5.9 0.5	Vietnam	6.5 0.2	Qatar	18 0.4	Sri Lanka	56 0.9	Oman	81 0.6
Cambodia	0.8 0.4	Sri Lanka	4.9 0.5	Myanmar	5.7 0.2	Bahrain	8.4 0.2	Myanmar	37 0.6	Myanmar	46 0.3
Qatar	0.5 0.3	Bahrain	3.5 0.3	Bahrain	4.5 0.1	Myanmar	7.8 0.2	Bahrain	26 0.4	Bahrain	38 0.3
Bahrain	0.4 0.2	Nepal	2.6 0.2	Nepal	4.4 0.1	Brunei	6.7 0.1	Nepal	19 0.3	Nepal	32 0.2
Oman	0.3 0.1	Fiji	1.2 0.1	Brunei	3.9 0.1	Nepal	6.3 0.1	Brunei	14 0.2	Cambodia	25 0.2
Brunei	0.2 0.1	Vietnam	1.0 0.1	Cambodia	1.8 0.1	Cambodia	3.7 0.1	Cambodia	11 0.2	Lao PDR	18 0.1
Fiji	0.2 0.1	Cambodia	0.7 0.1	Mongolia	1.6 0.1	Lao PDR	1.8 0.0	Lao PDR	7.4 0.1	Brunei	14 0.1
Lao PDR	0.1 0.1	Mongolia	0.5 0.0	Fiji	1.4 0.0	Fiji	1.7 0.0	Mongolia	7.2 0.1	Mongolia	13 0.1
Mongolia	0.1 0.1	Lao PDR	0.3 0.0	Lao PDR	0.9 0.0	Mongolia	1.4 0.0	Fiji	3.2 0.1	Fiji	5.6 0.0
Bhutan	0.1 0.0	Bhutan	0.1 0.0	Bhutan	0.3 0.0	Bhutan	0.4 0.0	Bhutan	1.5 0.0	Bhutan	2.5 0.0
(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)	
APO21	382 183.6	APO21	1,841 169.3	APO21	4,739 151.5	APO21	7,597 155.4	APO21	12,776 209.9	APO21	15,405 113.2
Asia25	478 229.7	Asia25	2,159 198.6	Asia25	5,144 164.4	Asia25	8,824 180.5	Asia25	18,916 310.8	Asia25	29,075 213.7
Asia31	489 234.8	Asia31	2,416 222.2	Asia31	5,356 171.2	Asia31	9,205 188.3	Asia31	20,076 329.8	Asia31	30,761 226.0
East Asia	320 153.7	East Asia	1,530 140.8	East Asia	4,051 129.5	East Asia	7,179 146.9	East Asia	13,611 223.6	East Asia	21,267 156.3
South Asia	88 42.1	South Asia	241 22.2	South Asia	427 13.6	South Asia	638 13.1	South Asia	2,036 33.5	South Asia	3,431 25.2
ASEAN	35 16.7	ASEAN	197 18.1	ASEAN	366 11.7	ASEAN	620 12.7	ASEAN	1,979 32.5	ASEAN	2,970 21.8
ASEAN6	30 14.4	ASEAN6	189 17.4	ASEAN6	351 11.2	ASEAN6	573 11.7	ASEAN6	1,806 29.7	ASEAN6	2,632 19.3
CLMV	4.8 2.3	CLMV	8.0 0.7	CLMV	15 0.5	CLMV	46 0.9	CLMV	173 2.8	CLMV	338 2.5
GCC	11 5.1	GCC	257 23.6	GCC	213 6.8	GCC	382 7.8	GCC	1,160 19.1	GCC	1,685 12.4
(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)	
US	1,073 515.7	US	2,857 262.8	US	5,963 190.6	US	10,252 209.8	US	14,992 246.3	US	20,580 151.2
EU15	1,248 599.7	EU15	3,331 306.4	EU15	6,409 204.9	EU15	9,924 203.0	EU15	14,579 239.5	EU15	19,190 141.0
						EU28	11,017 225.4	EU28	16,760 275.3	EU28	22,377 164.4
Australia	45 21.7	Australia	173 15.9	Australia	324 10.3	Australia	409 8.4	Australia	1,299 21.3	Australia	1,456 10.7

Unit: Billions of US dollars.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the adjustments made to harmonize GDP coverage across countries.

Table 9 GDP using PPP
—GDP at constant market prices, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Japan	1,629 100.0	Japan	2,586 100.0	Japan	4,076 100.0	Japan	4,630 100.0	China	12,069 100.0	China	21,139 100.0
India	697 42.8	India	937 36.2	China	1,625 39.9	China	4,073 88.0	India	5,331 44.2	India	9,051 42.8
Saudi Arabia	449 27.6	China	687 26.6	India	1,535 37.7	India	2,513 54.3	Japan	4,928 40.8	Japan	5,326 25.2
China	412 25.3	Saudi Arabia	645 24.9	Indonesia	816 20.0	Indonesia	1,234 26.7	Indonesia	2,055 17.0	Indonesia	3,126 14.8
Turkey	259 15.9	Indonesia	445 17.2	Saudi Arabia	722 17.7	Korea	1,100 23.8	Korea	1,772 14.7	Turkey	2,487 11.8
Iran	228 14.0	Turkey	416 16.1	Turkey	655 16.1	Turkey	954 20.6	Turkey	1,465 12.1	Turkey	2,218 10.5
Indonesia	199 12.2	Iran	317 12.3	Korea	556 13.6	Saudi Arabia	904 19.5	Saudi Arabia	1,267 10.5	Saudi Arabia	1,636 7.7
Kuwait	153 9.4	Korea	209 8.1	Iran	411 10.1	Thailand	642 13.9	Iran	1,186 9.8	Iran	1,349 6.4
Bangladesh	119 7.3	Thailand	188 7.3	Thailand	407 10.0	ROC	632 13.6	Thailand	1,014 8.4	Thailand	1,296 6.1
Pakistan	107 6.6	Philippines	184 7.1	ROC	321 7.9	Iran	617 13.3	ROC	951 7.9	ROC	1,202 5.7
Philippines	104 6.4	Pakistan	164 6.3	Pakistan	310 7.6	Pakistan	499 10.8	Pakistan	729 6.0	Pakistan	1,029 4.9
Thailand	93 5.7	UAE	154 6.0	Philippines	239 5.9	Malaysia	361 7.8	Malaysia	599 5.0	Philippines	889 4.2
Korea	84 5.2	ROC	124 4.8	UAE	199 4.9	Philippines	347 7.5	Philippines	553 4.6	Malaysia	886 4.2
Vietnam	58 3.5	Kuwait	122 4.7	Malaysia	176 4.3	UAE	341 7.4	UAE	495 4.1	Vietnam	766 3.6
Malaysia	45 2.8	Bangladesh	113 4.4	Bangladesh	165 4.0	Hong Kong	252 5.4	Vietnam	473 3.9	Bangladesh	736 3.5
ROC	44 2.7	Malaysia	98 3.8	Hong Kong	163 4.0	Bangladesh	249 5.4	Bangladesh	439 3.6	UAE	678 3.2
Hong Kong	34 2.1	Hong Kong	84 3.2	Vietnam	113 2.8	Vietnam	237 5.1	Singapore	394 3.3	Singapore	568 2.7
Sri Lanka	30 1.9	Vietnam	82 3.2	Singapore	103 2.5	Singapore	216 4.7	Hong Kong	373 3.1	Hong Kong	468 2.2
Qatar	24 1.5	Singapore	51 2.0	Kuwait	90 2.2	Kuwait	129 2.8	Sri Lanka	197 1.6	Sri Lanka	279 1.3
Singapore	22 1.3	Sri Lanka	45 1.8	Sri Lanka	68 1.7	Sri Lanka	115 2.5	Kuwait	190 1.6	Qatar	275 1.3
Myanmar	21 1.3	Myanmar	34 1.3	Oman	50 1.2	Oman	82 1.8	Qatar	188 1.6	Kuwait	224 1.1
Nepal	16 1.0	Qatar	31 1.2	Myanmar	42 1.0	Myanmar	69 1.5	Myanmar	118 1.0	Myanmar	186 0.9
Cambodia	14 0.8	Oman	24 0.9	Nepal	34 0.8	Qatar	59 1.3	Oman	111 0.9	Oman	154 0.7
Brunei	11 0.7	Brunei	24 0.9	Qatar	30 0.7	Nepal	50 1.1	Nepal	73 0.6	Nepal	109 0.5
Bahrain	8.7 0.5	Nepal	22 0.8	Bahrain	19 0.5	Bahrain	29 0.6	Bahrain	55 0.5	Bahrain	75 0.4
Oman	8.4 0.5	Bahrain	16 0.6	Brunei	18 0.4	Brunei	24 0.5	Cambodia	47 0.4	Cambodia	71 0.3
UAE	8.0 0.5	Lao PDR	9.2 0.4	Lao PDR	12 0.3	Lao PDR	22 0.5	Lao PDR	40 0.3	Lao PDR	57 0.3
Lao PDR	8.0 0.5	Cambodia	8.1 0.3	Cambodia	12 0.3	Cambodia	22 0.5	Brunei	26 0.2	Mongolia	39 0.2
Mongolia	3.3 0.2	Mongolia	6.0 0.2	Mongolia	10 0.2	Mongolia	11 0.2	Mongolia	21 0.2	Brunei	27 0.1
Fiji	3.2 0.2	Fiji	5.2 0.2	Fiji	6.4 0.2	Fiji	8.1 0.2	Fiji	9.3 0.1	Fiji	13 0.1
				Bhutan	1.5 0.0	Bhutan	2.5 0.1	Bhutan	5.5 0.0	Bhutan	8.8 0.0
(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)	
APO21	3,798 233.1	APO21	6,092 235.6	APO21	10,189 250.0	APO21	14,713 317.8	APO21	22,649 187.7	APO21	31,965 151.2
Asia25	4,242 260.3	Asia25	6,837 264.4	Asia25	11,875 291.4	Asia25	18,882 407.9	Asia25	34,867 288.9	Asia25	53,326 252.3
Asia31	4,892 300.2	Asia31	7,830 302.8	Asia31	12,985 318.6	Asia31	20,428 441.2	Asia31	37,173 308.0	Asia31	56,368 266.6
East Asia	2,207 135.4	East Asia	3,695 142.9	East Asia	6,750 165.6	East Asia	10,699 231.1	East Asia	20,112 166.7	East Asia	30,392 143.8
South Asia	970 59.6	South Asia	1,282 49.6	South Asia	2,113 51.8	South Asia	3,430 74.1	South Asia	6,774 56.1	South Asia	11,213 53.0
ASEAN	574 35.2	ASEAN	1,122 43.4	ASEAN	1,939 47.6	ASEAN	3,175 68.6	ASEAN	5,319 44.1	ASEAN	7,872 37.2
ASEAN6	474 29.1	ASEAN6	989 38.2	ASEAN6	1,760 43.2	ASEAN6	2,824 61.0	ASEAN6	4,641 38.5	ASEAN6	6,792 32.1
CLMV	100 6.1	CLMV	133 5.2	CLMV	180 4.4	CLMV	350 7.6	CLMV	677 5.6	CLMV	1,080 5.1
GCC	649 39.8	GCC	993 38.4	GCC	1,109 27.2	GCC	1,546 33.4	GCC	2,306 19.1	GCC	3,041 14.4
(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)	
US	5,565 341.5	US	7,599 293.9	US	10,428 255.8	US	14,588 315.1	US	17,304 143.4	US	20,580 97.4
EU15	7,057 433.1	EU15	9,658 373.5	EU15	12,338 302.7	EU15	15,471 334.2	EU15	17,514 145.1	EU15	19,529 92.4
						EU28	17,540 378.8	EU28	20,136 166.8	EU28	22,750 107.6
Australia	309 19.0	Australia	413 16.0	Australia	556 13.6	Australia	788 17.0	Australia	1,069 8.9	Australia	1,319 6.2

Unit: Billions of US dollars (as of 2018).

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the adjustments made to harmonize GDP coverage across countries.

Table 10 GDP Growth

—Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant market prices

1990–1995		1995–2000		2000–2005		2005–2010		2010–2015		2015–2018		2017–2018	
China	11.0	Qatar	8.8	China	10.0	Qatar	13.4	Mongolia	9.8	Bangladesh	7.5	Cambodia	8.8
Malaysia	9.3	Cambodia	7.6	Qatar	9.7	China	11.7	China	7.8	Cambodia	7.3	Vietnam	8.6
Thailand	8.7	China	7.4	Cambodia	9.4	Bhutan	9.5	Turkey	6.8	Vietnam	7.1	Myanmar	8.2
Singapore	8.5	Vietnam	7.3	Iran	7.5	India	8.1	Bhutan	6.6	Nepal	7.1	Bangladesh	7.8
Korea	8.3	Lao PDR	7.1	Vietnam	7.3	Singapore	7.2	India	6.5	India	6.9	Oman	7.7
ROC	7.6	Myanmar	6.8	Kuwait	7.2	Bahrain	6.5	Qatar	6.3	Lao PDR	6.7	India	7.4
Indonesia	7.5	Bhutan	6.8	India	6.9	Vietnam	6.5	Myanmar	6.2	Philippines	6.5	Turkey	6.9
Vietnam	7.5	UAE	6.6	Lao PDR	6.6	Mongolia	6.4	Bangladesh	5.8	Turkey	6.2	Lao PDR	6.8
Hong Kong	5.9	Singapore	6.2	Bahrain	6.4	Sri Lanka	6.2	Philippines	5.6	China	5.7	Nepal	6.8
Kuwait	5.7	ROC	6.0	Bhutan	6.3	Bangladesh	6.0	Vietnam	5.4	Pakistan	5.2	Mongolia	6.5
Oman	5.6	Korea	5.4	Mongolia	6.3	Cambodia	5.9	Indonesia	5.4	Indonesia	5.0	Philippines	6.2
Sri Lanka	5.5	India	5.4	Myanmar	5.7	Iran	5.6	Sri Lanka	5.2	Bhutan	4.9	Pakistan	5.5
Bahrain	5.5	Malaysia	5.1	Malaysia	5.3	Indonesia	5.6	Malaysia	5.1	Myanmar	4.7	Indonesia	5.0
Lao PDR	4.9	Sri Lanka	4.9	Bangladesh	5.3	Lao PDR	5.0	Saudi Arabia	5.0	Oman	4.6	China	5.0
Pakistan	4.8	Pakistan	4.8	Thailand	5.2	Myanmar	5.0	UAE	4.9	Malaysia	4.6	Malaysia	4.3
Qatar	4.7	Iran	4.5	Korea	5.1	Philippines	4.8	Singapore	4.6	Iran	4.4	Singapore	3.9
Cambodia	4.5	Bangladesh	4.4	UAE	4.9	Malaysia	4.8	Cambodia	4.1	Singapore	4.4	Thailand	3.7
India	4.5	Turkey	4.2	Turkey	4.9	Nepal	4.4	Bahrain	3.9	Mongolia	4.4	Fiji	3.5
UAE	4.3	Oman	4.2	Singapore	4.9	Korea	4.4	Fiji	3.8	Bahrain	3.8	Brunei	3.3
Nepal	4.1	Philippines	4.2	Indonesia	4.6	ROC	4.2	Pakistan	3.8	Fiji	3.8	Hong Kong	3.0
Bangladesh	3.9	Nepal	3.8	Sri Lanka	4.5	Thailand	3.9	Nepal	3.8	Hong Kong	3.1	Bhutan	3.0
Iran	3.7	Mongolia	3.6	Philippines	4.5	Turkey	3.7	Oman	3.7	Sri Lanka	3.0	Bahrain	2.8
Brunei	3.5	Bahrain	3.5	Pakistan	4.4	Hong Kong	3.7	Kuwait	3.5	Korea	2.9	Korea	2.7
Saudi Arabia	3.4	Hong Kong	2.9	Saudi Arabia	4.3	Pakistan	3.2	Thailand	3.2	ROC	2.9	ROC	2.6
Turkey	3.3	Brunei	2.7	Hong Kong	4.1	Oman	3.0	ROC	2.9	Thailand	2.8	Kuwait	2.3
Philippines	3.2	Fiji	2.0	ROC	4.0	UAE	2.5	Lao PDR	2.9	UAE	2.3	UAE	2.1
Myanmar	3.2	Kuwait	1.7	Nepal	3.1	Saudi Arabia	2.4	Korea	2.7	Qatar	2.2	Sri Lanka	2.0
Bhutan	3.0	Saudi Arabia	1.1	Oman	3.0	Fiji	0.7	Hong Kong	2.7	Japan	1.0	Saudi Arabia	0.7
Fiji	2.7	Japan	1.1	Fiji	2.0	Kuwait	0.4	Japan	1.0	Brunei	0.7	Qatar	0.4
Japan	1.5	Indonesia	0.7	Japan	1.2	Brunei	0.1	Brunei	0.9	Saudi Arabia	0.2	Japan	0.3
Mongolia	-1.8	Thailand	0.4	Brunei	1.1	Japan	0.1	Iran	-0.1	Kuwait	-0.2	Iran	-4.0
(region)	(region)												
APO21	4.2	APO21	3.1	APO21	4.3	APO21	4.3	APO21	4.1	APO21	4.6	APO21	4.4
Asia25	5.3	Asia25	4.0	Asia25	5.7	Asia25	6.6	Asia25	5.5	Asia25	5.1	Asia25	4.7
Asia31	5.2	Asia31	3.9	Asia31	5.6	Asia31	6.4	Asia31	5.4	Asia31	4.8	Asia31	4.5
East Asia	5.2	East Asia	4.0	East Asia	5.6	East Asia	7.0	East Asia	5.6	East Asia	4.5	East Asia	3.9
South Asia	4.5	South Asia	5.2	South Asia	6.3	South Asia	7.3	South Asia	6.1	South Asia	6.6	South Asia	7.1
ASEAN	7.4	ASEAN	2.5	ASEAN	5.1	ASEAN	5.2	ASEAN	4.9	ASEAN	4.9	ASEAN	5.2
ASEAN6	7.5	ASEAN6	2.0	ASEAN6	4.8	ASEAN6	5.1	ASEAN6	4.8	ASEAN6	4.6	ASEAN6	4.7
CLMV	6.2	CLMV	7.2	CLMV	7.1	CLMV	6.1	CLMV	5.3	CLMV	6.7	CLMV	8.4
GCC	3.9	GCC	2.7	GCC	4.9	GCC	3.1	GCC	4.9	GCC	1.1	GCC	1.5
(reference)	(reference)												
US	2.5	US	4.2	US	2.5	US	0.9	US	2.1	US	2.2	US	2.8
EU15	1.6	EU15	2.9	EU15	1.7	EU15	0.7	EU15	1.0	EU15	2.0	EU15	1.8
		EU28	2.9	EU28	1.9	EU28	0.9	EU28	1.1	EU28	2.2	EU28	2.0
Australia	3.2	Australia	3.8	Australia	3.4	Australia	2.8	Australia	2.8	Australia	2.4	Australia	2.0

Unit: Percentage.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the adjustments made to harmonize GDP coverage across countries.

Table 11 Population

1970	(%)	1980	(%)	1990	(%)	2000	(%)	2010	(%)	2018	(%)
China	829.9	987.1	39.2	1143.3	37.6	1267.4	36.1	1340.9	34.1	1395.4	32.9
India	555.2	699.0	27.8	873.3	28.7	1056.6	30.1	1234.3	31.4	1352.6	31.9
Indonesia	116.1	147.5	5.9	179.4	5.9	206.3	5.9	237.6	6.0	263.0	6.2
Japan	104.7	117.1	4.7	123.6	4.1	137.9	3.9	173.5	4.4	205.0	4.8
Bangladesh	71.2	85.4	3.4	112.1	3.7	126.9	3.6	147.3	3.7	163.7	3.9
Pakistan	60.6	82.6	3.3	109.0	3.6	124.1	3.5	128.1	3.3	126.4	3.0
Vietnam	42.7	53.7	2.1	66.0	2.2	77.6	2.2	92.3	2.3	105.5	2.5
Philippines	36.7	48.1	1.9	60.7	2.0	76.5	2.2	86.9	2.2	94.7	2.2
Turkey	35.6	44.8	1.8	56.5	1.9	67.8	1.9	74.3	1.9	82.4	1.9
Thailand	34.4	44.7	1.8	55.1	1.8	64.2	1.8	73.7	1.9	81.9	1.9
Korea	32.2	38.8	1.5	54.5	1.8	60.6	1.7	65.9	1.7	68.1	1.6
Iran	28.4	38.1	1.5	42.9	1.4	47.0	1.3	50.6	1.3	53.7	1.3
Myanmar	27.3	34.2	1.4	41.3	1.4	46.7	1.3	49.6	1.3	51.6	1.2
ROC	14.8	17.9	0.7	20.4	0.7	23.5	0.7	28.6	0.7	33.7	0.8
Sri Lanka	12.5	14.7	0.6	18.1	0.6	22.8	0.6	27.4	0.7	32.4	0.8
Nepal	11.3	14.6	0.6	18.1	0.6	22.3	0.6	26.4	0.7	27.5	0.6
Malaysia	10.9	13.9	0.6	17.0	0.6	20.7	0.6	23.2	0.6	23.6	0.6
Cambodia	6.77	9.69	0.4	16.2	0.5	19.1	0.5	20.7	0.5	21.7	0.5
Saudi Arabia	5.84	6.59	0.3	8.84	0.3	11.9	0.3	14.0	0.4	15.9	0.4
Hong Kong	3.96	5.06	0.2	5.70	0.2	6.67	0.2	8.26	0.2	9.31	0.2
Lao PDR	2.50	3.20	0.1	4.14	0.1	5.22	0.1	7.02	0.2	7.45	0.2
Singapore	2.07	2.41	0.1	3.05	0.1	4.03	0.1	6.26	0.2	7.14	0.2
Mongolia	1.25	1.66	0.1	2.10	0.1	3.00	0.1	5.08	0.1	5.64	0.1
Kuwait	0.74	1.36	0.1	2.07	0.1	2.40	0.1	2.91	0.1	4.95	0.1
Oman	0.68	1.09	0.0	1.77	0.1	2.39	0.1	2.77	0.1	3.82	0.1
Fiji	0.52	1.04	0.0	1.63	0.1	1.86	0.1	2.76	0.1	3.21	0.1
Bhutan	0.30	0.63	0.0	0.74	0.0	0.80	0.0	1.70	0.0	2.55	0.1
UAE	0.25	0.41	0.0	0.53	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.23	0.0	1.50	0.0
Bahrain	0.21	0.34	0.0	0.49	0.0	0.61	0.0	0.86	0.0	0.88	0.0
Brunei	0.13	0.22	0.0	0.42	0.0	0.60	0.0	0.68	0.0	0.73	0.0
Qatar	0.11	0.19	0.0	0.25	0.0	0.32	0.0	0.39	0.0	0.44	0.0
(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)	
APO21	1184.3	1480.4	58.8	1831.1	60.3	2164.2	61.7	2498.3	63.5	2740.3	64.5
Asia25	2041.9	2502.3	99.5	3016.6	99.3	3479.3	99.2	3890.9	98.9	4190.5	98.7
Asia31	2049.8	2516.1	100.0	3039.2	100.0	3508.4	100.0	3935.2	100.0	4246.3	100.0
East Asia	986.8	1166.8	46.4	1338.0	44.0	1472.7	42.0	1551.5	39.4	1607.7	37.9
South Asia	711.1	896.7	35.6	1129.9	37.2	1361.0	38.8	1602.8	40.7	1771.3	41.7
ASEAN	279.5	354.6	14.1	436.4	14.4	512.7	14.6	587.7	14.9	646.5	15.2
ASEAN6	200.3	256.9	10.2	316.0	10.4	371.2	10.6	430.0	10.9	475.1	11.2
CLMV	79.3	97.7	3.9	120.3	4.0	141.5	4.0	157.8	4.0	171.4	4.0
GCC	7.82	13.7	0.5	22.6	0.7	29.2	0.8	44.3	1.1	55.8	1.3
(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)	
US	205.1	227.2	9.0	249.6	8.2	282.2	8.0	309.3	7.9	326.7	7.7
EU15	342.1	357.3	14.2	366.3	12.1	377.7	10.8	397.4	10.1	409.2	9.6
EU28	439.9	461.8	18.4	475.2	15.6	487.3	13.9	503.2	12.8	512.4	12.1
Australia	12.6	14.7	0.6	17.1	0.6	19.0	0.5	22.0	0.6	25.0	0.6

Unit: Millions of persons.

Sources: Population census and other official data in each country, including author interpolations.

Table 12 Per Capita GDP using Exchange Rate
 —GDP at current market prices per person, using annual average exchange rate

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Japan	1.99 100.0	Japan	9.29 100.0	Japan	25.3 100.0	Japan	38.5 100.0	Singapore	47.2 100.0	Singapore	66.2 100.0
Hong Kong	0.96 48.4	Hong Kong	5.70 61.4	Hong Kong	13.5 53.3	Hong Kong	25.8 66.9	Japan	44.5 94.2	Hong Kong	48.7 73.5
Singapore	0.93 46.6	Singapore	5.00 53.9	Singapore	12.8 50.4	Singapore	23.9 61.9	Hong Kong	32.6 68.9	Japan	39.2 59.2
Turkey	0.68 34.4	Iran	2.51 27.0	ROC	8.16 32.2	ROC	14.8 38.6	Korea	23.1 48.9	Korea	33.3 50.4
Fiji	0.43 21.5	ROC	2.37 25.5	Korea	6.61 26.1	Korea	12.3 31.8	ROC	19.2 40.6	ROC	25.8 39.0
Iran	0.40 19.9	Turkey	2.06 22.2	Turkey	3.61 14.3	Malaysia	4.04 10.5	Turkey	10.5 22.2	Malaysia	11.1 16.7
ROC	0.39 19.7	Fiji	1.92 20.7	Malaysia	2.50 9.9	Turkey	4.03 10.5	Malaysia	8.92 18.9	China	9.75 14.7
Malaysia	0.36 17.9	Malaysia	1.78 19.1	Fiji	1.86 7.3	Fiji	2.11 5.5	Iran	6.92 14.7	Turkey	9.42 14.2
Korea	0.28 14.0	Korea	1.72 18.5	Iran	1.72 6.8	Thailand	2.09 5.4	Thailand	5.18 11.0	Iran	7.64 11.5
Sri Lanka	0.23 11.4	Thailand	0.74 8.0	Thailand	1.63 6.4	Iran	1.75 4.5	China	4.54 9.6	Thailand	7.51 11.3
Bhutan	0.22 11.2	Philippines	0.69 7.4	Philippines	0.77 3.0	Philippines	1.06 2.8	Fiji	3.68 7.8	Fiji	6.34 9.6
Thailand	0.21 10.7	Indonesia	0.54 5.8	Mongolia	0.77 3.0	Sri Lanka	1.01 2.6	Indonesia	3.18 6.7	Mongolia	4.07 6.2
Philippines	0.18 9.3	Bhutan	0.34 3.7	Indonesia	0.71 2.8	China	0.96 2.5	Sri Lanka	2.72 5.8	Sri Lanka	4.05 6.1
Pakistan	0.17 8.4	Sri Lanka	0.33 3.6	Bhutan	0.58 2.3	Indonesia	0.82 2.1	Mongolia	2.61 5.5	Indonesia	3.97 6.0
Bangladesh	0.14 7.0	China	0.31 3.3	Sri Lanka	0.55 2.2	Bhutan	0.74 1.9	Bhutan	2.28 4.8	Bhutan	3.35 5.1
Cambodia	0.12 6.0	Pakistan	0.29 3.1	Pakistan	0.41 1.6	Mongolia	0.60 1.6	Philippines	2.16 4.6	Philippines	3.14 4.7
India	0.11 5.8	Mongolia	0.29 3.1	India	0.38 1.5	Pakistan	0.57 1.5	India	1.35 2.9	Vietnam	2.63 4.0
China	0.11 5.6	India	0.27 2.9	China	0.35 1.4	India	0.46 1.2	Vietnam	1.35 2.8	Lao PDR	2.57 3.9
Nepal	0.10 5.0	Bangladesh	0.22 2.4	Bangladesh	0.29 1.1	Vietnam	0.42 1.1	Lao PDR	1.19 2.5	India	2.04 3.1
Myanmar	0.10 5.0	Nepal	0.18 1.9	Nepal	0.25 1.0	Bangladesh	0.42 1.1	Pakistan	1.01 2.1	Bangladesh	1.65 2.5
Mongolia	0.09 4.7	Myanmar	0.17 1.9	Lao PDR	0.22 0.9	Lao PDR	0.35 0.9	Cambodia	0.81 1.7	Cambodia	1.57 2.4
Indonesia	0.09 4.3	Cambodia	0.11 1.2	Cambodia	0.20 0.8	Cambodia	0.31 0.8	Bangladesh	0.78 1.6	Pakistan	1.39 2.1
Lao PDR	0.05 2.4	Lao PDR	0.10 1.1	Myanmar	0.14 0.5	Nepal	0.28 0.7	Myanmar	0.73 1.6	Nepal	1.18 1.8
Vietnam	0.05 1.4	Vietnam	0.02 0.2	Vietnam	0.10 0.4	Myanmar	0.17 0.4	Nepal	0.72 1.5	Myanmar	0.86 1.3
Bahrain	1.88 94.7	Bahrain	10.3 110.9	Bahrain	9.25 36.5	Bahrain	13.2 34.2	Bahrain	20.8 44.1	Bahrain	25.1 37.9
Kuwait	4.00 201.2	Kuwait	21.8 234.9	Kuwait	9.10 35.9	Kuwait	20.6 53.5	Kuwait	40.7 86.1	Kuwait	37.8 57.1
Oman	0.40 19.9	Oman	5.79 62.4	Oman	7.21 28.5	Oman	8.22 21.3	Oman	20.8 44.1	Oman	16.4 24.8
Qatar	4.97 250.0	Qatar	35.4 381.5	Qatar	17.8 70.4	Qatar	29.5 76.7	Qatar	75.3 159.3	Qatar	77.4 117.0
Saudi Arabia	0.92 46.4	Saudi Arabia	17.1 183.6	Saudi Arabia	7.30 28.8	Saudi Arabia	9.26 24.0	Saudi Arabia	19.4 41.1	Saudi Arabia	23.6 35.7
UAE	4.28 215.4	UAE	42.3 455.3	UAE	28.9 114.4	UAE	35.3 91.8	UAE	36.0 76.3	UAE	46.1 69.6
Brunei	1.72 86.7	Brunei	33.0 355.3	Brunei	15.4 61.0	Brunei	20.5 53.2	Brunei	35.5 75.1	Brunei	30.8 46.5
(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)	
APO21	0.32 16.2	APO21	1.24 13.4	APO21	2.59 10.2	APO21	3.51 9.1	APO21	5.11 10.8	APO21	5.62 8.5
Asia25	0.23 11.8	Asia25	0.86 9.3	Asia25	1.71 6.7	Asia25	2.54 6.6	Asia25	4.86 10.3	Asia25	6.94 10.5
Asia31	0.24 12.0	Asia31	0.96 10.3	Asia31	1.76 7.0	Asia31	2.62 6.8	Asia31	5.10 10.8	Asia31	7.24 10.9
East Asia	0.32 16.3	East Asia	1.31 14.1	East Asia	3.03 12.0	East Asia	4.87 12.7	East Asia	8.77 18.6	East Asia	13.2 20.0
South Asia	0.12 6.2	South Asia	0.27 2.9	South Asia	0.38 1.5	South Asia	0.47 1.2	South Asia	1.27 2.7	South Asia	1.94 2.9
ASEAN	0.12 6.3	ASEAN	0.56 6.0	ASEAN	0.84 3.3	ASEAN	1.21 3.1	ASEAN	3.37 7.1	ASEAN	4.59 6.9
ASEAN6	0.15 7.5	ASEAN6	0.74 7.9	ASEAN6	1.11 4.4	ASEAN6	1.54 4.0	ASEAN6	4.20 8.9	ASEAN6	5.54 8.4
CLMV	0.06 3.0	CLMV	0.08 0.9	CLMV	0.12 0.5	CLMV	0.33 0.8	CLMV	1.10 2.3	CLMV	1.97 3.0
GCC	1.36 68.2	GCC	18.7 201.1	GCC	9.39 37.1	GCC	13.1 34.0	GCC	26.2 55.4	GCC	30.2 45.6
(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)	
US	5.23 263.2	US	12.6 135.4	US	23.9 94.4	US	36.3 94.4	US	48.5 102.6	US	63.0 95.2
EU15	3.65 183.5	EU15	9.32 100.4	EU15	17.5 69.1	EU15	26.3 68.2	EU15	36.7 77.7	EU15	46.9 70.9
						EU28	22.6 58.7	EU28	33.3 70.5	EU28	43.7 66.0
Australia	3.57 179.8	Australia	11.8 126.9	Australia	19.0 74.9	Australia	21.5 55.8	Australia	59.0 124.9	Australia	58.3 88.0

Unit: Thousands of US dollars.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the adjustments made to harmonize GDP coverage across countries.

Table 13 Per Capita GDP

—GDP at constant market prices per person, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Japan	15.6	100.0	Japan	22.1	100.0	Singapore	33.9	100.0	Singapore	77.7	100.0
Singapore	10.5	67.6	Singapore	21.0	95.0	Singapore	53.6	100.0	Singapore	100.7	100.0
Hong Kong	8.66	55.7	Hong Kong	16.5	74.7	Japan	33.0	97.2	Hong Kong	53.0	68.3
Iran	8.02	51.5	Hong Kong	16.5	74.7	Hong Kong	28.5	84.1	ROC	41.0	52.8
Turkey	7.28	46.8	Turkey	9.29	42.1	ROC	15.7	46.4	ROC	28.4	53.0
Fiji	6.21	39.9	Iran	8.17	37.0	Korea	13.0	38.2	Japan	38.5	49.5
Malaysia	4.16	26.7	Iran	8.17	37.0	Korea	13.0	38.2	Korea	35.8	46.0
Lao PDR	3.18	20.4	Fiji	8.13	36.8	Turkey	11.6	34.2	Korea	23.4	43.7
ROC	2.96	19.0	Malaysia	7.04	31.9	Malaysia	9.74	28.7	Malaysia	21.0	27.0
Philippines	2.82	18.1	Malaysia	7.04	31.9	Malaysia	9.74	28.7	Turkey	19.9	25.6
Thailand	2.70	17.3	ROC	6.97	31.5	Fiji	8.73	25.7	Iran	16.0	20.5
Mongolia	2.64	17.0	Korea	5.48	24.8	Thailand	7.46	22.0	Thailand	15.4	19.8
Korea	2.61	16.8	Thailand	4.19	19.0	Iran	7.46	22.0	Fiji	10.9	14.0
Sri Lanka	2.41	15.5	Philippines	3.83	17.3	Iran	7.46	22.0	Iran	9.61	17.9
Cambodia	2.03	13.0	Philippines	3.83	17.3	Mongolia	4.85	14.3	Sri Lanka	6.01	11.2
Pakistan	1.77	11.4	Mongolia	3.60	16.3	Indonesia	4.55	13.4	Indonesia	5.98	11.2
Indonesia	1.72	11.0	Sri Lanka	3.08	13.9	Sri Lanka	4.01	11.8	Mongolia	4.60	8.6
Bangladesh	1.68	10.8	Indonesia	3.02	13.7	Sri Lanka	4.01	11.8	Philippines	4.53	8.5
Bhutan	1.64	10.6	Lao PDR	2.88	13.1	Philippines	3.94	11.6	Philippines	4.53	8.5
Nepal	1.39	8.9	Lao PDR	2.88	13.1	Lao PDR	2.97	8.8	Lao PDR	4.29	8.0
Vietnam	1.35	8.7	Bhutan	2.03	9.2	Bhutan	2.87	8.5	Bhutan	4.17	7.8
India	1.26	8.1	Pakistan	1.99	9.0	Pakistan	2.76	8.1	Pakistan	3.62	6.8
Myanmar	0.75	4.8	Vietnam	1.52	6.9	Nepal	1.87	5.5	China	3.21	6.0
China	0.50	3.2	Nepal	1.49	6.7	India	1.76	5.2	Vietnam	3.05	5.7
			India	1.34	6.1	Vietnam	1.72	5.1	India	2.38	4.4
			Bangladesh	1.32	6.0	Bangladesh	1.51	4.5	Nepal	2.20	4.1
			Cambodia	1.23	5.5	China	1.42	4.2	Bangladesh	2.01	3.8
			Myanmar	1.00	4.5	Cambodia	1.34	3.9	Cambodia	1.82	3.4
			China	0.70	3.1	Myanmar	1.02	3.0	Myanmar	1.48	2.8
Bahrain	41.8	268.3	Bahrain	48.7	220.3	Bahrain	37.7	111.1	Bahrain	45.6	85.0
Kuwait	206.5	1326.7	Kuwait	89.7	406.0	Kuwait	42.7	125.9	Kuwait	69.5	129.7
Oman	12.2	78.5	Oman	21.8	98.5	Oman	30.9	91.1	Oman	34.2	63.9
Qatar	219.7	1411.6	Qatar	138.7	628.0	Qatar	71.5	210.8	Qatar	96.3	179.7
Saudi Arabia	76.9	494.2	Saudi Arabia	66.5	301.2	Saudi Arabia	44.5	131.0	Saudi Arabia	43.8	81.7
UAE	32.5	208.5	UAE	148.0	670.1	UAE	112.1	330.5	UAE	114.0	212.8
Brunei	83.2	534.2	Brunei	125.3	567.3	Brunei	70.1	206.8	Brunei	74.7	139.5
(region)			(region)			(region)			(region)		
APO21	3.21	20.6	APO21	4.12	18.6	APO21	5.56	16.4	APO21	6.80	12.7
Asia25	2.08	13.3	Asia25	2.73	12.4	Asia25	3.94	11.6	Asia25	5.43	10.1
Asia31	2.39	15.3	Asia31	3.11	14.1	Asia31	4.27	12.6	Asia31	5.82	10.9
East Asia	2.24	14.4	East Asia	3.17	14.3	East Asia	5.04	14.9	East Asia	7.26	13.6
South Asia	1.36	8.8	South Asia	1.43	6.5	South Asia	1.87	5.5	South Asia	2.52	4.7
ASEAN	2.05	13.2	ASEAN	3.16	14.3	ASEAN	4.44	13.1	ASEAN	6.19	11.6
ASEAN6	2.37	15.2	ASEAN6	3.85	17.4	ASEAN6	5.57	16.4	ASEAN6	7.61	14.2
CLMV	1.26	8.1	CLMV	1.36	6.2	CLMV	1.49	4.4	CLMV	2.48	4.6
GCC	82.9	532.7	GCC	72.2	327.1	GCC	49.0	144.4	GCC	53.0	98.9
(reference)			(reference)			(reference)			(reference)		
US	27.1	174.3	US	33.4	151.4	US	41.8	123.1	US	51.7	96.5
EU15	20.6	132.5	EU15	27.0	122.4	EU15	33.7	99.3	EU15	41.0	76.5
									EU28	36.0	67.2
									EU28	40.0	51.5
Australia	24.5	157.3	Australia	28.1	127.3	Australia	32.6	96.0	Australia	41.4	77.3
									Australia	48.5	62.5
									Australia	52.8	52.5

Unit: Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018)

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: See Appendix 2 for the adjustments made to harmonize GDP coverage across countries.

Table 14 Final Demand Shares in GDP

—Share of final demands with respect to GDP at current market prices

	1970				1990				2000				2010				2018			
	Household consumption	Government consumption	Investment	Net exports	Household consumption	Government consumption	Investment	Net exports	Household consumption	Government consumption	Investment	Net exports	Household consumption	Government consumption	Investment	Net exports	Household consumption	Government consumption	Investment	Net exports
Bahrain	67.8	14.8	21.3	-3.9	62.1	23.4	12.8	1.8	48.9	17.3	10.1	23.8	41.2	12.9	27.3	18.6	39.6	16.3	36.4	7.7
Bangladesh	89.0	1.3	9.8	-0.1	84.7	4.6	17.5	-6.8	75.9	5.0	23.8	-4.6	74.4	5.1	26.2	-5.8	71.5	6.4	31.2	-9.1
Bhutan	68.5	33.6	24.6	-26.7	49.6	32.6	21.1	-3.3	51.2	21.9	45.8	-18.9	51.9	20.6	56.6	-29.1	62.9	17.0	45.0	-24.9
Brunei	21.1	8.3	15.2	55.3	39.3	21.8	19.5	19.5	30.4	25.5	18.9	25.3	14.7	22.1	23.8	39.4	24.8	24.1	41.2	9.9
Cambodia	69.0	22.5	10.2	-1.8	95.8	5.7	6.7	-8.3	88.9	5.2	17.8	-11.8	81.2	6.3	17.9	-5.4	72.7	4.9	24.1	-1.7
China	55.5	11.0	33.3	0.1	49.0	13.6	34.7	2.7	46.6	16.6	34.4	2.4	35.8	12.8	47.7	3.7	40.4	14.7	44.1	0.8
ROC	55.9	17.7	26.4	0.0	52.3	18.0	25.5	4.2	55.2	15.7	27.2	1.8	53.2	15.1	25.1	6.6	52.4	14.3	22.2	11.1
Fiji	66.8	14.0	22.4	-3.1	73.4	17.1	14.2	-4.7	66.2	17.2	21.7	-5.1	72.1	14.9	19.3	-6.3	68.2	19.7	19.7	-7.6
Hong Kong	66.2	5.7	20.4	7.7	57.5	6.8	27.2	8.5	58.6	9.4	27.6	4.4	61.4	8.9	23.9	5.9	68.3	9.9	21.7	0.1
India	74.0	9.4	16.7	-0.1	62.4	11.9	27.1	-14.1	64.1	12.8	23.9	-0.9	57.5	11.7	35.3	-4.5	61.3	11.2	31.2	-3.7
Indonesia	73.0	8.2	21.1	-2.2	61.8	7.9	27.7	2.5	61.2	6.4	22.1	10.3	56.2	9.0	32.9	1.9	57.4	9.0	34.7	-1.1
Iran	54.5	17.6	28.5	-0.6	56.1	11.8	40.3	-8.2	52.1	15.1	25.0	7.8	44.8	18.8	31.6	4.8	50.7	13.7	25.1	10.6
Japan	47.2	11.1	40.6	1.1	50.9	13.6	34.7	0.8	54.4	16.9	27.3	1.4	57.8	19.5	21.3	1.5	55.6	19.8	24.3	0.2
Korea	73.5	9.9	26.3	-9.7	50.2	11.0	39.6	-0.8	54.4	10.9	32.9	1.8	50.4	14.2	32.6	2.8	48.0	16.1	31.3	4.6
Kuwait	39.8	13.2	12.3	34.7	59.6	37.4	15.7	-12.7	42.2	21.1	10.9	25.9	30.0	16.7	17.8	35.4	42.5	22.0	22.8	12.6
Lao PDR	81.7	34.9	19.9	-36.5	79.3	7.2	26.6	-13.1	79.7	6.7	27.7	-14.0	78.8	11.4	23.2	-13.4	60.4	13.7	36.9	-11.0
Malaysia	57.4	18.2	20.2	4.2	52.6	13.4	31.9	2.0	43.8	10.0	27.1	19.0	48.1	12.6	23.4	15.9	57.4	12.0	23.6	7.0
Mongolia	77.7	24.1	32.7	-34.6	64.7	20.4	31.5	-16.7	72.3	14.4	24.4	-11.1	55.1	12.7	42.2	-10.0	50.7	11.7	43.2	-5.6
Myanmar	90.7	8.1	10.1	-8.9	91.0	7.6	8.2	-6.7	84.7	3.6	11.3	0.4	42.5	4.7	17.0	35.9	48.7	8.1	32.3	11.0
Nepal	90.0	6.1	7.5	-3.5	83.8	7.6	21.0	-12.4	80.2	8.0	22.4	-10.5	76.4	9.4	37.8	-23.7	67.9	11.3	61.7	-40.9
Oman	19.8	12.7	13.8	53.7	41.3	27.0	17.6	14.1	35.0	21.2	15.6	28.2	33.6	18.4	23.5	24.5	37.6	25.1	23.9	13.4
Pakistan	76.9	10.1	15.8	-2.7	71.8	13.0	19.9	-4.7	75.5	8.1	17.6	-1.1	79.7	10.3	15.8	-5.8	82.5	11.7	16.7	-11.0
Philippines	66.2	10.1	24.6	-0.8	70.1	10.6	26.3	-7.0	72.2	11.4	18.4	-2.0	71.6	9.7	20.5	-1.8	73.8	11.9	26.9	-12.7
Qatar	21.7	20.3	23.4	34.6	28.1	32.2	18.7	20.9	15.6	19.3	21.1	44.0	16.8	13.7	31.8	37.7	22.8	15.4	43.2	18.6
Saudi Arabia	32.6	15.8	22.4	29.2	46.6	28.8	15.7	8.9	36.5	25.6	19.4	18.5	32.4	20.0	31.2	16.4	37.8	24.3	24.8	13.1
Singapore	69.0	11.8	38.2	-19.0	44.8	9.5	35.7	10.1	42.0	10.5	35.2	12.3	36.3	9.7	27.7	26.3	36.0	10.1	25.5	28.4
Sri Lanka	79.4	6.3	16.9	-2.5	81.1	7.0	18.6	-6.7	73.1	7.6	28.2	-8.9	68.9	8.5	29.8	-7.3	68.4	9.2	29.9	-7.4
Thailand	67.0	11.9	25.3	-4.2	55.8	10.0	41.7	-7.4	55.6	13.5	22.5	8.4	53.0	15.8	25.5	5.7	49.3	16.0	25.9	8.8
Turkey	76.9	7.9	15.6	-0.4	68.7	9.3	23.2	-1.2	67.3	12.0	23.8	-3.1	63.1	15.0	27.0	-5.0	56.7	14.8	29.6	-1.1
UAE	38.5	6.0	21.7	33.8	56.9	9.5	17.4	16.2	58.0	9.3	20.9	11.9	42.8	9.8	27.4	20.1	39.4	12.7	22.9	25.0
Vietnam	69.4	33.5	21.8	-24.7	87.2	7.5	14.5	-9.1	67.7	6.1	28.6	-2.3	65.9	5.9	36.3	-8.1	62.8	6.4	27.5	3.3
(region)																				
APO21	61.2	10.9	28.5	-0.6	57.6	11.9	31.2	-0.7	59.1	12.9	25.7	2.2	57.4	13.8	28.4	0.4	58.3	13.2	28.4	0.0
Asia25	60.8	10.9	28.9	-0.6	56.5	12.1	31.6	-0.2	56.5	13.7	27.5	2.3	49.9	13.4	35.0	1.7	51.2	13.8	34.6	0.4
Asia31	57.2	11.5	27.7	3.5	55.9	13.3	30.3	0.6	55.3	14.3	26.8	3.6	48.8	13.7	34.6	2.9	50.5	14.1	34.2	1.2
East Asia	50.3	11.1	38.1	0.6	50.6	13.5	34.5	1.4	51.6	15.9	30.6	1.9	43.8	14.6	38.4	3.2	44.6	15.6	38.5	1.4
South Asia	76.4	8.4	15.7	-0.5	66.5	11.2	24.9	-2.6	67.2	11.3	23.1	-1.6	61.5	11.0	32.5	-5.0	64.2	10.9	30.2	-5.2
ASEAN	69.7	13.2	22.6	-5.5	62.0	9.3	30.1	-1.4	59.1	9.1	23.5	8.3	55.5	10.5	28.5	5.5	56.8	10.7	29.6	2.9
ASEAN6	68.6	10.5	23.4	-2.5	59.6	9.4	31.7	-0.7	57.3	9.6	23.3	9.8	54.4	11.2	28.1	6.4	56.2	11.2	29.8	2.8
CLMV	76.1	27.6	18.4	-22.1	87.6	7.5	13.8	-8.8	73.1	5.6	24.4	-3.1	63.6	6.1	30.9	-0.6	60.9	7.0	28.6	3.6
GCC	34.2	15.2	20.0	30.6	49.0	25.9	16.1	8.9	41.1	21.0	18.7	19.2	33.4	16.8	28.8	21.0	37.2	20.6	26.1	16.1
(reference)																				
US	60.3	18.0	21.4	0.4	63.9	15.9	21.5	-1.3	66.0	14.0	23.7	-3.7	67.9	16.7	18.7	-3.4	68.0	14.1	21.0	-3.1
EU15	56.5	16.0	28.0	-0.5	56.7	19.5	24.6	-0.7	57.7	19.1	22.8	0.4	57.0	21.7	20.2	1.1	55.6	20.3	20.9	3.2
EU28									58.1	19.0	22.6	0.3	57.1	21.5	20.4	1.0	55.4	20.1	21.2	3.3
Australia	54.2	13.9	32.1	-0.3	57.7	18.2	24.3	-0.1	58.7	17.8	23.5	0.1	54.7	17.8	26.5	1.0	55.2	18.9	23.3	2.5

Unit: Percentage.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: Final demand shares in country groups are computed by using the PPP for GDP. Household consumption includes consumption of NPISHs. Investment includes GFCF plus changes in inventories.

Table 15 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level
—GDP at constant basic prices per worker, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Singapore	31.4	100.0	Japan	43.5	100.0	Singapore	62.6	100.0	Singapore	96.7	100.0
Japan	29.5	94.1	Singapore	43.2	99.4	Japan	62.1	99.2	Hong Kong	75.5	78.1
Iran	29.5	94.0	Hong Kong	35.9	82.5	Hong Kong	58.1	92.8	Japan	68.5	70.8
Hong Kong	21.8	69.3	Iran	31.9	73.2	ROC	36.1	57.7	ROC	62.4	64.5
Turkey	21.7	69.1	Turkey	26.7	61.4	Turkey	32.4	51.8	Korea	45.8	47.4
Fiji	19.6	62.4	Fiji	22.9	52.6	Iran	32.1	51.3	Turkey	44.4	45.9
Malaysia	12.0	38.3	Malaysia	18.9	43.5	Korea	26.8	42.8	Malaysia	36.3	37.5
Philippines	8.6	27.3	ROC	17.7	40.6	Malaysia	24.5	39.2	Iran	36.1	37.4
ROC	8.6	27.3	Korea	13.7	31.6	Fiji	22.3	35.6	Fiji	23.7	24.5
Korea	8.1	25.8	Philippines	10.3	23.7	Thailand	12.1	19.4	Thailand	17.0	17.6
Sri Lanka	6.6	21.1	Mongolia	9.9	22.8	Mongolia	11.7	18.6	Sri Lanka	14.9	15.4
Mongolia	6.6	21.0	Sri Lanka	8.7	19.9	Sri Lanka	11.1	17.7	Indonesia	13.2	13.6
Thailand	5.9	18.8	Indonesia	8.3	19.0	Indonesia	10.3	16.5	Pakistan	12.5	12.9
Lao PDR	5.6	17.9	Thailand	8.0	18.3	Philippines	10.1	16.2	Mongolia	12.4	12.8
Pakistan	5.6	17.8	Pakistan	6.4	14.8	Pakistan	9.4	15.1	Philippines	11.9	12.3
Indonesia	5.2	16.6	Lao PDR	5.9	13.6	Bhutan	7.8	12.5	Bhutan	11.2	11.6
Bangladesh	4.4	13.9	Bhutan	5.4	12.4	Lao PDR	6.1	9.7	Lao PDR	8.3	8.6
Bhutan	4.3	13.7	Bangladesh	3.6	8.3	Nepal	4.2	6.7	India	5.6	5.8
Cambodia	4.1	13.1	Vietnam	3.3	7.5	Bangladesh	4.1	6.5	Vietnam	5.6	5.7
Vietnam	3.3	10.5	Myanmar	3.0	6.9	India	3.9	6.2	Nepal	5.0	5.2
Nepal	3.0	9.4	Nepal	3.0	6.9	Vietnam	3.3	5.3	Bangladesh	4.9	5.1
India	2.6	8.3	India	2.7	6.3	Myanmar	3.0	4.8	China	4.9	5.0
Myanmar	2.3	7.4	Cambodia	2.3	5.3	Cambodia	2.7	4.3	Myanmar	3.9	4.1
China	1.0	3.1	China	1.2	2.8	China	2.2	3.5	Cambodia	3.6	3.7
Bahrain	149.3	475.4	Bahrain	124.1	285.2	Bahrain	89.2	142.5	Bahrain	103.2	106.8
Kuwait	687.0	2188.1	Kuwait	265.9	611.2	Kuwait	104.8	167.5	Kuwait	166.3	171.9
Oman	91.4	291.1	Oman	124.6	286.5	Oman	133.3	212.9	Oman	115.3	119.2
Qatar	409.2	1303.3	Qatar	258.3	593.9	Qatar	139.2	222.4	Qatar	191.5	198.0
Saudi Arabia	209.5	667.1	Saudi Arabia	211.2	485.5	Saudi Arabia	143.5	229.2	Saudi Arabia	156.9	162.2
UAE	75.8	241.4	UAE	278.1	639.3	UAE	217.7	347.8	UAE	196.6	203.3
Brunei	281.5	896.5	Brunei	350.4	805.6	Brunei	174.1	278.2	Brunei	167.4	173.1
(region)			(region)			(region)			(region)		
APO21	8.0	25.6	APO21	10.0	23.0	APO21	13.4	21.5	APO21	16.6	17.2
Asia25	5.0	15.8	Asia25	6.1	14.1	Asia25	8.3	13.2	Asia25	11.5	11.9
Asia31	5.7	18.2	Asia31	7.0	16.1	Asia31	9.0	14.3	Asia31	12.4	12.8
East Asia	5.0	15.9	East Asia	6.4	14.7	East Asia	8.8	14.1	East Asia	12.7	13.1
South Asia	3.2	10.3	South Asia	3.3	7.7	South Asia	4.7	7.5	South Asia	6.6	6.8
ASEAN	5.9	18.7	ASEAN	8.1	18.7	ASEAN	10.1	16.1	ASEAN	13.6	14.0
ASEAN6	6.9	22.0	ASEAN6	10.0	23.1	ASEAN6	12.5	20.0	ASEAN6	16.8	17.4
CLMV	3.4	10.7	CLMV	3.4	7.8	CLMV	3.4	5.5	CLMV	5.3	5.5
GCC	236.7	753.7	GCC	215.2	494.8	GCC	142.5	227.6	GCC	157.7	163.1
(reference)			(reference)			(reference)			(reference)		
US	68.8	219.1	US	74.4	171.1	US	85.4	136.4	US	103.7	107.2
EU15	44.9	142.9	EU15	58.0	133.4	EU15	69.4	110.8	EU15	81.7	84.5
									EU28	72.9	75.4
Australia	53.5	170.3	Australia	61.4	141.1	Australia	66.0	105.4	Australia	82.6	85.4
									Australia	90.5	74.5
									Australia	97.8	65.6

Unit: Thousands of US dollars (as of 2018).
Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 16 Per-Worker Labor Productivity Growth

—Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant basic prices per worker, using 2017 PPP

1990–1995		1995–2000		2000–2005		2005–2010		2010–2015		2015–2018		2017–2018	
China	10.0	Oman	6.4	China	9.3	China	11.4	Mongolia	7.6	Vietnam	6.2	Vietnam	7.6
Kuwait	9.5	China	6.2	Cambodia	5.3	India	7.0	China	7.4	Bangladesh	6.2	Myanmar	7.2
Malaysia	6.6	Vietnam	5.3	Vietnam	4.9	Bhutan	6.4	Sri Lanka	5.8	India	6.1	Cambodia	6.3
Thailand	6.5	ROC	5.1	India	4.7	Iran	5.4	India	5.3	China	5.6	Bangladesh	6.0
Indonesia	6.4	Korea	4.8	Turkey	4.3	Mongolia	5.1	Myanmar	5.2	Lao PDR	4.8	Mongolia	5.4
Korea	5.9	Lao PDR	4.8	Lao PDR	4.3	Sri Lanka	5.0	Bhutan	4.7	Cambodia	4.8	India	5.2
ROC	5.9	Turkey	4.3	Thailand	3.8	Vietnam	4.1	Indonesia	4.2	Myanmar	4.1	China	5.1
Vietnam	5.1	Singapore	4.2	Malaysia	3.7	Bangladesh	3.5	Philippines	4.1	Singapore	3.9	Turkey	5.0
Bhutan	4.7	India	4.2	Iran	3.7	Myanmar	3.4	Bangladesh	4.1	Turkey	3.7	Lao PDR	4.6
Hong Kong	4.5	Myanmar	4.0	Indonesia	3.7	Korea	3.4	Vietnam	3.9	Thailand	3.7	Oman	4.4
Singapore	4.5	Cambodia	3.8	Bangladesh	3.6	ROC	3.1	Turkey	3.5	Nepal	3.7	Sri Lanka	4.4
Sri Lanka	4.3	Qatar	3.7	Korea	3.5	Nepal	3.1	Thailand	3.4	Philippines	3.4	Philippines	4.1
India	3.1	Philippines	2.9	Myanmar	3.4	Hong Kong	3.0	UAE	2.6	Bhutan	2.9	Singapore	3.1
Pakistan	3.1	Bangladesh	2.7	Singapore	3.3	Indonesia	2.8	Fiji	2.6	Malaysia	2.9	Nepal	3.1
Bahrain	3.0	Bhutan	2.5	ROC	3.3	Philippines	2.7	Nepal	2.4	Pakistan	2.6	Pakistan	3.0
Qatar	2.7	Pakistan	2.5	Hong Kong	3.2	Cambodia	2.6	Bahrain	2.2	Hong Kong	2.4	Indonesia	2.8
Turkey	2.0	Mongolia	2.5	Sri Lanka	3.1	Lao PDR	2.5	Cambodia	2.1	Fiji	2.4	Korea	2.4
Cambodia	1.8	Nepal	1.8	Mongolia	2.7	Thailand	2.5	Singapore	1.8	Sri Lanka	2.2	Thailand	2.3
Saudi Arabia	1.7	Sri Lanka	1.6	Nepal	1.9	Malaysia	1.3	Pakistan	1.8	ROC	2.2	Brunei	2.2
Nepal	1.6	Fiji	1.5	Pakistan	1.6	Singapore	1.3	ROC	1.7	Korea	2.1	Hong Kong	2.0
Lao PDR	1.4	Japan	1.3	Japan	1.4	Turkey	1.0	Malaysia	1.7	Indonesia	2.0	Malaysia	2.0
Iran	1.4	Malaysia	1.2	Philippines	1.2	Fiji	0.5	Korea	1.4	Iran	1.9	ROC	1.9
Myanmar	1.2	UAE	1.0	Oman	1.1	Japan	0.2	Hong Kong	1.1	Mongolia	1.6	Fiji	1.7
Bangladesh	1.1	Iran	1.0	Qatar	0.9	Pakistan	-0.5	Lao PDR	1.0	UAE	1.2	Kuwait	1.4
Japan	0.7	Hong Kong	0.7	Kuwait	0.9	Bahrain	-1.5	Japan	0.7	Brunei	0.8	UAE	1.1
Philippines	0.3	Thailand	0.3	Fiji	0.1	Brunei	-1.6	Saudi Arabia	-0.3	Oman	0.3	Bhutan	1.0
Brunei	-0.2	Saudi Arabia	0.0	Bhutan	0.0	Saudi Arabia	-1.9	Kuwait	-0.6	Qatar	0.0	Qatar	-1.4
Fiji	-0.2	Bahrain	-0.1	Saudi Arabia	-0.1	UAE	-4.1	Brunei	-0.7	Japan	-0.1	Japan	-1.8
Mongolia	-1.4	Kuwait	-0.2	Brunei	-1.5	Qatar	-6.1	Iran	-1.4	Kuwait	-1.7	Saudi Arabia	-2.0
UAE	-3.0	Brunei	-0.6	UAE	-2.3	Kuwait	-7.4	Qatar	-2.3	Bahrain	-1.9	Bahrain	-3.4
Oman	-9.3	Indonesia	-1.6	Bahrain	-4.3	Oman	-8.5	Oman	-4.9	Saudi Arabia	-2.3	Iran	-5.8
(region)	(region)												
APO21	2.5	APO21	1.7	APO21	2.5	APO21	2.9	APO21	2.9	APO21	3.3	APO21	2.7
Asia25	3.9	Asia25	2.7	Asia25	4.3	Asia25	5.6	Asia25	4.6	Asia25	4.3	Asia25	3.7
Asia31	3.8	Asia31	2.6	Asia31	4.3	Asia31	5.3	Asia31	4.5	Asia31	4.0	Asia31	3.5
East Asia	4.2	East Asia	3.0	East Asia	4.9	East Asia	6.7	East Asia	5.2	East Asia	4.3	East Asia	3.8
South Asia	3.0	South Asia	3.8	South Asia	4.1	South Asia	5.9	South Asia	4.8	South Asia	5.6	South Asia	4.9
ASEAN	5.4	ASEAN	0.6	ASEAN	3.3	ASEAN	2.8	ASEAN	3.7	ASEAN	3.1	ASEAN	3.4
ASEAN6	5.7	ASEAN6	0.2	ASEAN6	3.3	ASEAN6	2.6	ASEAN6	3.7	ASEAN6	2.5	ASEAN6	2.7
CLMV	3.8	CLMV	4.9	CLMV	4.5	CLMV	3.8	CLMV	3.9	CLMV	5.6	CLMV	7.2
GCC	1.1	GCC	0.9	GCC	-0.3	GCC	-3.5	GCC	-0.2	GCC	-1.3	GCC	-0.6
(reference)	(reference)												
US	1.5	US	2.4	US	1.8	US	1.3	US	0.8	US	0.7	US	1.3
EU15	1.9	EU15	1.4	EU15	0.9	EU15	0.3	EU15	0.6	EU15	0.6	EU15	0.3
		EU28	1.8	EU28	1.3	EU28	0.4	EU28	0.8	EU28	0.8	EU28	0.7
Australia	2.3	Australia	2.1	Australia	1.3	Australia	0.6	Australia	1.5	Australia	0.2	Australia	-0.7

Unit: Percentage.

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 17 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Level

—GDP at constant basic prices per hour, using 2017 PPP, reference year 2018

1970 (%)		1980 (%)		1990 (%)		2000 (%)		2010 (%)		2018 (%)	
Singapore	14.4 100.0	Singapore	20.3 100.0	Japan	29.7 100.0	Singapore	40.3 100.0	Singapore	52.4 100.0	Singapore	66.5 100.0
Japan	13.1 91.1	Japan	20.3 99.6	Singapore	27.6 93.0	Japan	36.3 90.0	Hong Kong	44.8 85.5	Hong Kong	54.0 81.2
Iran	11.7 81.8	Hong Kong	14.5 71.2	Hong Kong	25.5 85.8	Hong Kong	32.4 80.4	ROC	41.6 79.4	ROC	47.7 71.7
Turkey	10.9 75.8	Turkey	13.2 65.1	ROC	16.2 54.5	ROC	28.6 71.0	Japan	41.1 78.5	Japan	43.4 65.3
Fiji	10.5 73.3	Iran	12.6 62.1	Turkey	15.4 51.8	Turkey	21.1 52.3	Korea	28.8 55.0	Turkey	38.0 57.2
Hong Kong	8.6 60.0	Fiji	12.1 59.6	Iran	12.6 42.5	Korea	18.2 45.1	Turkey	26.7 50.9	Korea	36.1 54.2
Malaysia	5.4 37.7	Malaysia	8.5 41.6	Fiji	12.3 41.3	Malaysia	16.2 40.1	Iran	24.0 45.8	Malaysia	25.6 38.4
Philippines	4.1 28.3	ROC	7.6 37.5	Malaysia	10.9 36.9	Iran	14.4 35.6	Malaysia	21.0 40.1	Iran	24.7 37.2
ROC	3.7 25.9	Mongolia	5.3 25.8	Korea	10.0 33.7	Fiji	12.8 31.7	Fiji	13.5 25.7	Sri Lanka	16.6 24.9
Sri Lanka	3.5 24.4	Korea	5.1 25.1	Mongolia	6.2 20.9	Sri Lanka	7.5 18.5	Sri Lanka	12.0 22.8	Fiji	15.7 23.6
Mongolia	3.5 24.2	Philippines	4.8 23.8	Sri Lanka	5.6 18.8	Thailand	6.8 16.9	Thailand	9.9 19.0	Mongolia	14.8 22.2
Korea	3.0 21.0	Sri Lanka	4.4 21.7	Indonesia	5.4 18.2	Indonesia	6.7 16.5	Mongolia	9.6 18.4	Thailand	14.2 21.4
Indonesia	2.8 19.2	Indonesia	4.1 20.3	Thailand	4.7 15.8	Mongolia	6.6 16.3	Indonesia	8.8 16.8	Indonesia	12.1 18.1
Lao PDR	2.6 17.9	Thailand	2.9 14.4	Philippines	4.6 15.5	Pakistan	5.7 14.1	Philippines	6.8 13.0	China	10.8 16.2
Pakistan	2.5 17.4	Pakistan	2.9 14.2	Pakistan	4.3 14.4	Philippines	5.5 13.6	China	6.3 12.0	Philippines	9.1 13.6
Thailand	2.4 16.8	Lao PDR	2.8 13.6	Lao PDR	2.9 9.7	Bhutan	3.9 9.8	Pakistan	6.2 11.8	Bhutan	8.5 12.8
Cambodia	1.9 13.2	Bhutan	1.9 9.3	Bhutan	2.8 9.3	Lao PDR	3.9 9.7	Bhutan	5.7 10.8	Pakistan	8.0 12.1
Bangladesh	1.7 12.1	Nepal	1.7 8.5	Nepal	2.3 7.9	Nepal	2.8 6.9	Lao PDR	5.4 10.2	India	7.4 11.2
Nepal	1.7 11.9	Bangladesh	1.4 7.0	India	1.9 6.3	India	2.7 6.7	India	4.8 9.1	Lao PDR	6.5 9.7
Bhutan	1.5 10.5	India	1.3 6.5	Bangladesh	1.7 5.7	China	2.3 5.8	Vietnam	3.8 7.2	Vietnam	5.9 8.8
India	1.3 8.8	Vietnam	1.3 6.4	Vietnam	1.4 4.7	Vietnam	2.3 5.8	Nepal	3.5 6.7	Nepal	4.4 6.7
Vietnam	1.1 7.9	Myanmar	1.2 6.1	Cambodia	1.2 4.2	Bangladesh	1.9 4.8	Bangladesh	2.7 5.2	Bangladesh	4.3 6.5
Myanmar	1.0 6.7	Cambodia	1.1 5.3	Myanmar	1.2 4.2	Myanmar	1.6 4.0	Myanmar	2.3 4.3	Myanmar	3.3 5.0
China	0.5 3.5	China	0.6 3.1	China	1.1 3.7	Cambodia	1.6 3.9	Cambodia	2.2 4.2	Cambodia	2.8 4.1
Brunei	121.0 842.8	Brunei	151.0 742.2	Brunei	75.3 253.6	Brunei	72.7 180.4	Brunei	62.3 118.8	Brunei	62.5 93.9
(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)		(region)	
APO21	3.7 25.7	APO21	4.6 22.8	APO21	6.3 21.1	APO21	7.7 19.2	APO21	10.1 19.3	APO21	13.2 19.9
Asia25	2.4 16.5	Asia25	2.9 14.5	Asia25	4.0 13.4	Asia25	5.4 13.4	Asia25	8.7 16.7	Asia25	12.7 19.0
East Asia	2.5 17.2	East Asia	3.2 15.6	East Asia	4.4 14.8	East Asia	6.1 15.1	East Asia	10.5 20.1	East Asia	15.6 23.4
South Asia	1.5 10.6	South Asia	1.6 7.8	South Asia	2.2 7.5	South Asia	3.1 7.7	South Asia	5.1 9.6	South Asia	7.7 11.6
ASEAN	2.6 18.1	ASEAN	3.6 17.6	ASEAN	4.6 15.5	ASEAN	6.1 15.2	ASEAN	8.4 16.0	ASEAN	11.4 17.2
ASEAN6	3.3 23.2	ASEAN6	4.6 22.4	ASEAN6	5.9 19.8	ASEAN6	7.9 19.5	ASEAN6	10.6 20.2	ASEAN6	14.2 21.4
CLMV	1.3 8.8	CLMV	1.4 6.8	CLMV	1.5 4.9	CLMV	2.2 5.5	CLMV	3.4 6.6	CLMV	5.1 7.7
(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)		(reference)	
US	34.4 239.6	US	39.4 193.4	US	45.9 154.7	US	56.6 140.4	US	68.2 130.2	US	71.9 108.2
		Australia	33.8 166.0	Australia	37.0 124.7	Australia	46.9 116.4	Australia	53.5 102.1	Australia	59.0 88.7

Unit: US dollar (as of 2018).

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 18 Per-Hour Labor Productivity Growth

—Average annual growth rate of GDP at constant basic prices per hour, using 2017 PPP

1990–1995		1995–2000		2000–2005		2005–2010		2010–2015		2015–2018		2017–2018	
China	9.7	Korea	5.6	China	8.3	China	11.5	Mongolia	7.6	Vietnam	6.4	Myanmar	7.3
Malaysia	6.5	ROC	5.5	Vietnam	6.6	India	6.9	China	7.5	Bangladesh	6.1	Turkey	6.5
Korea	6.4	China	5.4	Thailand	5.2	Iran	6.5	Bhutan	7.1	India	6.0	Cambodia	6.1
Indonesia	6.3	Vietnam	4.8	Cambodia	4.6	Bhutan	5.6	Bangladesh	5.4	China	5.5	Bangladesh	6.0
Thailand	6.2	Turkey	4.8	India	4.6	Sri Lanka	5.1	India	5.2	Lao PDR	4.9	Korea	5.5
ROC	5.9	Lao PDR	4.8	Korea	4.6	Mongolia	4.9	Sri Lanka	5.2	Turkey	4.8	Vietnam	5.4
Vietnam	5.2	India	4.1	Sri Lanka	4.3	Korea	4.7	Myanmar	5.1	Singapore	4.6	India	5.2
Hong Kong	4.8	Myanmar	4.0	Lao PDR	4.2	ROC	3.7	Vietnam	4.9	Korea	4.5	Mongolia	5.1
Sri Lanka	4.7	Singapore	3.8	Iran	3.8	Bangladesh	3.6	Thailand	4.8	Cambodia	4.5	Indonesia	4.8
Bhutan	4.7	Cambodia	2.8	ROC	3.8	Myanmar	3.5	Indonesia	4.6	Myanmar	4.1	Lao PDR	4.6
Singapore	3.8	Pakistan	2.7	Singapore	3.7	Hong Kong	3.4	Turkey	4.2	Pakistan	4.1	China	4.5
India	3.1	Mongolia	2.6	Myanmar	3.4	Vietnam	3.1	Philippines	3.9	Thailand	3.9	Pakistan	4.5
Pakistan	3.0	Philippines	2.6	Bangladesh	3.4	Nepal	2.9	Pakistan	2.7	Nepal	3.6	Sri Lanka	4.2
Japan	1.9	Bhutan	2.4	Indonesia	3.3	Philippines	2.5	Nepal	2.5	ROC	3.2	Thailand	3.8
Cambodia	1.8	Bangladesh	2.4	Malaysia	3.2	Cambodia	2.4	Malaysia	2.2	Philippines	3.1	Singapore	3.7
Iran	1.6	Japan	2.1	Hong Kong	3.1	Thailand	2.4	Hong Kong	2.1	Iran	3.0	Nepal	2.9
Turkey	1.5	Nepal	1.9	Mongolia	2.8	Indonesia	2.4	Singapore	2.0	Malaysia	2.8	Brunei	2.2
Nepal	1.4	Malaysia	1.3	Turkey	2.6	Malaysia	2.1	Fiji	1.9	Indonesia	2.7	Malaysia	2.1
Lao PDR	1.4	Fiji	1.2	Nepal	1.9	Turkey	2.1	Korea	1.7	Hong Kong	2.7	ROC	1.8
Myanmar	1.1	Thailand	1.2	Pakistan	1.8	Lao PDR	2.1	Cambodia	1.5	Sri Lanka	2.2	Fiji	1.6
Philippines	0.9	Iran	1.0	Japan	1.8	Singapore	1.5	Japan	1.0	Fiji	2.0	Hong Kong	1.0
Bangladesh	0.2	Sri Lanka	1.0	Philippines	1.7	Fiji	1.4	Lao PDR	0.9	Bhutan	1.8	Philippines	0.8
Brunei	−0.2	Hong Kong	0.0	Bhutan	1.6	Japan	0.8	ROC	0.8	Mongolia	1.5	Bhutan	−0.8
Fiji	−0.4	Brunei	−0.5	Fiji	−0.3	Pakistan	−0.2	Brunei	−0.6	Brunei	1.1	Japan	−1.1
Mongolia	−1.5	Indonesia	−2.1	Brunei	−1.5	Brunei	−1.6	Iran	−1.2	Japan	0.1	Iran	−2.0
(region)													
APO21	2.5	APO21	1.7	APO21	2.6	APO21	2.8	APO21	3.2	APO21	3.6	APO21	3.0
Asia25	3.8	Asia25	2.3	Asia25	4.0	Asia25	5.6	Asia25	4.8	Asia25	4.4	Asia25	3.6
East Asia	4.0	East Asia	2.4	East Asia	4.1	East Asia	6.9	East Asia	5.2	East Asia	4.3	East Asia	3.4
South Asia	2.9	South Asia	3.7	South Asia	4.1	South Asia	5.8	South Asia	5.0	South Asia	5.7	South Asia	5.0
ASEAN	5.3	ASEAN	0.5	ASEAN	3.7	ASEAN	2.5	ASEAN	4.2	ASEAN	3.4	ASEAN	3.6
ASEAN6	5.6	ASEAN6	0.2	ASEAN6	3.5	ASEAN6	2.4	ASEAN6	4.2	ASEAN6	2.9	ASEAN6	3.4
CLMV	3.9	CLMV	4.5	CLMV	5.5	CLMV	3.3	CLMV	4.4	CLMV	5.7	CLMV	6.0
(reference)													
US	1.6	US	2.5	US	2.2	US	1.5	US	0.7	US	0.7	US	0.9
				EU15	1.2	EU15	0.7	EU15	0.9	EU15	0.5	EU15	0.2
Australia	2.3	Australia	2.5	Australia	1.7	Australia	0.9	Australia	1.7	Australia	0.5	Australia	−0.4

Unit: Percentage.

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 19 TFP Growth

—Average annual growth rate of total factor productivity

1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2018	2017–2018							
China	6.2	Mongolia	3.7	Mongolia	3.7	China	5.2	China	2.6	India	2.9	Cambodia	4.1
Sri Lanka	3.4	Iran	2.3	China	3.3	Bhutan	3.0	Fiji	2.5	China	2.7	Myanmar	3.2
ROC	2.7	Korea	1.9	Iran	3.1	Sri Lanka	2.3	Mongolia	2.4	Cambodia	2.6	Vietnam	3.0
Iran	2.0	ROC	1.8	Cambodia	3.0	India	2.3	Pakistan	2.2	Vietnam	2.6	China	2.9
Vietnam	2.0	India	1.8	Lao PDR	2.7	Iran	2.0	Philippines	1.7	Iran	2.4	Turkey	2.6
Cambodia	1.9	Cambodia	1.6	India	2.5	Singapore	2.0	India	1.5	Hong Kong	2.1	India	2.3
India	1.6	China	1.2	Thailand	2.3	Hong Kong	1.9	Bhutan	1.4	Pakistan	2.1	Thailand	2.2
Hong Kong	1.4	Sri Lanka	1.1	Hong Kong	1.9	ROC	1.8	Turkey	1.4	Singapore	1.9	Pakistan	2.2
Korea	1.4	Lao PDR	0.8	Malaysia	1.4	Philippines	1.3	Vietnam	1.0	ROC	1.8	Mongolia	2.1
Singapore	0.8	Pakistan	0.7	Sri Lanka	1.4	Mongolia	1.2	Hong Kong	1.0	Thailand	1.7	Bangladesh	2.1
Bhutan	0.5	Singapore	0.5	ROC	1.3	Korea	1.2	Japan	0.9	Nepal	1.6	Korea	1.8
Malaysia	0.2	Japan	0.5	Singapore	1.3	Fiji	0.7	Nepal	0.7	Bangladesh	1.5	Singapore	1.3
Pakistan	0.1	Bhutan	0.3	Philippines	1.0	Malaysia	0.6	ROC	0.4	Korea	1.5	ROC	1.1
Japan	0.1	Turkey	0.2	Pakistan	0.9	Bangladesh	0.5	Singapore	0.3	Turkey	1.5	Hong Kong	1.1
Indonesia	-0.2	Vietnam	0.0	Japan	0.7	Nepal	0.3	Malaysia	0.2	Mongolia	1.4	Lao PDR	1.0
Philippines	-0.4	Fiji	-0.2	Korea	0.7	Indonesia	0.3	Korea	0.2	Lao PDR	1.3	Malaysia	1.0
Mongolia	-0.5	Myanmar	-0.2	Vietnam	0.2	Thailand	0.2	Bangladesh	0.2	Malaysia	0.9	Indonesia	0.9
Thailand	-0.9	Philippines	-0.3	Turkey	0.2	Pakistan	0.2	Thailand	0.2	Fiji	0.7	Fiji	0.7
Bangladesh	-1.0	Bangladesh	-0.5	Indonesia	0.1	Japan	-0.1	Sri Lanka	0.1	Japan	0.2	Nepal	0.6
Lao PDR	-1.0	Brunei	-0.6	Bangladesh	0.1	Lao PDR	-0.1	Indonesia	-1.3	Philippines	0.2	Brunei	0.3
Turkey	-1.2	Malaysia	-1.2	Fiji	-0.3	Cambodia	-1.3	Myanmar	-1.9	Myanmar	-0.4	Philippines	-0.4
Myanmar	-1.3	Hong Kong	-1.5	Myanmar	-0.9	Vietnam	-1.4	Cambodia	-1.9	Indonesia	-0.5	Japan	-0.7
Fiji	-1.6	Nepal	-1.7	Nepal	-1.0	Turkey	-1.5	Lao PDR	-2.5	Brunei	-0.6	Sri Lanka	-1.1
Nepal	-2.1	Thailand	-2.9	Brunei	-1.1	Myanmar	-2.8	Iran	-3.1	Bhutan	-1.0	Bhutan	-2.6
Brunei	-5.0	Indonesia	-5.4	Bhutan	-2.0	Brunei	-3.4	Brunei	-4.4	Sri Lanka	-1.5	Iran	-5.1
(region)													
APO21	0.6	APO21	0.0	APO21	1.2	APO21	0.8	APO21	0.7	APO21	1.5	APO21	1.1
Asia25	1.6	Asia25	0.2	Asia25	1.8	Asia25	2.4	Asia25	1.2	Asia25	1.8	Asia25	1.7
East Asia	2.0	East Asia	0.4	East Asia	1.9	East Asia	3.4	East Asia	1.9	East Asia	2.1	East Asia	2.2
South Asia	1.2	South Asia	1.4	South Asia	2.0	South Asia	1.8	South Asia	1.2	South Asia	2.5	South Asia	2.1
ASEAN	0.4	ASEAN	-2.4	ASEAN	1.2	ASEAN	0.4	ASEAN	0.1	ASEAN	0.6	ASEAN	1.0
ASEAN6	0.0	ASEAN6	-3.0	ASEAN6	1.1	ASEAN6	0.7	ASEAN6	-0.1	ASEAN6	0.2	ASEAN6	0.7
CLMV	1.1	CLMV	0.2	CLMV	0.4	CLMV	-1.5	CLMV	0.3	CLMV	2.0	CLMV	3.1
(reference)													
US	0.8	US	1.1	US	0.8	US	0.0	US	0.5	US	0.3	US	0.7

Unit: Percentage.

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 20 Output Growth and Contributions of Labor, Capital, and TFP

	Out-put	Labor			Capital		TFP		Out-put	Labor			Capital		TFP	
		Hours Worked	Labor Quality		IT	Non-IT				Hours Worked	Labor Quality		IT	Non-IT		
Bangladesh	1970–1975	-4.9	0.2	(-4)	0.3	(-6)	0.0	(0)	0.6	(-13)	-6.0	(124)				
	1975–1980	3.8	1.2	(33)	0.8	(21)	0.1	(2)	1.4	(38)	0.2	(6)				
	1980–1985	3.0	1.5	(51)	0.5	(16)	0.0	(1)	1.9	(65)	-1.0	(-34)				
	1985–1990	4.6	0.7	(15)	-0.1	(-1)	0.1	(2)	2.7	(58)	1.2	(26)				
	1990–1995	3.9	1.8	(48)	0.2	(6)	0.1	(2)	2.7	(70)	-1.0	(-26)				
	1995–2000	4.4	1.0	(22)	0.2	(5)	0.2	(4)	3.5	(79)	-0.5	(-10)				
	2000–2005	5.3	0.9	(17)	0.2	(4)	0.1	(2)	4.0	(75)	0.1	(1)				
	2005–2010	6.0	1.1	(18)	0.1	(2)	0.2	(3)	4.2	(69)	0.5	(8)				
	2010–2015	5.8	0.1	(3)	1.0	(16)	0.3	(4)	4.3	(74)	0.2	(3)				
	2015–2018	7.5	0.5	(7)	0.8	(10)	0.3	(4)	4.4	(58)	1.5	(21)				
1970–2018	3.8	0.9	(25)	0.4	(10)	0.1	(3)	2.9	(77)	-0.6	(-15)					
Bhutan	1970–1975	4.2	1.9	(44)	0.2	(4)	0.0	(1)	1.2	(29)	0.9	(22)				
	1975–1980	6.3	2.0	(32)	-0.1	(-2)	0.1	(1)	1.0	(16)	3.3	(53)				
	1980–1985	5.6	1.4	(25)	0.6	(10)	0.1	(1)	1.7	(30)	1.9	(33)				
	1985–1990	6.6	1.3	(20)	1.3	(20)	0.1	(1)	1.8	(27)	2.1	(32)				
	1990–1995	3.0	-0.9	(-30)	1.4	(48)	0.2	(7)	1.7	(57)	0.5	(18)				
	1995–2000	6.8	2.3	(34)	0.6	(8)	0.8	(11)	2.8	(42)	0.3	(4)				
	2000–2005	6.3	2.5	(40)	0.8	(13)	0.0	(0)	5.0	(79)	-2.0	(-32)				
	2005–2010	9.5	1.8	(19)	1.0	(11)	0.4	(4)	3.2	(34)	3.0	(32)				
	2010–2015	6.6	-0.2	(-3)	0.9	(13)	0.2	(2)	4.4	(66)	1.4	(22)				
	2015–2018	4.9	1.4	(28)	0.5	(9)	0.0	(0)	4.1	(83)	-1.0	(-20)				
1970–2018	6.0	1.3	(22)	0.7	(12)	0.2	(3)	2.6	(44)	1.1	(19)					
Brunei	1970–1975	3.9	0.7	(18)	0.3	(8)	-0.1	(-1)	1.4	(36)	1.5	(39)				
	1975–1980	11.6	0.7	(6)	0.2	(2)	0.7	(6)	4.1	(36)	5.9	(50)				
	1980–1985	-4.1	0.4	(-9)	0.4	(-9)	0.1	(-2)	9.0	(-216)	-13.9	(336)				
	1985–1990	-1.5	1.1	(-71)	0.4	(-25)	0.0	(3)	3.8	(-252)	-6.7	(445)				
	1990–1995	3.5	0.8	(22)	0.2	(6)	0.4	(11)	7.1	(202)	-5.0	(-140)				
	1995–2000	2.7	0.7	(26)	0.1	(2)	0.1	(4)	2.5	(91)	-0.6	(-23)				
	2000–2005	1.1	0.6	(51)	0.2	(18)	0.1	(8)	1.3	(124)	-1.1	(-100)				
	2005–2010	0.1	0.4	(426)	0.2	(226)	0.2	(226)	2.7	(2978)	-3.4	(-3756)				
	2010–2015	0.9	0.3	(36)	0.0	(-3)	0.2	(21)	4.8	(546)	-4.4	(-501)				
	2015–2018	0.7	-0.1	(-16)	-0.1	(-18)	0.0	(-2)	1.6	(211)	-0.6	(-75)				
1970–2018	1.9	0.6	(30)	0.2	(10)	0.2	(9)	3.9	(202)	-2.9	(-151)					
Cambodia	1970–1975	4.0	1.0	(26)	0.2	(5)	0.0	(1)	4.4	(112)	-1.7	(-44)				
	1975–1980	6.3	1.4	(22)	0.1	(1)	0.0	(1)	3.5	(55)	1.3	(21)				
	1980–1985	9.9	1.9	(19)	0.1	(1)	0.1	(1)	3.3	(33)	4.5	(46)				
	1985–1990	7.3	1.3	(18)	0.1	(2)	0.1	(1)	4.3	(58)	1.6	(21)				
	1990–1995	11.0	0.7	(7)	0.4	(3)	0.1	(1)	3.6	(32)	6.2	(56)				
	1995–2000	7.4	1.2	(16)	0.7	(9)	0.2	(3)	4.1	(55)	1.2	(16)				
	2000–2005	10.0	0.9	(9)	0.6	(8)	0.8	(8)	4.4	(44)	3.3	(33)				
	2005–2010	11.7	0.1	(1)	0.2	(2)	0.4	(3)	5.8	(49)	5.2	(45)				
	2010–2015	7.8	0.2	(2)	0.2	(3)	0.3	(3)	4.5	(58)	2.6	(33)				
	2015–2018	5.7	0.1	(2)	-0.8	(-14)	0.2	(3)	3.5	(61)	2.7	(48)				
1970–2018	8.2	0.9	(11)	0.2	(3)	0.2	(3)	4.1	(51)	2.7	(33)					
China	1970–1975	6.0	1.0	(26)	0.2	(5)	0.0	(1)	4.4	(112)	-1.7	(-44)				
	1975–1980	4.3	1.4	(22)	0.1	(1)	0.0	(1)	3.5	(55)	1.3	(21)				
	1980–1985	9.9	1.9	(19)	0.1	(1)	0.1	(1)	3.3	(33)	4.5	(46)				
	1985–1990	7.3	1.3	(18)	0.1	(2)	0.1	(1)	4.3	(58)	1.6	(21)				
	1990–1995	11.0	0.7	(7)	0.4	(3)	0.1	(1)	3.6	(32)	6.2	(56)				
	1995–2000	7.4	1.2	(16)	0.7	(9)	0.2	(3)	4.1	(55)	1.2	(16)				
	2000–2005	10.0	0.9	(9)	0.6	(8)	0.8	(8)	4.4	(44)	3.3	(33)				
	2005–2010	11.7	0.1	(1)	0.2	(2)	0.4	(3)	5.8	(49)	5.2	(45)				
	2010–2015	7.8	0.2	(2)	0.2	(3)	0.3	(3)	4.5	(58)	2.6	(33)				
	2015–2018	5.7	0.1	(2)	-0.8	(-14)	0.2	(3)	3.5	(61)	2.7	(48)				
1970–2018	8.2	0.9	(11)	0.2	(3)	0.2	(3)	4.1	(51)	2.7	(33)					
ROC	1970–1975	9.8	1.8	(18)	0.1	(1)	0.3	(3)	4.7	(48)	2.8	(29)				
	1975–1980	11.2	1.7	(16)	1.1	(10)	0.3	(3)	4.3	(38)	3.7	(33)				
	1980–1985	9.0	1.2	(14)	0.2	(3)	0.3	(3)	3.3	(37)	3.9	(44)				
	1985–1990	10.0	1.0	(10)	0.8	(8)	0.3	(3)	3.0	(30)	4.8	(48)				
	1990–1995	7.6	1.0	(13)	0.6	(8)	0.2	(3)	3.0	(40)	2.7	(35)				
	1995–2000	6.0	0.3	(5)	0.6	(10)	0.6	(11)	2.7	(44)	1.8	(30)				
	2000–2005	4.0	0.1	(3)	0.9	(21)	0.3	(7)	1.5	(36)	1.3	(33)				
	2005–2010	4.2	0.2	(5)	0.9	(22)	0.0	(1)	1.1	(27)	1.8	(44)				
	2010–2015	2.9	1.0	(35)	0.6	(21)	0.1	(2)	0.8	(26)	0.4	(15)				
	2015–2018	2.9	-0.1	(-4)	0.4	(13)	0.1	(2)	0.8	(29)	1.8	(60)				
1970–2018	6.9	0.9	(12)	0.6	(9)	0.3	(4)	2.6	(38)	2.5	(37)					
Hong Kong	1970–1975	6.5	1.9	(29)	0.1	(2)	0.2	(2)	2.8	(44)	1.5	(23)				
	1975–1980	11.3	2.0	(17)	0.7	(6)	0.3	(2)	3.5	(31)	4.9	(43)				
	1980–1985	5.3	0.9	(16)	0.6	(11)	0.2	(4)	2.8	(53)	0.8	(15)				
	1985–1990	8.0	0.2	(2)	1.0	(13)	0.4	(5)	2.1	(27)	4.3	(53)				
	1990–1995	5.9	0.6	(10)	0.9	(15)	0.4	(7)	2.6	(44)	1.4	(24)				
	1995–2000	2.9	1.5	(51)	0.5	(16)	0.6	(21)	1.9	(66)	-1.5	(-54)				
	2000–2005	4.1	0.5	(13)	0.3	(6)	0.4	(9)	1.1	(26)	1.9	(46)				
	2005–2010	3.7	0.2	(5)	0.3	(7)	0.3	(7)	1.1	(29)	1.9	(52)				
	2010–2015	2.7	0.3	(12)	0.6	(23)	0.2	(8)	0.5	(19)	1.0	(38)				
	2015–2018	3.1	0.2	(7)	0.5	(15)	0.0	(-2)	0.3	(11)	2.1	(68)				
1970–2018	5.4	0.8	(15)	0.5	(10)	0.3	(5)	1.9	(36)	1.8	(33)					
Indonesia	1970–1975	8.3	1.4	(17)	0.8	(9)	0.0	(0)	4.2	(50)	1.9	(23)				
	1975–1980	7.8	1.4	(17)	0.6	(7)	0.1	(2)	5.4	(69)	0.4	(5)				
	1980–1985	4.7	1.4	(30)	0.5	(10)	0.1	(2)	5.0	(107)	-2.3	(-50)				
	1985–1990	7.5	1.0	(13)	1.3	(17)	0.2	(3)	4.4	(59)	0.6	(9)				
	1990–1995	7.5	0.5	(7)	2.5	(33)	0.2	(3)	4.5	(60)	-0.2	(-3)				
	1995–2000	0.7	1.1	(152)	1.1	(147)	0.1	(17)	3.8	(524)	-5.4	(-740)				
	2000–2005	4.6	0.5	(11)	1.4	(31)	0.2	(4)	2.4	(51)	0.1	(2)				
	2005–2010	5.6	1.1	(20)	0.6	(11)	0.2	(3)	3.4	(61)	0.3	(5)				
	2010–2015	5.4	0.3	(5)	2.2	(40)	0.2	(5)	4.0	(73)	-1.3	(-23)				
	2015–2018	5.0	1.0	(20)	0.9	(17)	0.2	(4)	3.4	(69)	-0.5	(-10)				
1970–2018	5.7	1.0	(17)	1.2	(21)	0.2	(3)	4.1	(71)	-0.6	(-11)					
Japan	1970–1975	4.4	-0.4	(-10)	1.0	(24)	0.2	(5)	2.7	(60)	0.9	(21)				
	1975–1980	4.7	0.7	(15)	0.8	(18)	0.2	(4)	1.5	(32)	1.5	(32)				
	1980–1985	4.3	0.5	(11)	0.6	(15)	0.3	(8)	1.3	(31)	1.5	(35)				
	1985–1990	4.9	0.4	(8)	0.6	(12)	0.5	(10)	1.6	(33)	1.8	(37)				
	1990–1995	1.5	-0.2	(-17)	0.4	(27)	0.2	(16)	1.0	(69)	0.1	(5)				
	1995–2000	1.1	-0.6	(-52)	0.4	(36)	0.3	(30)	0.5	(44)	0.5	(41)				
	2000–2005	1.2	-0.3	(-28)	0.4	(38)	0.2	(19)	0.1	(12)	0.7	(60)				
	2005–2010	0.1	-0.4	(-384)	0.4	(391)	0.1	(119)	0.1	(77)	-0.1	(-104)				
	2010–2015	1.0	0.0	(-1)	0.1	(15)	0.1	(6)	-0.1	(-11)	0.9	(92)				
	2015–2018	1.0	0.5	(48)	0.2	(17)	0.0	(1)	0.2	(16)	0.2	(18)				
1970–2018	2.5	0.0	(-1)	0.5	(21)	0.2	(9)	0.9	(37)	0.8	(33)					

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	Out-put	Labor		Capital		TFP		Out-put	Labor		Capital		TFP	
		Hours Worked	Labor Quality	IT	Non-IT				Hours Worked	Labor Quality	IT	Non-IT		
Korea	1970-1975	9.4	1.6 (17)	0.2 (3)	0.1 (1)	4.1 (44)	3.4 (36)	1970-1975	3.0	0.8 (27)	0.2 (6)	0.0 (0)	2.0 (66)	0.0 (2)
	1975-1980	7.7	1.3 (18)	0.6 (7)	0.4 (5)	6.2 (80)	-0.8 (-10)	1975-1980	0.0	-0.3 (3409)	0.2 (-2312)	0.0 (-319)	1.6 (-20776)	-1.5 (20099)
	1980-1985	8.9	1.1 (13)	1.7 (20)	0.3 (4)	3.6 (41)	2.1 (23)	1980-1985	2.2	0.4 (20)	0.2 (10)	0.1 (4)	3.2 (148)	-1.8 (-82)
	1985-1990	9.9	1.6 (16)	1.4 (14)	0.6 (6)	4.4 (44)	1.9 (19)	1985-1990	3.6	1.5 (42)	0.2 (4)	0.1 (2)	3.4 (94)	-1.5 (-42)
	1990-1995	8.3	1.0 (12)	1.6 (19)	0.4 (4)	3.9 (48)	1.4 (16)	1990-1995	4.9	1.4 (29)	0.1 (3)	0.2 (4)	4.2 (85)	-1.0 (-20)
	1995-2000	5.6	0.0 (0)	0.7 (12)	0.6 (10)	2.5 (44)	1.9 (33)	1995-2000	7.1	1.1 (15)	0.5 (7)	0.1 (2)	4.5 (64)	0.8 (12)
	2000-2005	5.0	0.2 (4)	1.2 (25)	0.4 (9)	2.4 (49)	0.7 (14)	2000-2005	6.7	1.2 (18)	0.4 (7)	0.1 (2)	2.2 (33)	2.7 (40)
	2005-2010	4.4	-0.1 (-3)	1.0 (23)	0.2 (4)	2.1 (49)	1.2 (28)	2005-2010	5.0	1.6 (31)	0.6 (12)	0.3 (5)	2.7 (54)	-0.1 (-2)
	2010-2015	3.0	0.6 (21)	0.6 (19)	0.1 (2)	1.5 (52)	0.2 (6)	2010-2015	2.9	1.0 (35)	0.4 (16)	0.2 (8)	3.6 (127)	-2.5 (-86)
	2015-2018	2.9	-0.9 (-30)	0.5 (18)	0.1 (3)	1.6 (54)	1.5 (54)	2015-2018	6.7	0.9 (13)	0.0 (1)	0.2 (2)	4.4 (65)	1.3 (19)
1970-2018	6.7	0.7 (11)	1.0 (15)	0.3 (5)	3.3 (50)	1.3 (20)	1970-2018	4.1	1.0 (24)	0.3 (7)	0.1 (3)	3.1 (76)	-0.4 (-10)	
Malaysia	1970-1975	7.6	1.2 (16)	0.4 (6)	0.0 (0)	4.5 (59)	1.4 (19)	1970-1975	6.5	0.5 (8)	2.6 (40)	-0.1 (-1)	2.9 (44)	0.6 (9)
	1975-1980	7.8	1.2 (15)	0.8 (11)	0.1 (1)	5.0 (64)	0.7 (9)	1975-1980	5.4	0.9 (16)	0.7 (13)	0.1 (2)	4.4 (81)	-0.7 (-13)
	1980-1985	5.2	1.2 (23)	0.9 (16)	0.1 (2)	6.0 (114)	-2.9 (-55)	1980-1985	6.6	0.8 (12)	0.5 (7)	0.2 (2)	5.1 (77)	0.1 (1)
	1985-1990	6.6	1.3 (20)	0.7 (10)	0.2 (3)	2.9 (44)	1.5 (23)	1985-1990	3.8	1.5 (39)	0.3 (7)	0.1 (2)	2.8 (75)	-0.9 (-24)
	1990-1995	9.3	1.0 (11)	1.2 (13)	0.4 (4)	6.5 (71)	0.2 (2)	1990-1995	-1.8	-0.1 (6)	-1.3 (72)	0.0 (-3)	0.1 (-3)	-0.5 (27)
	1995-2000	5.1	1.3 (25)	0.6 (12)	0.5 (9)	4.0 (78)	-1.2 (-23)	1995-2000	3.6	0.2 (6)	-0.2 (-7)	0.1 (3)	-0.2 (-6)	3.7 (104)
	2000-2005	5.3	0.7 (13)	0.9 (17)	0.7 (14)	1.6 (29)	1.4 (27)	2000-2005	6.3	0.8 (12)	0.7 (11)	0.3 (5)	0.8 (13)	3.7 (59)
	2005-2010	4.8	0.9 (19)	0.5 (10)	0.5 (11)	2.3 (48)	0.6 (12)	2005-2010	6.4	0.3 (5)	0.0 (0)	0.4 (6)	4.4 (69)	1.2 (20)
	2010-2015	5.1	1.0 (21)	0.4 (7)	0.5 (10)	2.9 (58)	0.2 (5)	2010-2015	9.8	0.7 (7)	1.5 (15)	0.2 (2)	5.0 (51)	2.4 (24)
	2015-2018	4.6	0.7 (14)	0.0 (-1)	0.2 (5)	2.8 (61)	0.9 (20)	2015-2018	4.4	1.0 (22)	0.8 (18)	0.0 (0)	1.2 (28)	1.4 (32)
1970-2018	6.2	1.1 (17)	0.7 (11)	0.3 (5)	3.9 (63)	0.3 (4)	1970-2018	5.1	0.7 (13)	0.5 (11)	0.1 (3)	2.7 (53)	1.1 (21)	
Myanmar	1970-1975	3.3	1.1 (33)	-0.2 (-7)	0.0 (0)	2.0 (61)	0.4 (12)	1970-1975	3.2	2.1 (67)	0.3 (9)	-0.1 (-3)	0.7 (24)	0.1 (4)
	1975-1980	7.1	1.3 (19)	0.4 (6)	0.1 (2)	5.0 (70)	0.2 (3)	1975-1980	3.4	2.3 (67)	0.3 (9)	0.1 (2)	1.7 (49)	-0.9 (-27)
	1980-1985	4.3	1.0 (23)	0.3 (7)	0.1 (3)	5.0 (117)	-2.1 (-50)	1980-1985	4.0	1.1 (28)	2.2 (54)	0.0 (1)	2.1 (52)	-1.5 (-36)
	1985-1990	-0.2	0.6 (-278)	0.8 (-362)	0.0 (-15)	1.2 (-552)	-2.8 (1307)	1985-1990	4.7	0.7 (15)	2.1 (44)	0.0 (1)	2.1 (45)	-0.3 (-6)
	1990-1995	3.2	1.1 (33)	1.0 (30)	0.1 (2)	2.4 (74)	-1.3 (-40)	1990-1995	4.1	1.7 (41)	2.1 (51)	0.0 (1)	2.3 (57)	-2.1 (-50)
	1995-2000	6.8	1.4 (20)	0.3 (4)	0.3 (4)	5.1 (75)	-0.2 (-4)	1995-2000	3.8	1.2 (32)	2.2 (57)	0.1 (2)	2.1 (55)	-1.7 (-46)
	2000-2005	5.7	1.0 (17)	0.6 (11)	0.2 (4)	4.8 (84)	-0.9 (-15)	2000-2005	3.0	0.7 (22)	1.4 (45)	0.1 (2)	2.0 (64)	-1.0 (-33)
	2005-2010	5.0	0.6 (12)	0.7 (14)	0.3 (6)	6.1 (124)	-2.8 (-56)	2005-2010	4.1	0.6 (15)	0.7 (18)	0.1 (2)	2.4 (58)	0.3 (7)
	2010-2015	6.2	0.4 (6)	0.2 (4)	0.4 (6)	7.1 (115)	-1.9 (-30)	2010-2015	3.5	0.6 (17)	-0.1 (-4)	0.1 (4)	2.2 (63)	0.7 (21)
	2015-2018	4.7	0.2 (5)	0.0 (-1)	0.1 (3)	4.8 (102)	-0.4 (-9)	2015-2018	6.7	1.7 (25)	0.0 (0)	0.2 (2)	3.3 (48)	1.6 (24)
1970-2018	4.6	0.9 (19)	0.4 (9)	0.2 (4)	4.3 (94)	-1.2 (-26)	1970-2018	4.0	1.3 (32)	1.2 (29)	0.1 (1)	2.0 (52)	-0.6 (-14)	
Pakistan	1970-1975	3.2	1.0 (32)	0.7 (23)	0.0 (0)	2.2 (69)	-0.8 (-24)	1970-1975	6.1	2.0 (32)	0.3 (6)	0.0 (1)	2.8 (46)	0.9 (15)
	1975-1980	5.3	1.5 (28)	1.0 (19)	0.0 (0)	2.8 (52)	0.0 (0)	1975-1980	5.5	1.4 (26)	0.8 (14)	0.1 (2)	4.5 (83)	-1.4 (-25)
	1980-1985	6.2	1.3 (21)	0.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	2.8 (45)	2.0 (33)	1980-1985	-0.4	1.4 (-333)	0.7 (-168)	0.2 (-43)	3.4 (-787)	-6.1 (1431)
	1985-1990	6.5	1.4 (21)	1.0 (16)	0.1 (1)	2.8 (43)	1.2 (19)	1985-1990	5.6	1.0 (18)	0.9 (16)	0.1 (1)	1.1 (20)	2.5 (44)
	1990-1995	4.8	1.0 (20)	0.9 (20)	0.0 (1)	2.7 (56)	0.1 (3)	1990-1995	3.2	1.0 (30)	0.2 (7)	0.1 (3)	2.3 (72)	-0.4 (-12)
	1995-2000	4.8	1.0 (22)	0.5 (10)	0.0 (0)	2.5 (53)	0.7 (15)	1995-2000	4.2	0.7 (17)	1.1 (27)	0.5 (11)	2.3 (54)	-0.3 (-8)
	2000-2005	4.4	1.1 (25)	0.6 (14)	0.1 (3)	1.7 (39)	0.9 (20)	2000-2005	4.5	1.2 (26)	0.2 (4)	0.5 (11)	1.6 (36)	1.0 (23)
	2005-2010	3.2	1.3 (42)	0.2 (5)	0.1 (2)	1.5 (46)	0.2 (5)	2005-2010	4.8	1.1 (23)	0.7 (14)	0.1 (3)	1.7 (35)	1.3 (26)
	2010-2015	3.8	0.4 (11)	0.7 (17)	0.0 (1)	0.5 (14)	2.2 (57)	2010-2015	5.6	0.7 (13)	0.5 (9)	0.2 (3)	2.5 (44)	1.7 (31)
	2015-2018	5.2	0.5 (10)	1.1 (21)	0.1 (2)	1.4 (27)	2.1 (40)	2015-2018	6.5	1.4 (22)	0.7 (10)	0.4 (6)	3.8 (59)	0.2 (3)
1970-2018	4.7	1.1 (23)	0.7 (14)	0.1 (1)	2.1 (45)	0.8 (17)	1970-2018	4.5	1.2 (26)	0.6 (14)	0.2 (5)	2.6 (57)	-0.1 (-2)	
Singapore	1970-1975	8.8	2.6 (29)	0.4 (5)	0.1 (1)	4.5 (51)	1.2 (14)	1970-1975	3.5	0.8 (23)	0.3 (9)	0.0 (0)	1.8 (52)	0.6 (16)
	1975-1980	8.0	2.3 (29)	0.6 (8)	0.3 (3)	3.6 (45)	1.2 (15)	1975-1980	4.6	0.8 (18)	0.2 (5)	0.1 (1)	2.9 (62)	0.6 (14)
	1980-1985	6.5	1.4 (21)	1.3 (20)	0.5 (8)	4.5 (70)	-1.2 (-19)	1980-1985	4.5	0.1 (3)	0.9 (20)	0.1 (1)	3.1 (68)	0.3 (7)
	1985-1990	7.8	2.1 (27)	0.7 (9)	0.8 (10)	2.5 (33)	1.6 (21)	1985-1990	3.6	1.5 (42)	0.3 (8)	0.0 (-1)	0.8 (23)	1.0 (28)
	1990-1995	8.5	2.1 (25)	1.7 (19)	0.6 (7)	3.4 (40)	0.8 (9)	1990-1995	5.5	0.4 (7)	0.8 (15)	0.1 (2)	0.8 (14)	3.4 (62)
	1995-2000	6.2	1.1 (18)	1.0 (16)	0.6 (9)	3.1 (50)	0.5 (8)	1995-2000	4.9	1.9 (40)	0.2 (3)	0.1 (3)	1.5 (31)	1.1 (23)
	2000-2005	4.9	0.5 (10)	1.0 (21)	0.5 (10)	1.5 (32)	1.3 (27)	2000-2005	4.5	0.1 (1)	0.9 (20)	0.2 (5)	1.9 (43)	1.4 (31)
	2005-2010	7.2	2.4 (34)	0.4 (6)	0.4 (6)	2.0 (27)	2.0 (27)	2005-2010	6.2	0.4 (6)	-0.2 (-3)	0.2 (3)	3.5 (56)	2.3 (37)
	2010-2015	4.6	1.1 (24)	0.5 (12)	0.5 (12)	2.1 (46)	0.3 (6)	2010-2015	5.2	0.0 (0)	0.3 (5)	0.0 (1)	4.8 (93)	0.1 (1)
	2015-2018	4.4	-0.1 (-1)	0.5 (11)	0.7 (16)	1.4 (31)	1.9 (44)	2015-2018	3.0	0.3 (9)	0.4 (15)	0.0 (1)	3.8 (126)	-1.5 (-51)
1970-2018	6.8	1.6 (24)	0.8 (12)	0.5 (7)	2.9 (43)	0.9 (13)	1970-2018	4.6	0.7 (14)	0.4 (9)	0.1 (2)	2.4 (53)	1.0 (22)	
Thailand	1970-1975	5.5	1.0 (18)	1.3 (24)	0.0 (-1)	2.3 (41)	1.0 (18)	1970-1975	6.5	1.0 (16)	0.2 (4)	-0.1 (-1)	3.8 (59)	1.4 (22)
	1975-1980	7.4	3.0 (41)	1.0 (14)	0.2 (3)	2.8 (38)	0.3 (5)	1975-1980	3.0	0.4 (14)	0.3 (11)	0.0 (2)	4.6 (154)	-2.4 (-80)
	1980-1985	5.3	1.1 (22)	1.9 (35)	0.2 (4)	2.9 (54)	-0.8 (-16)	1980-1985	4.0	0.5 (12)	0.1 (2)	0.1 (3)	2.7 (66)	0.7 (16)
	1985-1990	9.8	1.6 (16)	1.7 (17)	0.4 (4)	3.6 (37)	2.5 (26)	1985-1990	5.1	0.9 (18)	0.3 (7)	0.2 (5)	3.6 (72)	0.0 (-1)
	1990-1995	8.1	0.8 (9)	1.8 (23)	0.6 (8)	5.8 (71)	-0.9 (-11)	1990-1995	3.3	0.5 (14)	0.3 (9)	0.1 (3)	3.6 (110)	-1.2 (-35)
	1995-2000	0.7	-0.2 (-23)	2.0 (265)	0.1 (11)	1.7 (229)	-2.9 (-381)	1995-2000	4.2	-0.2 (-4)	0.6 (13)	0.3 (7)	3.3 (78)	0.2 (5)
	2000-2005	5.3	0.1 (1)	1.9 (36)	0.4 (7)	0.7 (13)	2.3 (43)	2000-2005	4.9	0.8 (16)	0.9 (19)	0.1 (2)	2.8 (58)	0.2 (5)
	2005-2010	3.7	0.5 (14)	0.9 (24)	0.7 (18)	1.4 (39)	0.2 (4)	2005-2010	3.7	0.6 (15)	0.5 (14)	0.2 (6)	3.9 (105)	-1.5 (-41)
	2010-2015	3.0	-0.8 (-25)	1.5 (51)	0.7 (25)	1.3 (44)	0.2 (5)	2010-2015	6.8	0.9 (14)	0.7 (11)	0.2 (3)	3.5 (52)	1.4 (21)
	2015-2018	4.0	0.0 (0)	0.7 (17)	0.2 (4)	1.4 (35)	1.7 (43)	2015-2018	6.2	0.6 (9)	0.6 (9)	0.1 (2)	3.5 (56)	1.5 (24)
1970-2018	5.3	0.7 (14)	1.5 (28)	0.4 (7)	2.4 (46)	0.3 (6)	1970-2018	4.7	0.6 (13)	0.5 (10)	0.1 (3)	3.5 (75)	0.0 (0)	
Lao PDR	1970-1975	3.0	0.8 (27)	0.2 (6)	0.0 (0)	2.0 (61)	0.4 (12)	1970-1975	3.2	2.1 (67)	0.3 (9)	-0.1 (-3)	0.7 (24)	0.1 (4)
	1975-1980	0.0	-0.3 (3409)	0.2 (-2312)	0.0 (-319)	1.6 (-20776)	-1.5 (20099)	1975-1980	3.4	2.3 (67)	0.3 (9)	0.1 (2)	1.7 (49)	-0.9 (-27)
	1980-1985	2.2	0.4 (20)	0.2 (10)	0.1 (4)	3.2 (148)	-1.8 (-82)	1980-1985	4.0	1.1 (28)	2.2 (54)	0.0 (1)	2.1 (52)	-1.5 (-36)
	1985-1990	3.6	1.5 (42)	0.2 (4)	0.1 (2)	3.4 (94)	-1.5 (-42)	1985-1990	4.7	0				

	Out-put	Labor		Capital		TFP		Out-put	Labor		Capital		TFP		
		Hours Worked	Labor Quality	IT	Non-IT				Hours Worked	Labor Quality	IT	Non-IT			
Vietnam	1970–1975	2.7	1.1 (40)	0.6 (21)	0.0 (–1)	3.2 (118)	–2.1 (–78)	US	1970–1975	2.6	0.6 (25)	0.1 (3)	0.1 (4)	1.5 (58)	0.3 (10)
	1975–1980	4.3	0.6 (15)	0.4 (8)	0.1 (2)	3.7 (86)	–0.5 (–12)		1975–1980	3.6	1.5 (43)	0.0 (0)	0.2 (6)	1.2 (32)	0.7 (19)
	1980–1985	3.5	0.9 (26)	0.5 (13)	0.1 (3)	3.2 (89)	–1.1 (–31)		1980–1985	3.2	0.9 (28)	0.2 (6)	0.3 (11)	0.9 (27)	0.9 (28)
	1985–1990	3.1	0.9 (31)	0.3 (10)	0.0 (2)	2.6 (86)	–0.9 (–28)		1985–1990	3.2	1.1 (34)	0.2 (7)	0.4 (11)	1.0 (31)	0.5 (17)
	1990–1995	7.5	1.0 (14)	0.1 (1)	0.1 (1)	4.3 (58)	2.0 (27)		1990–1995	2.5	0.5 (21)	0.3 (13)	0.3 (11)	0.6 (24)	0.8 (31)
	1995–2000	7.3	1.3 (17)	0.6 (8)	0.1 (2)	5.3 (73)	0.0 (0)		1995–2000	4.2	1.0 (24)	0.4 (10)	0.7 (16)	1.0 (24)	1.1 (26)
	2000–2005	7.3	0.3 (4)	1.5 (20)	0.2 (2)	5.1 (70)	0.2 (3)		2000–2005	2.5	0.2 (6)	0.4 (15)	0.4 (15)	0.8 (33)	0.8 (31)
	2005–2010	6.5	1.5 (23)	0.9 (15)	0.3 (5)	5.2 (80)	–1.4 (–22)		2005–2010	0.9	–0.4 (–41)	0.3 (37)	0.3 (37)	0.5 (61)	0.0 (5)
	2010–2015	5.4	0.3 (5)	0.6 (11)	0.3 (5)	3.2 (60)	1.0 (19)		2010–2015	2.1	0.8 (39)	0.2 (10)	0.3 (13)	0.3 (15)	0.5 (23)
	2015–2018	7.1	0.3 (5)	0.9 (12)	0.3 (4)	3.0 (43)	2.6 (36)		2015–2018	2.2	0.9 (40)	0.2 (9)	0.3 (12)	0.5 (24)	0.3 (15)
1970–2018	5.4	0.8 (16)	0.6 (11)	0.1 (3)	3.9 (73)	–0.1 (–2)	1970–2018	2.7	0.7 (26)	0.2 (9)	0.3 (12)	0.8 (31)	0.6 (22)		
APO21	1970–1975	4.9	1.2 (24)	0.3 (6)	0.1 (3)	2.7 (56)	0.6 (12)	Asia25	1970–1975	4.8	1.2 (26)	0.3 (7)	0.1 (3)	2.9 (60)	0.2 (5)
	1975–1980	4.5	1.4 (32)	0.4 (9)	0.1 (3)	2.4 (53)	0.1 (3)		1975–1980	4.7	1.5 (31)	0.2 (5)	0.1 (3)	2.5 (53)	0.4 (8)
	1980–1985	4.6	1.2 (26)	0.5 (11)	0.2 (4)	2.0 (44)	0.7 (15)		1980–1985	5.2	1.5 (29)	0.4 (7)	0.2 (4)	2.2 (41)	1.0 (19)
	1985–1990	5.8	1.1 (19)	0.7 (11)	0.3 (5)	2.1 (37)	1.6 (27)		1985–1990	5.9	1.2 (20)	0.4 (6)	0.3 (5)	2.4 (40)	1.7 (29)
	1990–1995	4.3	0.9 (22)	0.5 (12)	0.2 (4)	2.1 (49)	0.6 (13)		1990–1995	5.3	0.8 (15)	0.4 (7)	0.2 (3)	2.3 (44)	1.6 (31)
	1995–2000	3.2	0.8 (24)	0.6 (17)	0.3 (8)	1.6 (50)	0.0 (1)		1995–2000	4.1	0.9 (23)	0.6 (15)	0.2 (6)	2.1 (52)	0.2 (4)
	2000–2005	4.2	0.8 (19)	0.6 (15)	0.2 (4)	1.4 (32)	1.2 (29)		2000–2005	5.6	0.8 (15)	0.6 (10)	0.2 (4)	2.2 (38)	1.8 (32)
	2005–2010	4.3	0.7 (16)	0.7 (15)	0.1 (3)	2.0 (46)	0.8 (20)		2005–2010	6.6	0.4 (7)	0.3 (5)	0.2 (3)	3.2 (49)	2.4 (36)
	2010–2015	4.1	0.4 (10)	0.8 (20)	0.1 (3)	2.0 (49)	0.7 (18)		2010–2015	5.4	0.3 (6)	0.5 (9)	0.2 (3)	3.2 (59)	1.2 (23)
	2015–2018	4.7	0.5 (11)	0.5 (10)	0.1 (2)	2.1 (45)	1.5 (32)		2015–2018	5.1	0.4 (7)	–0.2 (–4)	0.1 (2)	2.9 (58)	1.8 (36)
1970–2018	4.4	0.9 (21)	0.5 (12)	0.2 (4)	2.0 (46)	0.8 (17)	1970–2018	5.3	0.9 (18)	0.4 (7)	0.2 (3)	2.6 (49)	1.2 (23)		
East Asia	1970–1975	4.7	1.3 (27)	0.4 (7)	0.2 (4)	3.0 (65)	–0.2 (–4)	South Asia	1970–1975	2.1	1.4 (68)	0.4 (17)	0.0 (0)	1.1 (55)	–0.9 (–41)
	1975–1980	5.5	1.6 (29)	0.2 (4)	0.2 (3)	2.0 (37)	1.5 (28)		1975–1980	3.5	1.6 (47)	0.6 (17)	0.0 (1)	1.5 (44)	–0.3 (–7)
	1980–1985	5.9	1.9 (32)	0.2 (3)	0.3 (4)	1.8 (31)	1.8 (30)		1980–1985	5.0	1.4 (28)	0.7 (13)	0.0 (1)	1.5 (31)	1.3 (27)
	1985–1990	6.1	1.3 (22)	0.2 (3)	0.4 (6)	2.3 (37)	1.9 (32)		1985–1990	5.7	1.2 (22)	0.8 (14)	0.1 (1)	1.8 (31)	1.9 (33)
	1990–1995	5.2	0.7 (13)	0.4 (8)	0.2 (4)	1.9 (37)	2.0 (39)		1990–1995	4.9	1.3 (26)	0.5 (9)	0.1 (1)	1.9 (39)	1.2 (25)
	1995–2000	4.1	1.0 (24)	0.6 (14)	0.3 (7)	1.8 (44)	0.4 (10)		1995–2000	5.4	1.0 (19)	0.8 (15)	0.1 (2)	2.0 (38)	1.4 (27)
	2000–2005	5.6	0.8 (14)	0.5 (10)	0.3 (5)	2.1 (37)	1.9 (34)		2000–2005	6.0	1.1 (19)	0.5 (9)	0.1 (2)	2.2 (36)	2.0 (34)
	2005–2010	7.1	0.1 (1)	0.3 (4)	0.2 (3)	3.1 (44)	3.4 (48)		2005–2010	7.0	0.7 (10)	0.9 (13)	0.2 (3)	3.5 (49)	1.8 (25)
	2010–2015	5.6	0.2 (4)	0.2 (4)	0.1 (3)	3.1 (55)	1.9 (34)		2010–2015	5.9	0.5 (9)	0.8 (14)	0.2 (3)	3.2 (54)	1.2 (21)
	2015–2018	4.5	0.1 (2)	–0.6 (–13)	0.1 (2)	2.7 (61)	2.1 (47)		2015–2018	6.6	0.5 (7)	0.5 (8)	0.1 (2)	3.0 (45)	2.5 (38)
1970–2018	5.5	0.9 (17)	0.3 (5)	0.2 (4)	2.4 (43)	1.7 (30)	1970–2018	5.1	1.1 (21)	0.6 (13)	0.1 (2)	2.1 (42)	1.2 (23)		
ASEAN	1970–1975	6.3	1.2 (20)	0.5 (7)	0.0 (0)	3.3 (52)	1.3 (21)	ASEAN6	1970–1975	7.1	1.4 (20)	0.7 (10)	0.0 (0)	3.4 (47)	1.6 (23)
	1975–1980	6.9	1.4 (20)	0.3 (4)	0.1 (2)	4.3 (62)	0.8 (12)		1975–1980	7.4	1.7 (24)	0.6 (8)	0.1 (2)	4.4 (60)	0.5 (7)
	1980–1985	3.9	1.2 (32)	0.6 (15)	0.2 (4)	4.2 (108)	–2.3 (–60)		1980–1985	3.9	1.4 (35)	0.8 (21)	0.2 (5)	4.2 (108)	–2.7 (–69)
	1985–1990	7.0	1.1 (15)	0.8 (12)	0.2 (3)	3.3 (48)	1.6 (22)		1985–1990	7.5	1.1 (15)	1.1 (15)	0.2 (3)	3.4 (45)	1.6 (22)
	1990–1995	7.2	0.8 (11)	1.1 (15)	0.3 (4)	4.7 (65)	0.4 (5)		1990–1995	7.3	0.7 (10)	1.5 (21)	0.3 (5)	4.8 (65)	0.0 (0)
	1995–2000	2.6	0.9 (34)	0.9 (36)	0.2 (8)	3.0 (118)	–2.4 (–95)		1995–2000	2.1	0.7 (36)	1.2 (56)	0.2 (10)	2.9 (143)	–3.0 (–145)
	2000–2005	5.1	0.6 (11)	1.1 (22)	0.3 (6)	1.9 (36)	1.2 (24)		2000–2005	4.8	0.5 (11)	1.2 (24)	0.3 (7)	1.7 (34)	1.1 (24)
	2005–2010	5.2	1.0 (20)	0.7 (14)	0.3 (6)	2.7 (51)	0.4 (9)		2005–2010	5.1	1.0 (20)	0.6 (13)	0.3 (7)	2.4 (48)	0.7 (13)
	2010–2015	4.9	0.3 (6)	1.1 (23)	0.4 (8)	3.0 (62)	0.1 (2)		2010–2015	4.8	0.2 (5)	1.4 (29)	0.4 (8)	2.9 (61)	–0.1 (–3)
	2015–2018	5.1	0.7 (14)	0.6 (12)	0.3 (5)	2.9 (58)	0.6 (11)		2015–2018	4.9	0.8 (17)	0.7 (14)	0.3 (5)	2.9 (59)	0.2 (4)
1970–2018	5.4	0.9 (17)	0.8 (14)	0.2 (4)	3.3 (62)	0.1 (3)	1970–2018	5.5	1.0 (18)	1.0 (18)	0.2 (4)	3.3 (60)	0.0 (0)		
CLMV	1970–1975	2.0	1.0 (52)	0.4 (20)	0.0 (0)	2.5 (127)	–1.9 (–99)								
	1975–1980	3.8	0.7 (19)	0.3 (8)	0.1 (2)	2.9 (76)	–0.2 (–6)								
	1980–1985	3.5	0.9 (27)	0.4 (11)	0.1 (3)	2.9 (84)	–0.9 (–25)								
	1985–1990	2.5	0.9 (35)	0.4 (17)	0.1 (2)	2.1 (84)	–1.0 (–39)								
	1990–1995	6.2	1.1 (17)	0.3 (4)	0.1 (1)	3.6 (59)	1.1 (19)								
	1995–2000	7.2	1.4 (19)	0.5 (6)	0.1 (2)	5.0 (70)	0.2 (2)								
	2000–2005	7.1	0.7 (10)	1.1 (16)	0.2 (2)	4.7 (67)	0.4 (5)								
	2005–2010	6.1	1.3 (21)	0.9 (15)	0.3 (5)	5.2 (85)	–1.5 (–25)								
	2010–2015	5.3	0.4 (8)	0.5 (10)	0.3 (5)	3.8 (71)	0.3 (6)								
	2015–2018	6.7	0.5 (7)	0.5 (8)	0.2 (4)	3.4 (51)	2.0 (30)								
1970–2018	5.0	0.9 (18)	0.5 (11)	0.1 (3)	3.6 (73)	–0.2 (–5)									

Unit: Average annual growth rate (percentage), contribution share in parentheses.
Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 21 Role of TFP and Capital Deepening in Labor Productivity Growth

	Labor Productivity	Labor Quality		Capital deepening		TFP			Labor Productivity	Labor Quality		Capital deepening		TFP	
				IT	Non-IT					IT	Non-IT				
Bangladesh	1970–1975	-5.3	0.3	(-6)	0.0	(0)	0.4	(-8)	-6.0	(114)					
	1975–1980	1.3	0.8	(59)	0.0	(4)	0.3	(20)	0.2	(17)					
	1980–1985	0.3	0.5	(163)	0.0	(9)	0.8	(262)	-1.0	(-335)					
	1985–1990	3.2	-0.1	(-2)	0.1	(3)	1.9	(61)	1.2	(37)					
	1990–1995	0.2	0.2	(147)	0.0	(30)	0.9	(572)	-1.0	(-649)					
	1995–2000	2.4	0.2	(8)	0.2	(7)	2.5	(104)	-0.5	(-19)					
	2000–2005	3.4	0.2	(6)	0.1	(3)	3.0	(89)	0.1	(2)					
	2005–2010	3.6	0.1	(3)	0.2	(4)	2.9	(80)	0.5	(13)					
	2010–2015	5.4	1.0	(18)	0.3	(5)	4.0	(75)	0.2	(3)					
2015–2018	6.1	0.8	(12)	0.3	(5)	3.5	(58)	1.5	(25)						
1970–2018	1.7	0.4	(21)	0.1	(6)	1.9	(112)	-0.7	(-40)						
Bhutan	1970–1975	-1.2	0.3	(-27)	-0.2	(18)	-2.8	(238)	1.5	(-129)					
	1975–1980	5.6	0.2	(4)	0.5	(10)	-1.0	(-18)	5.9	(105)					
	1980–1985	-6.8	0.4	(-5)	0.0	(0)	6.8	(-100)	-13.9	(205)					
	1985–1990	-7.1	0.4	(-5)	-0.1	(2)	-0.7	(10)	-6.7	(94)					
	1990–1995	-0.2	0.2	(-139)	0.3	(-211)	4.3	(-2776)	-5.0	(3226)					
	1995–2000	-0.5	0.1	(-10)	0.0	(-8)	0.0	(5)	-0.6	(113)					
	2000–2005	-1.5	0.2	(-13)	0.0	(-3)	-0.7	(44)	-1.1	(71)					
	2005–2010	-1.6	0.2	(-13)	0.2	(-11)	1.4	(-90)	-3.4	(214)					
	2010–2015	-0.6	0.0	(4)	0.2	(-27)	3.6	(-612)	-4.4	(735)					
2015–2018	1.1	-0.1	(-12)	0.0	(-1)	1.8	(163)	-0.6	(-50)						
1970–2018	-1.5	0.2	(-13)	0.1	(-7)	1.2	(-82)	-3.0	(202)						
Cambodia	1970–1975	1.1	0.2	(18)	0.0	(2)	2.6	(232)	-1.7	(-152)					
	1975–1980	3.4	0.1	(2)	0.0	(1)	2.0	(59)	1.3	(37)					
	1980–1985	6.4	0.1	(2)	0.1	(1)	1.7	(27)	4.5	(71)					
	1985–1990	4.8	0.1	(2)	0.1	(2)	3.1	(64)	1.6	(32)					
	1990–1995	9.7	0.4	(4)	0.1	(1)	3.0	(31)	6.2	(64)					
	1995–2000	5.4	0.7	(13)	0.2	(4)	3.3	(61)	1.2	(22)					
	2000–2005	8.3	0.6	(7)	0.8	(9)	3.7	(44)	3.3	(40)					
	2005–2010	11.5	0.2	(2)	0.4	(3)	5.7	(49)	5.2	(45)					
	2010–2015	7.5	0.2	(3)	0.3	(4)	4.4	(59)	2.6	(34)					
2015–2018	5.5	-0.8	(-14)	0.2	(3)	3.4	(61)	2.7	(50)						
1970–2018	6.5	0.3	(4)	0.2	(3)	3.3	(51)	2.7	(41)						
ROC	1970–1975	1.9	0.8	(44)	0.0	(1)	0.3	(13)	0.8	(41)					
	1975–1980	1.0	1.4	(140)	0.0	(1)	1.2	(122)	-1.6	(-163)					
	1980–1985	-1.7	0.9	(-56)	0.0	(-1)	0.5	(-26)	-3.1	(183)					
	1985–1990	1.9	1.4	(73)	0.2	(9)	-0.4	(-23)	0.8	(41)					
	1990–1995	-0.4	1.3	(-288)	0.1	(-13)	-0.2	(42)	-1.6	(358)					
	1995–2000	1.2	0.7	(57)	-0.1	(-5)	0.8	(61)	-0.2	(-13)					
	2000–2005	-0.3	0.6	(-179)	0.0	(-10)	-0.7	(209)	-0.3	(81)					
	2005–2010	1.4	0.2	(11)	0.1	(8)	0.4	(32)	0.7	(49)					
	2010–2015	1.9	0.2	(9)	0.1	(4)	-0.9	(-46)	2.5	(133)					
2015–2018	2.0	0.7	(36)	0.2	(11)	0.4	(20)	0.7	(33)						
1970–2018	0.7	0.8	(117)	0.1	(7)	0.1	(11)	-0.3	(-35)						
Hong Kong	1970–1975	0.4	0.3	(80)	0.0	(2)	0.2	(55)	-0.2	(-37)					
	1975–1980	0.6	0.5	(82)	0.0	(3)	0.5	(84)	-0.4	(-68)					
	1980–1985	2.9	0.8	(26)	0.0	(1)	0.6	(21)	1.5	(52)					
	1985–1990	3.9	0.9	(22)	0.1	(1)	1.0	(25)	2.0	(51)					
	1990–1995	3.1	0.4	(13)	0.1	(2)	1.1	(34)	1.6	(51)					
	1995–2000	4.1	0.9	(23)	0.1	(3)	1.3	(31)	1.8	(43)					
	2000–2005	4.6	0.6	(12)	0.1	(2)	1.4	(30)	2.5	(55)					
	2005–2010	6.9	1.2	(18)	0.2	(3)	3.2	(46)	2.3	(33)					
	2010–2015	5.2	0.8	(16)	0.2	(3)	2.8	(53)	1.5	(28)					
2015–2018	6.0	0.4	(7)	0.1	(2)	2.6	(43)	2.9	(48)						
1970–2018	3.6	0.7	(20)	0.1	(2)	1.4	(38)	1.4	(40)						
Indonesia	1970–1975	7.3	0.5	(7)	0.0	(0)	3.0	(41)	3.8	(52)					
	1975–1980	-5.8	0.2	(-3)	0.0	(0)	3.2	(-56)	-9.3	(159)					
	1980–1985	1.8	0.1	(8)	0.0	(2)	0.9	(48)	0.7	(41)					
	1985–1990	-1.8	0.6	(-35)	0.0	(-2)	-1.6	(87)	-0.9	(50)					
	1990–1995	1.6	0.5	(32)	0.1	(4)	-1.0	(-65)	2.0	(129)					
	1995–2000	1.0	0.3	(33)	0.1	(5)	-1.7	(-162)	2.3	(225)					
	2000–2005	3.8	0.5	(12)	0.2	(6)	0.0	(1)	3.1	(81)					
	2005–2010	6.5	0.4	(6)	0.2	(3)	3.9	(60)	2.0	(31)					
	2010–2015	-1.2	0.4	(-30)	0.1	(-12)	1.3	(-111)	-3.1	(253)					
2015–2018	3.0	0.0	(0)	0.0	(1)	0.6	(19)	2.4	(80)						
1970–2018	1.7	0.4	(23)	0.1	(5)	0.9	(52)	0.3	(19)						
Japan	1970–1975	1.2	0.2	(13)	0.0	(2)	0.1	(8)	0.9	(76)					
	1975–1980	3.3	-0.1	(-3)	0.1	(2)	0.1	(2)	3.3	(100)					
	1980–1985	3.4	0.6	(18)	0.0	(1)	0.9	(26)	1.9	(55)					
	1985–1990	4.2	1.3	(32)	0.1	(1)	0.7	(16)	2.1	(50)					
	1990–1995	4.7	1.4	(31)	0.2	(4)	2.5	(53)	0.5	(12)					
	1995–2000	2.4	0.6	(23)	0.7	(27)	0.9	(38)	0.3	(12)					
	2000–2005	1.6	0.8	(51)	-0.1	(-8)	2.9	(184)	-2.0	(-127)					
	2005–2010	5.6	1.0	(18)	0.3	(5)	1.3	(22)	3.0	(54)					
	2010–2015	7.1	0.9	(12)	0.2	(2)	4.6	(65)	1.4	(20)					
2015–2018	1.8	0.5	(25)	0.0	(-2)	2.4	(132)	-1.0	(-55)						
1970–2018	3.8	0.7	(19)	0.2	(4)	1.6	(42)	1.3	(35)						
Bhutan	1970–1975	-6.3	0.3	(-5)	0.0	(0)	0.5	(-8)	-7.2	(113)					
	1975–1980	-5.0	0.4	(-9)	0.0	(0)	0.5	(-9)	-5.9	(118)					
	1980–1985	-1.8	0.2	(-11)	0.0	(-1)	-1.3	(71)	-0.7	(40)					
	1985–1990	4.7	0.1	(3)	0.0	(0)	-0.8	(-16)	5.4	(114)					
	1990–1995	1.8	0.1	(8)	0.0	(2)	-0.3	(-17)	1.9	(107)					
	1995–2000	2.8	0.4	(13)	0.1	(3)	0.8	(27)	1.6	(57)					
	2000–2005	4.6	0.4	(10)	0.1	(2)	1.1	(24)	3.0	(64)					
	2005–2010	2.4	0.5	(19)	0.1	(5)	3.1	(129)	-1.3	(-53)					
	2010–2015	1.5	1.2	(77)	0.1	(7)	2.2	(141)	-1.9	(-125)					
2015–2018	4.5	-0.1	(-2)	0.1	(2)	2.0	(43)	2.6	(57)						
1970–2018	0.6	0.4	(68)	0.1	(9)	0.7	(114)	-0.5	(-91)						
ROC	1970–1975	6.4	0.1	(2)	0.3	(4)	3.1	(49)	2.8	(45)					
	1975–1980	8.0	1.1	(14)	0.3	(3)	2.9	(36)	3.7	(47)					
	1980–1985	6.8	0.2	(3)	0.2	(4)	2.4	(36)	3.9	(58)					
	1985–1990	8.2	0.8	(10)	0.3	(4)	2.3	(28)	4.8	(59)					
	1990–1995	5.9	0.6	(11)	0.2	(4)	2.4	(41)	2.7	(45)					
	1995–2000	5.5	0.6	(11)	0.6	(11)	2.4	(44)	1.8	(33)					
	2000–2005	3.8	0.9	(23)	0.3	(7)	1.3	(35)	1.3	(35)					
	2005–2010	3.7	0.9	(25)	0.0	(1)	0.9	(25)	1.8	(50)					
	2010–2015	0.8	0.6	(74)	0.0	(2)	-0.3	(-31)	0.4	(54)					
2015–2018	3.2	0.4	(12)	0.1	(2)	1.0	(30)	1.8	(56)						
1970–2018	5.4	0.6	(12)	0.2	(4)	1.9	(36)	2.6	(48)						
Hong Kong	1970–1975	3.0	0.1	(4)	0.1	(4)	1.2	(41)	1.5	(51)					
	1975–1980	7.4	0.7	(10)	0.2	(3)	1.6	(22)	4.9	(66)					
	1980–1985	3.6	0.6	(16)	0.2	(6)	2.0	(55)	0.8	(23)					
	1985–1990	7.7	1.0	(13)	0.4	(5)	2.0	(26)	4.3	(56)					
	1990–1995	4.8	0.9	(19)	0.4	(8)	2.1	(43)	1.4	(30)					
	1995–2000	0.0	0.5	(1068)	0.5	(1193)	0.6	(1426)	-1.5	(-3587)					
	2000–2005	3.1	0.3	(9)	0.3	(10)	0.6	(21)	1.9	(60)					
	2005–2010	3.4	0.3	(8)	0.3	(8)	0.9	(28)	1.9	(57)					
	2010–2015	2.1	0.6	(29)	0.2	(9)	0.3	(13)	1.0	(49)					
2015–2018	2.7	0.5	(18)	-0.1	(-2)	0.2	(6)	2.1	(78)						
1970–2018	3.9	0.5	(14)	0.3	(7)	1.2	(32)	1.8	(47)						
Indonesia	1970–1975	4.4	0.8	(18)	0.0	(0)	1.7	(38)	1.9	(44)					
	1975–1980	3.7	0.6	(15)	0.1	(3)	2.7	(72)	0.4	(9)					

		Labor		Capital deepening		TFP			Labor		Capital deepening		TFP	
		Productivity	Quality	IT	Non-IT				Productivity	Quality	IT	Non-IT		
Korea	1970–1975	5.8	0.2 (4)	0.1 (1)	2.2 (37)	3.4 (58)			1.0	0.2 (17)	0.0 (–1)	0.8 (79)	0.0 (5)	
	1975–1980	4.7	0.6 (12)	0.4 (8)	4.6 (97)	–0.8 (–16)			0.6	0.2 (30)	0.0 (4)	1.9 (329)	–1.5 (–264)	
	1980–1985	6.7	1.7 (26)	0.3 (4)	2.6 (39)	2.1 (31)			1.0	0.2 (23)	0.1 (8)	2.4 (255)	–1.8 (–186)	
	1985–1990	6.7	1.4 (21)	0.5 (7)	2.9 (43)	1.9 (28)			–0.3	0.2 (–56)	0.0 (–13)	1.0 (–364)	–1.5 (533)	
	1990–1995	6.4	1.6 (25)	0.3 (5)	3.1 (49)	1.4 (21)			1.4	0.1 (9)	0.1 (10)	2.1 (153)	–1.0 (–72)	
	1995–2000	5.6	0.7 (12)	0.6 (10)	2.4 (44)	1.9 (33)			4.8	0.5 (10)	0.1 (2)	3.3 (70)	0.8 (18)	
	2000–2005	4.6	1.2 (27)	0.4 (9)	2.2 (49)	0.7 (15)			4.2	0.4 (10)	0.1 (2)	1.0 (24)	2.7 (63)	
	2005–2010	4.7	1.0 (21)	0.2 (4)	2.3 (48)	1.2 (27)			2.1	0.6 (30)	0.2 (10)	1.4 (66)	–0.1 (–5)	
	2010–2015	1.7	0.6 (33)	0.0 (2)	1.0 (55)	0.2 (10)			0.9	0.4 (52)	0.2 (22)	2.7 (313)	–2.5 (–287)	
	2015–2018	4.5	0.5 (12)	0.1 (3)	2.3 (51)	1.5 (34)			4.9	0.0 (1)	0.1 (2)	3.4 (70)	1.3 (27)	
1970–2018	5.2	1.0 (19)	0.3 (6)	2.6 (50)	1.3 (25)			1.8	0.3 (17)	0.1 (5)	1.9 (107)	–0.5 (–30)		
Malaysia	1970–1975	4.4	0.4 (10)	0.0 (0)	2.6 (57)	1.4 (32)			5.1	2.6 (51)	–0.1 (–2)	2.0 (40)	0.6 (11)	
	1975–1980	4.5	0.8 (18)	0.1 (2)	2.9 (65)	0.7 (15)			3.2	0.7 (23)	0.1 (3)	3.1 (96)	–0.7 (–22)	
	1980–1985	1.9	0.9 (44)	0.1 (4)	3.9 (202)	–2.9 (–150)			4.1	0.5 (12)	0.1 (3)	3.4 (84)	0.1 (2)	
	1985–1990	3.2	0.7 (22)	0.2 (5)	0.8 (26)	1.5 (48)			–0.8	0.3 (–34)	0.0 (–5)	–0.2 (26)	–0.9 (113)	
	1990–1995	6.5	1.2 (18)	0.3 (5)	4.8 (74)	0.2 (3)			–1.5	–1.3 (85)	0.0 (–3)	0.2 (–14)	–0.5 (32)	
	1995–2000	1.3	0.6 (47)	0.4 (31)	1.5 (117)	–1.2 (–95)			2.6	–0.2 (–9)	0.1 (4)	–0.9 (–36)	3.7 (141)	
	2000–2005	3.2	0.9 (28)	0.6 (20)	0.2 (7)	1.4 (45)			2.8	0.7 (24)	0.2 (8)	–1.8 (–63)	3.7 (131)	
	2005–2010	2.1	0.5 (23)	0.4 (20)	0.6 (29)	0.6 (27)			4.9	0.0 (0)	0.4 (7)	3.3 (67)	1.2 (26)	
	2010–2015	2.2	0.4 (17)	0.4 (17)	1.2 (55)	0.2 (11)			7.6	1.5 (19)	0.2 (3)	3.6 (47)	2.4 (31)	
	2015–2018	2.8	0.0 (–1)	0.1 (5)	1.8 (63)	0.9 (32)			1.5	0.8 (53)	0.0 (–2)	–0.7 (–46)	1.4 (96)	
1970–2018	3.3	0.7 (21)	0.3 (8)	2.1 (63)	0.2 (7)			3.1	0.5 (18)	0.1 (4)	1.4 (45)	1.0 (34)		
Myanmar	1970–1975	1.1	–0.2 (–20)	0.0 (0)	0.9 (83)	0.4 (37)			0.2	0.3 (170)	–0.1 (–67)	–0.1 (–78)	0.1 (75)	
	1975–1980	4.0	0.4 (10)	0.1 (3)	3.3 (82)	0.2 (5)			0.2	0.3 (157)	0.0 (19)	0.8 (384)	–0.9 (–460)	
	1980–1985	1.6	0.3 (17)	0.1 (5)	3.4 (207)	–2.1 (–130)			2.4	2.2 (91)	0.0 (2)	1.6 (68)	–1.5 (–61)	
	1985–1990	–1.5	0.8 (–51)	0.0 (–1)	0.5 (–30)	–2.8 (182)			3.6	2.1 (57)	0.0 (1)	1.8 (49)	–0.3 (–7)	
	1990–1995	1.1	1.0 (85)	0.1 (5)	1.4 (123)	–1.3 (–113)			1.4	2.1 (146)	0.0 (1)	1.4 (96)	–2.1 (–143)	
	1995–2000	4.0	0.3 (7)	0.2 (6)	3.7 (93)	–0.2 (–6)			1.9	2.2 (116)	0.1 (3)	1.4 (75)	–1.7 (–94)	
	2000–2005	3.4	0.6 (19)	0.2 (5)	3.5 (102)	–0.9 (–26)			1.9	1.4 (72)	0.1 (3)	1.5 (78)	–1.0 (–53)	
	2005–2010	3.5	0.7 (21)	0.3 (8)	5.3 (151)	–2.8 (–79)			2.9	0.7 (26)	0.1 (3)	1.8 (62)	0.3 (10)	
	2010–2015	5.1	0.2 (4)	0.3 (6)	6.4 (126)	–1.9 (–37)			2.5	–0.1 (–6)	0.1 (5)	1.8 (72)	0.7 (30)	
	2015–2018	4.1	0.0 (–1)	0.1 (3)	4.5 (108)	–0.4 (–11)			3.6	0.0 (0)	0.1 (3)	1.8 (51)	1.6 (45)	
1970–2018	2.5	0.4 (18)	0.1 (6)	3.2 (128)	–1.3 (–52)			1.9	1.2 (62)	0.0 (2)	1.3 (68)	–0.6 (–32)		
Pakistan	1970–1975	0.8	0.7 (96)	0.0 (0)	0.8 (107)	–0.8 (–103)			1.6	0.3 (21)	0.0 (–2)	0.4 (24)	0.9 (57)	
	1975–1980	2.2	1.0 (46)	0.0 (0)	1.2 (55)	0.0 (0)			1.9	0.8 (40)	0.0 (2)	2.5 (129)	–1.4 (–72)	
	1980–1985	3.8	0.1 (2)	0.0 (0)	1.7 (45)	2.0 (53)			–4.0	0.7 (–18)	0.1 (–3)	1.2 (–30)	–6.1 (152)	
	1985–1990	4.0	1.0 (26)	0.1 (2)	1.6 (41)	1.2 (31)			3.1	0.9 (29)	0.0 (1)	–0.3 (–10)	2.5 (80)	
	1990–1995	3.0	0.9 (31)	0.0 (1)	1.9 (64)	0.1 (4)			0.9	0.2 (25)	0.1 (8)	1.0 (110)	–0.4 (–43)	
	1995–2000	2.7	0.5 (18)	0.0 (0)	1.5 (57)	0.7 (26)			2.6	1.1 (44)	0.4 (17)	1.4 (53)	–0.3 (–13)	
	2000–2005	1.8	0.6 (33)	0.1 (6)	0.2 (13)	0.9 (48)			1.7	0.2 (10)	0.4 (23)	0.1 (7)	1.0 (60)	
	2005–2010	–0.2	0.2 (–88)	0.0 (–14)	–0.5 (281)	0.2 (–79)			2.5	0.7 (28)	0.1 (2)	0.5 (18)	1.3 (51)	
	2010–2015	2.7	0.7 (24)	0.0 (1)	–0.1 (–4)	2.2 (79)			3.9	0.5 (14)	0.1 (3)	1.5 (39)	1.7 (45)	
	2015–2018	4.1	1.1 (26)	0.1 (2)	0.9 (21)	2.1 (51)			3.1	0.7 (21)	0.3 (11)	1.9 (62)	0.2 (6)	
1970–2018	2.4	0.6 (27)	0.0 (2)	0.9 (39)	0.7 (32)			1.6	0.6 (40)	0.1 (9)	0.9 (57)	–0.1 (–6)		
Singapore	1970–1975	4.0	0.4 (11)	0.0 (0)	2.4 (59)	1.2 (31)			1.8	0.3 (19)	0.0 (0)	0.9 (50)	0.6 (32)	
	1975–1980	3.0	0.6 (22)	0.2 (6)	0.9 (32)	1.2 (41)			2.9	0.2 (8)	0.1 (2)	1.9 (68)	0.6 (22)	
	1980–1985	3.2	1.3 (40)	0.5 (14)	2.7 (84)	–1.2 (–38)			4.2	0.9 (21)	0.1 (1)	2.9 (70)	0.3 (8)	
	1985–1990	2.9	0.7 (24)	0.6 (22)	0.0 (–1)	1.6 (56)			0.6	0.3 (52)	0.0 (–9)	–0.7 (–125)	1.0 (182)	
	1990–1995	3.8	1.7 (44)	0.4 (11)	1.0 (25)	0.8 (20)			4.7	0.8 (17)	0.1 (2)	0.4 (8)	3.4 (73)	
	1995–2000	3.8	1.0 (26)	0.5 (13)	1.8 (49)	0.5 (13)			1.0	0.2 (15)	0.1 (9)	–0.4 (–34)	1.1 (109)	
	2000–2005	3.7	1.0 (27)	0.5 (12)	1.0 (26)	1.3 (35)			4.3	0.9 (21)	0.2 (6)	1.7 (40)	1.4 (33)	
	2005–2010	1.5	0.4 (27)	0.2 (12)	–1.0 (–70)	2.0 (131)			5.1	–0.2 (–4)	0.2 (4)	2.9 (56)	2.3 (45)	
	2010–2015	2.0	0.5 (27)	0.4 (22)	0.8 (37)	0.3 (14)			5.2	0.3 (5)	0.0 (1)	4.8 (93)	0.1 (1)	
	2015–2018	4.6	0.5 (10)	0.7 (16)	1.4 (32)	1.9 (42)			2.2	0.4 (20)	0.1 (1)	3.3 (149)	–1.5 (–70)	
1970–2018	3.1	0.8 (27)	0.4 (12)	1.0 (34)	0.9 (28)			3.2	0.4 (13)	0.1 (2)	1.6 (51)	1.1 (33)		
Thailand	1970–1975	3.1	1.3 (43)	–0.1 (–2)	0.8 (27)	1.0 (32)			2.6	0.2 (9)	–0.1 (–4)	1.0 (39)	1.4 (55)	
	1975–1980	0.9	1.0 (111)	0.1 (14)	–0.6 (–62)	0.3 (37)			1.3	0.3 (26)	0.0 (2)	3.3 (251)	–2.4 (–179)	
	1980–1985	3.1	1.9 (60)	0.2 (7)	1.9 (60)	–0.8 (–27)			1.7	0.1 (6)	0.1 (5)	0.9 (52)	0.7 (37)	
	1985–1990	6.3	1.7 (27)	0.3 (5)	1.8 (28)	2.5 (40)			1.3	0.3 (27)	0.2 (15)	0.8 (61)	0.0 (–3)	
	1990–1995	6.2	1.8 (29)	0.6 (9)	4.7 (76)	–0.9 (–15)			1.5	0.3 (21)	0.1 (5)	2.3 (154)	–1.2 (–79)	
	1995–2000	1.2	2.0 (172)	0.1 (8)	1.9 (167)	–2.9 (–247)			4.8	0.6 (12)	0.3 (6)	3.7 (77)	0.2 (5)	
	2000–2005	5.2	1.9 (36)	0.4 (7)	0.6 (12)	2.3 (44)			2.6	0.9 (36)	0.1 (2)	1.4 (53)	0.2 (9)	
	2005–2010	2.4	0.9 (37)	0.6 (26)	0.7 (30)	0.2 (6)			2.1	0.5 (25)	0.2 (9)	2.9 (138)	–1.5 (–73)	
	2010–2015	4.8	1.5 (32)	0.8 (18)	2.3 (47)	0.2 (3)			4.2	0.7 (18)	0.1 (3)	1.9 (46)	1.4 (34)	
	2015–2018	3.9	0.7 (17)	0.2 (4)	1.4 (35)	1.7 (44)			4.8	0.6 (12)	0.1 (2)	2.7 (56)	1.5 (31)	
1970–2018	3.7	1.5 (42)	0.3 (9)	1.6 (43)	0.2 (6)			2.4	0.5 (19)	0.1 (4)	2.0 (84)	–0.2 (–7)		

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	Labor Productivity	Labor Quality		Capital deepening		TFP		Labor Productivity	Labor Quality		Capital deepening		TFP
				IT	Non-IT				IT	Non-IT			
Vietnam	1970–1975	0.2	0.6 (321)	0.0 (-20)	1.7 (1001)	-2.1 (-1202)	US	1970–1975	1.6	0.1 (5)	0.1 (6)	1.2 (73)	0.3 (17)
	1975–1980	2.7	0.4 (13)	0.1 (3)	2.7 (102)	-0.5 (-18)		1975–1980	1.1	0.0 (1)	0.2 (18)	0.2 (21)	0.7 (60)
	1980–1985	1.1	0.5 (44)	0.1 (7)	1.6 (151)	-1.1 (-102)		1980–1985	1.7	0.2 (11)	0.3 (18)	0.3 (19)	0.9 (52)
	1985–1990	0.3	0.3 (104)	0.0 (11)	0.8 (267)	-0.9 (-282)		1985–1990	1.4	0.2 (15)	0.3 (22)	0.3 (25)	0.5 (38)
	1990–1995	5.2	0.1 (1)	0.1 (1)	3.1 (60)	2.0 (38)		1990–1995	1.6	0.3 (19)	0.3 (16)	0.3 (17)	0.8 (48)
	1995–2000	4.8	0.6 (12)	0.1 (2)	4.1 (85)	0.0 (1)		1995–2000	2.5	0.4 (16)	0.6 (25)	0.4 (15)	1.1 (44)
	2000–2005	6.6	1.5 (23)	0.2 (3)	4.7 (71)	0.2 (4)		2000–2005	2.2	0.4 (16)	0.4 (17)	0.7 (32)	0.8 (35)
	2005–2010	3.1	0.9 (30)	0.3 (8)	3.4 (108)	-1.4 (-46)		2005–2010	1.5	0.3 (22)	0.4 (24)	0.8 (51)	0.0 (3)
	2010–2015	4.9	0.6 (12)	0.3 (5)	3.0 (61)	1.0 (21)		2010–2015	0.7	0.2 (33)	0.2 (32)	-0.3 (-41)	0.5 (76)
	2015–2018	6.4	0.9 (14)	0.3 (4)	2.7 (43)	2.6 (40)		2015–2018	0.7	0.2 (30)	0.2 (31)	-0.1 (-10)	0.3 (50)
1970–2018	3.3	0.6 (19)	0.1 (4)	2.8 (86)	-0.3 (-8)	1970–2018	1.6	0.2 (15)	0.3 (19)	0.4 (27)	0.6 (38)		
APO21	1970–1975	2.7	0.5 (20)	0.1 (4)	1.4 (54)	0.6 (23)	Asia25	1970–1975	2.3	0.7 (28)	0.1 (4)	1.4 (58)	0.2 (10)
	1975–1980	1.8	0.7 (40)	0.1 (5)	0.9 (48)	0.1 (7)		1975–1980	2.0	0.4 (22)	0.1 (5)	1.1 (54)	0.4 (20)
	1980–1985	2.4	0.9 (38)	0.2 (7)	0.6 (26)	0.7 (29)		1980–1985	2.4	0.7 (29)	0.1 (6)	0.6 (25)	1.0 (41)
	1985–1990	3.6	1.2 (34)	0.2 (7)	0.6 (16)	1.6 (43)		1985–1990	3.6	0.7 (19)	0.2 (6)	1.0 (27)	1.7 (47)
	1990–1995	2.5	1.0 (38)	0.1 (5)	0.9 (35)	0.6 (22)		1990–1995	3.8	0.7 (19)	0.1 (3)	1.3 (35)	1.6 (43)
	1995–2000	1.7	1.1 (63)	0.2 (11)	0.4 (23)	0.0 (3)		1995–2000	2.3	1.2 (51)	0.2 (7)	0.8 (34)	0.2 (8)
	2000–2005	2.6	1.3 (50)	0.1 (4)	0.0 (-1)	1.2 (48)		2000–2005	4.0	1.1 (28)	0.2 (4)	0.9 (22)	1.8 (46)
	2005–2010	2.8	1.4 (49)	0.1 (2)	0.6 (20)	0.8 (30)		2005–2010	5.6	0.7 (12)	0.1 (2)	2.4 (43)	2.4 (42)
	2010–2015	3.2	1.7 (53)	0.0 (2)	0.7 (22)	0.7 (23)		2010–2015	4.8	0.9 (19)	0.1 (3)	2.5 (52)	1.2 (26)
	2015–2018	3.6	0.9 (25)	0.0 (1)	1.1 (32)	1.5 (42)		2015–2018	4.4	-0.3 (-8)	0.1 (2)	2.8 (63)	1.8 (42)
1970–2018	2.6	1.1 (42)	0.1 (5)	0.7 (26)	0.7 (28)	1970–2018	3.5	0.8 (22)	0.1 (4)	1.4 (39)	1.2 (34)		
East Asia	1970–1975	2.3	0.7 (29)	0.1 (6)	1.7 (72)	-0.2 (-7)	South Asia	1970–1975	-0.1	0.6 (-403)	0.0 (-2)	0.1 (-101)	-0.9 (606)
	1975–1980	2.8	0.3 (12)	0.1 (5)	0.8 (30)	1.5 (53)		1975–1980	1.0	0.9 (89)	0.0 (2)	0.3 (35)	-0.3 (-26)
	1980–1985	2.8	0.3 (12)	0.2 (8)	0.5 (17)	1.8 (64)		1980–1985	2.8	1.0 (36)	0.0 (1)	0.4 (16)	1.3 (47)
	1985–1990	3.7	0.3 (9)	0.3 (9)	1.1 (31)	1.9 (51)		1985–1990	3.8	1.2 (31)	0.0 (1)	0.7 (19)	1.9 (48)
	1990–1995	4.0	0.7 (17)	0.1 (4)	1.2 (29)	2.0 (50)		1990–1995	2.9	0.7 (25)	0.1 (2)	0.9 (31)	1.2 (42)
	1995–2000	2.4	1.0 (43)	0.2 (9)	0.7 (31)	0.4 (17)		1995–2000	3.7	1.3 (36)	0.1 (2)	0.9 (23)	1.4 (39)
	2000–2005	4.1	1.0 (23)	0.2 (5)	1.1 (26)	1.9 (46)		2000–2005	4.1	1.0 (23)	0.1 (3)	1.0 (24)	2.0 (50)
	2005–2010	6.9	0.5 (8)	0.2 (2)	2.8 (40)	3.4 (49)		2005–2010	5.8	1.7 (30)	0.2 (3)	2.1 (37)	1.8 (30)
	2010–2015	5.2	0.5 (9)	0.1 (2)	2.7 (52)	1.9 (37)		2010–2015	5.0	1.5 (30)	0.1 (3)	2.1 (43)	1.2 (25)
	2015–2018	4.3	-1.0 (-24)	0.1 (3)	3.1 (72)	2.1 (49)		2015–2018	5.7	0.9 (16)	0.1 (2)	2.2 (38)	2.5 (44)
1970–2018	3.8	0.6 (15)	0.2 (5)	1.4 (38)	1.6 (43)	1970–2018	3.3	1.1 (34)	0.1 (2)	1.0 (30)	1.1 (34)		
ASEAN	1970–1975	3.2	1.1 (36)	0.0 (-1)	0.7 (23)	1.3 (41)	ASEAN6	1970–1975	3.5	1.8 (51)	0.0 (-1)	0.2 (5)	1.6 (45)
	1975–1980	3.2	0.7 (23)	0.1 (3)	1.6 (49)	0.8 (25)		1975–1980	2.8	1.6 (57)	0.1 (3)	0.6 (21)	0.5 (18)
	1980–1985	0.7	1.5 (211)	0.1 (17)	1.4 (191)	-2.3 (-319)		1980–1985	0.5	2.2 (438)	0.1 (25)	0.9 (185)	-2.7 (-549)
	1985–1990	4.3	2.1 (49)	0.2 (4)	0.5 (11)	1.6 (36)		1985–1990	4.6	2.8 (61)	0.2 (4)	0.0 (0)	1.6 (35)
	1990–1995	5.3	2.6 (48)	0.2 (5)	2.2 (40)	0.4 (7)		1990–1995	5.6	3.7 (67)	0.2 (4)	1.6 (29)	0.0 (0)
	1995–2000	0.5	2.2 (484)	0.1 (25)	0.6 (126)	-2.4 (-534)		1995–2000	0.2	2.9 (1341)	0.1 (51)	0.2 (95)	-3.0 (-1387)
	2000–2005	3.7	2.8 (76)	0.2 (6)	-0.6 (-15)	1.2 (34)		2000–2005	3.5	2.9 (84)	0.2 (6)	-0.8 (-24)	1.1 (33)
	2005–2010	2.5	1.8 (73)	0.2 (9)	0.0 (0)	0.4 (18)		2005–2010	2.4	1.7 (71)	0.2 (9)	-0.2 (-7)	0.7 (27)
	2010–2015	4.2	2.8 (67)	0.3 (7)	1.0 (24)	0.1 (3)		2010–2015	4.2	3.7 (88)	0.3 (6)	0.4 (10)	-0.1 (-3)
	2015–2018	3.4	1.4 (40)	0.2 (5)	1.3 (38)	0.6 (17)		2015–2018	2.9	1.6 (55)	0.2 (5)	0.9 (32)	0.2 (7)
1970–2018	3.0	2.0 (65)	0.2 (5)	0.8 (27)	0.1 (4)	1970–2018	3.0	2.6 (86)	0.2 (5)	0.3 (10)	0.0 (-2)		
CLMV	1970–1975	-0.4	0.9 (-259)	0.0 (6)	0.7 (-187)	-1.9 (540)		1970–1975	1.6	0.1 (5)	0.1 (6)	1.2 (73)	0.3 (17)
	1975–1980	2.1	0.7 (36)	0.1 (3)	1.5 (71)	-0.2 (-11)		1975–1980	1.1	0.0 (1)	0.2 (18)	0.2 (21)	0.7 (60)
	1980–1985	1.0	1.0 (105)	0.1 (8)	0.7 (74)	-0.9 (-86)		1980–1985	1.7	0.2 (11)	0.3 (18)	0.3 (19)	0.9 (52)
	1985–1990	0.2	1.2 (736)	0.0 (19)	-0.1 (-45)	-1.0 (-610)		1985–1990	1.4	0.2 (15)	0.3 (22)	0.3 (25)	0.5 (38)
	1990–1995	3.9	0.5 (14)	0.1 (2)	2.2 (55)	1.1 (29)		1990–1995	1.6	0.3 (19)	0.3 (16)	0.3 (17)	0.8 (48)
	1995–2000	4.5	0.9 (20)	0.1 (3)	3.3 (74)	0.2 (4)		1995–2000	2.5	0.4 (16)	0.6 (25)	0.4 (15)	1.1 (44)
	2000–2005	5.5	2.5 (45)	0.1 (2)	2.5 (46)	0.4 (7)		2000–2005	2.2	0.4 (16)	0.4 (17)	0.7 (32)	0.8 (35)
	2005–2010	3.3	2.0 (61)	0.2 (7)	2.6 (79)	-1.5 (-47)		2005–2010	1.5	0.3 (22)	0.4 (24)	0.8 (51)	0.0 (3)
	2010–2015	4.4	1.1 (24)	0.2 (5)	2.8 (63)	0.3 (7)		2010–2015	0.7	0.2 (33)	0.2 (32)	-0.3 (-41)	0.5 (76)
	2015–2018	5.7	1.0 (18)	0.2 (3)	2.5 (44)	2.0 (35)		2015–2018	0.7	0.2 (30)	0.2 (31)	-0.1 (-10)	0.3 (50)
1970–2018	2.7	1.2 (44)	0.1 (4)	1.8 (66)	-0.4 (-14)	1970–2018	1.6	0.2 (15)	0.3 (19)	0.4 (27)	0.6 (38)		

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate, contribution share in parentheses).

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 22 Industry Shares of Value Added
—Shares of industry GDP at current prices by Industry

	1980				1990				2000				2010				2018			
	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Service	Others																
Bahrain	0.7	10.9	45.6	42.8	0.7	11.1	58.0	30.2	0.6	11.4	55.1	32.9	0.3	14.6	54.2	30.8	0.3	17.8	56.4	25.5
Bangladesh	30.0	13.2	40.0	6.7	28.8	12.5	40.9	8.4	24.1	14.4	43.4	10.0	17.8	16.9	45.5	9.3	13.8	19.0	56.0	11.2
Bhutan	42.5	3.1	45.8	8.6	34.3	8.5	40.7	16.5	27.4	8.4	36.6	27.6	15.6	9.3	38.8	36.3	16.9	8.0	42.4	32.7
Brunei	0.2	19.4	9.3	71.1	0.9	13.8	35.8	49.5	1.0	18.3	34.3	46.4	0.7	14.6	31.9	52.7	1.0	13.8	36.7	48.4
Cambodia	43.8	10.0	40.7	5.5	49.9	8.6	37.5	4.0	37.8	16.9	39.1	6.2	36.0	15.6	40.7	7.6	28.1	16.4	39.6	16.0
China	29.9	37.2	21.9	10.9	26.8	31.0	32.0	10.1	14.9	32.5	39.4	13.2	9.6	32.1	43.7	14.5	7.5	29.3	51.7	11.5
ROC	8.2	35.3	46.0	10.6	4.2	32.5	54.8	8.5	2.1	26.1	66.0	5.9	1.7	29.5	64.0	4.9	1.7	33.2	60.7	4.3
Fiji	21.0	10.8	58.7	9.5	20.4	10.8	58.6	10.3	16.3	13.3	62.6	7.9	11.7	15.3	67.1	5.9	17.0	14.4	63.3	5.3
Hong Kong	0.8	20.5	70.5	8.2	0.2	14.9	77.3	7.6	0.1	4.8	87.3	7.8	0.1	1.8	93.0	5.2	0.1	1.0	93.1	5.8
India	35.6	17.8	38.5	8.1	29.1	17.2	43.5	10.1	23.1	15.3	50.8	10.8	18.0	14.9	54.4	12.7	16.1	13.6	59.6	10.7
Indonesia	19.2	10.8	46.0	24.1	15.1	16.7	54.9	13.4	12.2	21.2	51.9	14.7	14.2	22.4	42.4	21.1	13.3	20.7	45.2	20.7
Iran	13.1	12.3	49.5	25.2	15.1	18.5	49.0	17.4	11.0	14.6	47.8	26.7	5.9	13.4	46.3	34.4	8.1	16.7	47.0	28.2
Japan	3.5	27.6	57.4	11.4	2.3	26.3	59.7	11.7	1.6	22.1	66.9	9.4	1.2	20.9	71.3	6.7	1.2	20.7	70.6	7.4
Korea	16.0	24.7	48.0	11.3	8.4	27.7	51.4	12.5	4.3	29.3	57.2	9.2	2.4	30.2	60.1	7.3	2.0	29.2	60.7	8.2
Kuwait	0.3	5.6	27.1	67.0	1.6	11.2	49.1	38.1	0.6	6.5	44.2	48.7	0.4	5.3	41.4	52.9	0.4	6.2	45.9	47.5
Lao PDR	65.5	3.8	23.3	7.5	61.2	5.1	24.3	9.4	52.5	10.7	24.6	12.2	31.4	9.8	40.4	18.4	23.0	8.1	37.5	31.4
Malaysia	23.8	17.7	40.3	18.2	15.5	22.9	45.2	16.4	8.6	29.2	46.5	15.7	10.2	23.7	48.9	17.2	7.6	21.8	53.6	16.9
Mongolia	8.1	16.6	56.7	18.7	9.6	19.4	50.6	20.3	24.7	7.4	52.6	15.3	13.1	7.6	50.0	29.4	12.1	10.6	44.4	32.8
Myanmar	46.5	9.5	40.8	3.1	54.7	7.7	35.0	2.5	53.4	8.4	31.2	7.0	24.7	5.4	19.6	50.3	20.3	6.8	24.4	48.5
Nepal	53.0	4.9	36.9	5.2	45.5	6.8	40.9	6.8	36.6	9.0	46.1	8.3	37.1	6.2	48.0	8.7	27.0	5.6	57.8	9.6
Oman	2.5	0.6	28.2	68.7	2.9	2.9	40.5	53.6	2.2	5.6	39.4	52.7	1.4	10.4	35.9	52.4	2.1	9.2	45.6	43.1
Pakistan	34.5	10.1	48.6	6.9	28.8	12.1	51.3	7.8	29.4	10.6	52.6	7.3	24.3	13.6	55.1	6.9	24.4	13.0	56.3	6.2
Philippines	21.9	27.6	36.0	14.5	19.2	26.7	43.2	10.9	14.0	24.5	51.6	10.0	12.3	21.4	55.1	11.1	9.3	19.1	60.0	11.7
Qatar	0.5	3.3	23.5	72.7	0.8	13.0	42.8	43.5	0.4	5.4	29.5	64.7	0.1	8.9	32.4	58.6	0.2	8.9	41.1	49.9
Saudi Arabia	1.0	4.1	27.8	67.1	5.7	8.5	45.3	40.5	4.9	9.6	41.2	44.3	2.6	11.0	39.1	47.3	2.2	12.8	48.3	36.7
Singapore	1.6	27.5	62.2	8.7	0.3	25.6	67.3	6.8	0.1	27.7	65.1	7.1	0.0	22.0	71.8	6.2	0.0	21.9	73.3	4.8
Sri Lanka	20.2	21.3	47.9	10.5	17.4	19.9	53.7	9.0	11.6	20.2	60.0	8.2	9.5	20.1	60.9	9.6	8.6	17.3	62.4	11.8
Thailand	20.3	22.5	50.4	6.9	10.0	27.1	53.1	9.8	8.5	28.4	54.8	8.3	10.5	30.9	49.6	9.0	8.1	26.7	57.1	8.1
Turkey	21.1	22.2	48.2	8.5	13.9	28.2	47.6	10.3	11.3	20.9	58.7	9.1	10.3	17.2	61.8	10.8	6.5	21.3	60.6	11.6
UAE	0.5	3.7	30.8	65.0	1.1	7.1	42.1	49.7	2.2	12.0	46.2	39.6	0.8	7.9	46.7	44.6	0.7	8.9	52.5	37.9
Vietnam	41.7	17.2	35.3	5.7	41.5	5.6	43.1	9.8	26.2	12.7	42.6	18.5	21.0	14.8	42.8	21.3	16.3	17.8	46.2	19.7
(region)																				
APO21	15.2	22.3	50.4	12.2	11.8	23.0	53.8	11.4	10.2	20.7	58.3	10.8	9.9	19.8	58.4	11.9	9.7	19.1	59.7	11.5
Asia25	16.8	23.7	47.2	12.2	14.1	24.0	50.7	11.2	11.4	23.3	53.9	11.4	9.8	24.3	52.8	13.1	8.8	23.4	56.2	11.7
Asia31	14.9	21.3	44.9	18.9	13.2	22.7	50.2	13.8	10.8	22.3	53.1	13.8	9.4	23.5	52.0	15.1	8.4	22.8	55.8	13.0
East Asia	9.3	29.3	50.1	11.3	8.8	27.6	52.4	11.2	7.1	26.7	55.5	10.7	6.6	28.7	53.2	11.6	5.8	27.6	56.3	10.3
South Asia	34.8	16.2	41.2	7.9	29.0	16.0	45.5	9.6	23.9	14.6	51.3	10.1	18.6	14.9	54.7	11.7	16.6	13.9	59.1	10.4
ASEAN	21.8	17.4	43.5	17.3	16.3	20.2	51.4	12.1	12.6	23.3	51.3	12.8	12.8	22.9	47.5	16.7	11.0	21.0	51.5	16.5
ASEAN6	19.1	17.8	44.4	18.7	13.6	21.4	52.5	12.5	10.2	24.5	52.6	12.6	11.4	24.3	48.8	15.5	9.9	21.9	53.0	15.2
CLMV	44.9	13.7	36.4	5.1	46.7	6.3	39.4	7.6	34.4	11.9	38.8	14.9	23.4	12.8	38.3	25.5	18.2	15.2	41.4	25.1
GCC	0.9	4.2	28.4	66.6	4.2	8.4	45.0	42.4	3.5	9.5	42.3	44.6	1.7	9.7	40.6	47.9	1.5	11.0	48.4	39.0
(reference)																				
US	2.2	21.0	66.9	9.9	1.6	17.7	72.7	8.0	1.0	15.1	76.6	7.3	1.1	12.3	79.1	7.6	0.8	11.3	80.6	7.3
Australia	5.9	18.5	57.2	18.5	3.5	13.7	66.4	16.4	3.8	12.0	70.2	13.9	2.4	7.9	69.3	20.4	2.2	6.0	70.8	20.9

Unit: Percentage.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

Note: Services are defined as the total of industries 6–9 and Others are defined as the total of industries 2, 4, and 5 of nine industries, which consists of 1–agriculture; 2–mining; 3–manufacturing; 4–electricity, gas, and water supply; 5–construction; 6–wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants; 7–transport, storage, and communications; 8–finance, real estate, and business activities; and 9–community, social, and personal services. See the Online Appendix for the concordance with the ISIC, Revisions 3 and 4.

Table 23 Industry Origins of Economic Growth
—Average annual growth rates (contributions) of industry labor productivity in 2010–2018

	1. Agriculture	2. Mining	3. Manufacturing	4. Electricity, gas, and water supply	5. Construction	6. Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants	7. Transport, storage, and communications	8. Finance, real estate, and business activities	9. Community, social, and personal services	Total economy
Bahrain	2.8 (0.0)	1.4 (0.4)	3.4 (0.5)	-0.2 (-0.0)	3.1 (0.2)	2.3 (0.1)	6.2 (0.4)	2.9 (0.6)	6.4 (1.2)	3.5
Bangladesh	3.3 (0.5)	7.4 (0.1)	9.8 (1.7)	8.5 (0.1)	8.0 (0.6)	7.3 (1.1)	6.6 (0.7)	4.8 (0.5)	5.2 (1.1)	6.4
Bhutan	3.1 (0.5)	16.0 (0.6)	4.2 (0.4)	-1.1 (-0.1)	6.9 (1.2)	13.1 (1.2)	8.9 (0.9)	6.0 (0.5)	1.8 (0.2)	5.2
Brunei	1.6 (0.0)	-3.1 (-1.5)	1.1 (0.1)	4.5 (0.0)	5.5 (0.1)	1.5 (0.1)	0.7 (0.0)	1.4 (0.1)	1.0 (0.1)	-0.9
Cambodia	1.7 (0.6)	18.3 (0.2)	8.5 (1.4)	7.7 (0.0)	15.9 (1.5)	6.6 (1.0)	7.3 (0.6)	9.3 (0.8)	5.4 (0.5)	6.6
China	3.9 (0.3)	0.4 (0.0)	7.9 (2.4)	5.3 (0.1)	7.2 (0.5)	8.0 (0.9)	8.9 (0.6)	6.7 (0.9)	8.4 (1.4)	7.2
ROC	-0.1 (-0.0)	-3.0 (-0.0)	4.9 (1.5)	1.6 (0.0)	0.0 (0.0)	2.1 (0.4)	4.0 (0.2)	2.9 (0.5)	1.2 (0.2)	2.9
Fiji	2.9 (0.4)	-10.3 (-0.1)	2.6 (0.4)	11.1 (0.2)	5.4 (0.1)	2.0 (0.4)	4.1 (0.7)	2.9 (0.5)	2.7 (0.4)	3.0
Hong Kong	-2.5 (-0.0)	-2.5 (-0.0)	-0.1 (-0.0)	-0.3 (-0.0)	6.3 (0.2)	2.8 (0.8)	3.7 (0.4)	2.8 (1.1)	3.7 (0.6)	3.1
India	3.4 (0.6)	3.5 (0.1)	7.1 (1.0)	6.8 (0.1)	4.7 (0.4)	8.0 (1.5)	6.8 (0.5)	8.9 (1.5)	6.7 (1.0)	6.6
Indonesia	3.9 (0.5)	1.3 (0.1)	4.6 (1.0)	4.8 (0.1)	6.4 (0.6)	5.1 (0.8)	8.2 (0.7)	6.5 (0.6)	5.4 (0.5)	5.0
Iran	3.0 (0.2)	-1.8 (-0.8)	-0.9 (-0.1)	5.1 (0.3)	-1.4 (-0.1)	-0.4 (-0.1)	4.5 (0.4)	4.1 (0.6)	4.3 (0.5)	1.0
Japan	-1.4 (-0.0)	-3.9 (-0.0)	1.5 (0.3)	-3.2 (-0.0)	2.5 (0.1)	0.7 (0.1)	0.7 (0.1)	1.3 (0.2)	0.7 (0.2)	1.0
Korea	0.7 (0.0)	-3.4 (-0.0)	2.9 (0.9)	1.5 (0.0)	2.2 (0.1)	2.8 (0.3)	3.3 (0.3)	3.5 (0.8)	2.9 (0.5)	3.0
Kuwait	2.2 (0.0)	1.7 (1.1)	4.0 (0.2)	8.8 (0.2)	1.7 (0.0)	0.7 (0.0)	0.1 (0.0)	0.7 (0.1)	4.6 (0.8)	2.5
Lao PDR	2.9 (0.8)	2.5 (0.3)	6.8 (0.6)	15.4 (1.0)	15.7 (1.2)	7.6 (1.3)	7.9 (0.3)	7.2 (0.5)	4.6 (0.5)	6.4
Malaysia	1.8 (0.2)	0.7 (0.1)	4.8 (1.1)	4.1 (0.1)	8.5 (0.4)	6.6 (1.2)	7.1 (0.6)	5.0 (0.6)	5.9 (0.8)	5.0
Mongolia	8.9 (1.2)	7.9 (1.5)	8.0 (0.7)	5.3 (0.1)	0.7 (0.0)	7.4 (1.2)	8.1 (0.7)	8.5 (1.2)	1.6 (0.2)	6.8
Myanmar	0.3 (0.1)	-1.3 (0.8)	7.8 (0.5)	8.1 (0.1)	8.2 (0.6)	2.7 (0.2)	4.5 (0.3)	29.0 (0.1)	8.9 (0.6)	3.2
Nepal	3.0 (1.0)	6.0 (0.0)	3.6 (0.2)	5.5 (0.1)	4.9 (0.4)	6.5 (1.0)	5.6 (0.5)	4.3 (0.6)	5.8 (0.9)	4.6
Oman	9.4 (0.2)	1.8 (0.7)	2.5 (0.2)	8.7 (0.1)	6.7 (0.4)	5.0 (0.4)	5.9 (0.3)	4.8 (0.4)	5.4 (0.9)	3.6
Pakistan	2.4 (0.6)	2.9 (0.1)	4.1 (0.6)	3.6 (0.1)	4.7 (0.1)	4.1 (0.8)	3.8 (0.4)	4.1 (0.3)	7.3 (1.2)	4.1
Philippines	1.5 (0.2)	3.3 (0.0)	6.6 (1.3)	4.6 (0.2)	8.0 (0.5)	6.2 (1.1)	5.6 (0.4)	7.3 (1.5)	6.1 (0.8)	6.0
Qatar	8.7 (0.0)	1.6 (0.9)	5.2 (0.5)	8.7 (0.0)	15.3 (1.3)	5.1 (0.3)	5.2 (0.2)	8.2 (1.1)	6.7 (0.7)	5.0
Saudi Arabia	1.8 (0.0)	3.0 (1.2)	4.7 (0.5)	3.5 (0.0)	2.8 (0.1)	3.5 (0.3)	5.3 (0.3)	4.3 (0.4)	3.4 (0.5)	3.5
Singapore	1.9 (0.0)	0.0 ()	3.4 (0.7)	1.5 (0.0)	2.5 (0.1)	4.0 (0.8)	4.1 (0.5)	5.4 (1.7)	3.1 (0.3)	4.1
Sri Lanka	2.8 (0.2)	7.4 (0.2)	3.3 (0.6)	6.0 (0.1)	8.4 (0.6)	5.1 (0.7)	5.7 (0.8)	8.7 (1.1)	4.0 (0.9)	5.1
Thailand	1.4 (0.1)	0.0 (0.0)	1.7 (0.4)	3.3 (0.1)	2.9 (0.1)	4.9 (0.9)	5.4 (0.4)	6.2 (0.7)	2.8 (0.4)	3.2
Turkey	2.7 (0.2)	3.8 (0.0)	6.8 (1.3)	6.2 (0.2)	8.1 (0.7)	5.5 (0.9)	6.3 (0.7)	4.8 (0.7)	5.8 (1.0)	5.8
UAE	2.8 (0.0)	3.3 (1.1)	4.6 (0.4)	5.2 (0.1)	0.5 (0.0)	4.2 (0.5)	3.4 (0.3)	5.4 (0.8)	5.2 (0.5)	3.9
Vietnam	2.9 (0.6)	0.2 (0.1)	10.4 (1.6)	9.9 (0.4)	6.6 (0.4)	7.9 (1.2)	6.7 (0.3)	5.2 (0.7)	8.1 (1.0)	6.2
(region)										
APO21	2.9 (0.3)	0.6 (0.0)	4.2 (0.8)	3.9 (0.1)	4.8 (0.3)	4.9 (0.8)	5.0 (0.4)	5.2 (0.8)	3.6 (0.7)	4.2
Asia25	3.3 (0.3)	0.6 (0.0)	6.2 (1.5)	4.6 (0.1)	5.8 (0.4)	5.8 (0.8)	6.5 (0.5)	5.7 (0.9)	5.4 (1.0)	5.4
Asia31	3.3 (0.3)	1.5 (0.1)	6.1 (1.4)	4.6 (0.1)	5.7 (0.4)	5.8 (0.8)	6.4 (0.5)	5.7 (0.8)	5.3 (0.9)	5.3
East Asia	3.7 (0.2)	0.4 (0.0)	6.5 (1.8)	3.7 (0.1)	6.0 (0.4)	5.5 (0.7)	6.6 (0.5)	4.9 (0.7)	5.2 (1.0)	5.5
South Asia	3.2 (0.6)	3.7 (0.1)	6.9 (1.0)	6.6 (0.1)	5.0 (0.4)	7.5 (1.3)	6.3 (0.5)	8.4 (1.3)	6.6 (1.0)	6.3
ASEAN	2.7 (0.3)	1.1 (0.1)	4.5 (1.0)	5.2 (0.1)	6.5 (0.4)	5.5 (0.9)	6.7 (0.5)	6.1 (0.8)	5.0 (0.6)	4.8
ASEAN6	2.9 (0.3)	1.0 (0.1)	4.0 (0.9)	4.0 (0.1)	6.3 (0.4)	5.3 (0.9)	6.7 (0.6)	6.2 (0.8)	4.7 (0.6)	4.7
CLMV	2.3 (0.5)	0.7 (0.2)	9.9 (1.3)	10.3 (0.4)	8.1 (0.5)	7.2 (1.0)	6.4 (0.3)	5.6 (0.6)	7.8 (0.8)	5.7
GCC	2.4 (0.0)	2.7 (1.1)	4.6 (0.4)	4.9 (0.1)	3.7 (0.2)	3.7 (0.3)	4.3 (0.3)	4.6 (0.6)	4.2 (0.6)	3.6
(reference)										
US	2.1 (0.0)	5.2 (0.1)	1.1 (0.2)	0.8 (0.0)	2.2 (0.1)	2.3 (0.3)	4.4 (0.3)	2.5 (0.8)	1.1 (0.3)	2.1
Australia	-1.1 (-0.0)	6.4 (0.5)	3.0 (-0.1)	0.6 (0.0)	1.5 (0.1)	2.5 (0.3)	2.5 (0.2)	3.0 (0.8)	3.0 (0.7)	2.6

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate, contribution share in parentheses).

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 24 Industry Origins of Labor Productivity Growth

—Average annual growth rates (contributions) of industry labor productivity in 2010–2018

	1. Agriculture	2. Mining	3. Manufacturing	4. Electricity, gas, and water supply	5. Construction	6. Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants	7. Transport, storage, and communications	8. Finance, real estate, and business activities	9. Community, social, and personal services	Total economy
Bahrain	1.3 (0.0)	1.3 (0.4)	1.3 (0.3)	1.3 (0.0)	1.3 (−0.1)	1.3 (0.0)	1.3 (0.0)	1.3 (0.6)	1.3 (−0.9)	0.3
Bangladesh	4.0 (0.8)	7.9 (0.1)	4.3 (0.9)	2.9 (0.1)	3.6 (0.3)	5.4 (0.8)	4.4 (0.5)	2.8 (0.5)	2.1 (0.7)	4.7
Brunei	1.2 (0.0)	1.2 (−1.4)	1.2 (0.1)	1.2 (0.0)	1.2 (−0.9)	1.2 (0.0)	1.2 (0.0)	1.2 (0.1)	1.2 (0.2)	−1.9
Cambodia	4.4 (1.8)	7.6 (0.2)	7.5 (1.3)	−0.9 (−0.0)	2.6 (0.9)	−0.8 (−0.5)	−1.1 (0.3)	0.4 (0.7)	−1.9 (−0.5)	4.2
China	8.1 (1.6)	7.5 (0.1)	7.5 (2.3)	7.5 (0.1)	7.5 (0.5)	4.5 (0.5)	4.5 (0.4)	4.5 (0.9)	4.5 (0.5)	6.9
ROC	−0.3 (−0.0)	−2.9 (−0.0)	4.0 (1.3)	1.2 (0.0)	−1.5 (−0.1)	1.8 (0.3)	2.3 (0.1)	1.7 (0.4)	−0.9 (−0.2)	1.8
Fiji	2.3 (0.3)	2.3 (0.1)	2.3 (0.3)	2.3 (−0.6)	2.3 (0.0)	2.3 (0.4)	2.3 (0.4)	2.3 (0.5)	2.3 (0.3)	1.6
Hong Kong	−2.5 (−0.0)	0.0 ()	3.2 (0.1)	−0.3 (−0.0)	2.8 (0.0)	3.3 (0.9)	2.9 (0.3)	0.2 (0.6)	1.4 (0.0)	1.8
India	4.3 (1.0)	4.3 (0.1)	4.6 (0.7)	4.3 (0.1)	4.3 (0.3)	4.3 (1.0)	4.3 (0.7)	4.3 (1.4)	4.3 (0.8)	5.8
Indonesia	5.7 (1.1)	−0.7 (0.1)	1.0 (0.5)	0.1 (0.0)	1.4 (0.3)	1.1 (−0.1)	6.6 (0.6)	−4.3 (0.4)	2.6 (0.1)	3.1
Iran	1.9 (0.0)	−9.0 (−0.7)	−3.2 (−0.5)	−0.6 (0.2)	−2.5 (−0.2)	−1.6 (−0.3)	3.5 (0.3)	1.0 (0.5)	1.6 (0.0)	−0.8
Japan	0.1 (0.0)	−2.7 (−0.0)	1.9 (0.4)	−2.9 (−0.0)	2.5 (0.1)	0.7 (0.1)	0.4 (0.0)	0.6 (0.2)	−0.9 (−0.5)	0.4
Korea	2.8 (0.1)	−2.0 (−0.0)	1.7 (0.7)	3.0 (0.0)	0.5 (0.0)	1.9 (0.1)	1.6 (0.1)	1.7 (0.6)	0.8 (0.0)	1.6
Kuwait	2.3 (0.0)	−0.6 (1.1)	1.3 (0.1)	6.6 (0.1)	0.1 (−0.2)	1.9 (0.1)	−0.2 (−0.0)	−0.8 (−0.0)	−0.4 (−2.1)	−0.7
Malaysia	2.0 (0.2)	−5.2 (−0.0)	2.4 (0.7)	1.9 (0.1)	6.5 (0.2)	1.9 (0.0)	4.3 (0.5)	0.0 (0.1)	4.4 (0.5)	2.2
Mongolia	9.4 (1.3)	1.3 (1.1)	2.5 (0.4)	3.6 (0.1)	−4.9 (−0.3)	3.0 (0.4)	8.6 (0.7)	2.0 (1.1)	−1.2 (−0.4)	4.2
Nepal	1.9 (0.2)	1.9 (0.0)	1.9 (0.1)	1.9 (0.0)	1.9 (0.2)	1.9 (0.6)	1.9 (0.4)	1.9 (0.6)	1.9 (0.6)	2.8
Oman	6.3 (0.0)	−14.5 (0.4)	−7.3 (−0.8)	−23.9 (−0.0)	1.8 (−1.4)	−4.6 (−1.2)	−14.8 (−0.3)	0.6 (0.0)	1.3 (−0.2)	−3.5
Pakistan	1.8 (0.3)	−8.5 (0.1)	−0.4 (−0.1)	4.0 (0.1)	0.7 (−0.2)	1.4 (0.4)	0.4 (0.2)	14.3 (0.4)	3.3 (0.7)	1.8
Philippines	3.3 (0.7)	2.9 (0.0)	5.1 (1.2)	6.1 (0.2)	1.4 (0.1)	3.6 (0.5)	3.2 (0.2)	1.6 (1.1)	1.1 (−0.1)	3.8
Qatar	2.8 (−0.1)	4.6 (1.1)	4.6 (0.4)	0.7 (0.0)	4.8 (−3.4)	2.7 (−0.1)	2.7 (0.1)	12.9 (1.2)	2.7 (−0.4)	−1.3
Saudi Arabia	−4.4 (−0.3)	−1.5 (1.2)	−1.3 (−0.0)	−3.4 (−0.1)	−2.0 (−0.7)	4.2 (0.3)	2.0 (0.1)	8.0 (0.5)	−2.5 (−2.2)	−1.1
Singapore	−7.1 (−0.0)	0.0 ()	4.5 (0.8)	8.3 (0.0)	0.7 (−0.1)	2.4 (0.5)	0.9 (0.1)	3.1 (1.5)	−0.2 (−0.7)	2.1
Sri Lanka	5.9 (1.2)	11.1 (0.2)	2.9 (0.5)	1.1 (0.1)	3.4 (0.3)	3.9 (0.5)	4.7 (0.7)	9.9 (1.1)	2.9 (0.6)	5.1
Thailand	3.9 (0.9)	−7.4 (−0.0)	−0.2 (0.1)	−1.0 (0.1)	4.0 (0.1)	4.6 (0.9)	2.7 (0.3)	0.7 (0.6)	1.4 (0.2)	3.3
Turkey	2.6 (0.2)	−0.7 (−0.0)	4.9 (0.9)	−1.0 (0.1)	4.4 (0.4)	2.3 (0.2)	3.3 (0.6)	−1.2 (0.3)	0.2 (0.0)	2.7
UAE	2.6 (0.0)	2.6 (1.1)	2.6 (0.2)	2.6 (0.1)	2.6 (0.2)	2.6 (0.2)	2.6 (0.2)	2.6 (0.6)	2.6 (−0.5)	2.2
Vietnam (region)	5.1 (1.4)	5.4 (0.1)	5.6 (0.9)	6.9 (0.4)	2.6 (0.1)	3.8 (0.4)	3.9 (0.2)	2.9 (0.7)	4.9 (0.6)	4.7
APO21	3.9 (0.7)	0.0 (0.0)	1.6 (0.5)	1.5 (0.1)	3.1 (0.2)	2.0 (0.3)	2.8 (0.3)	1.3 (0.7)	0.9 (0.3)	3.0
Asia25	5.4 (1.0)	4.7 (0.0)	4.5 (1.2)	4.3 (0.1)	5.0 (0.3)	2.7 (0.4)	3.5 (0.3)	2.0 (0.8)	2.1 (0.4)	4.6
Asia31	5.4 (1.0)	5.3 (0.1)	4.5 (1.1)	4.2 (0.1)	4.8 (0.3)	2.7 (0.4)	3.4 (0.3)	2.0 (0.8)	2.0 (0.3)	4.5
East Asia	7.8 (1.3)	7.3 (0.1)	6.0 (1.7)	5.6 (0.1)	6.1 (0.4)	2.6 (0.3)	3.0 (0.3)	3.1 (0.7)	1.6 (0.2)	5.1
South Asia	4.0 (0.9)	4.2 (0.1)	3.9 (0.6)	4.3 (0.1)	4.1 (0.3)	4.1 (0.9)	3.8 (0.4)	4.7 (1.3)	3.8 (0.7)	5.2
ASEAN	4.5 (0.9)	2.2 (0.1)	1.2 (0.5)	2.2 (0.1)	2.7 (0.2)	2.1 (0.2)	4.3 (0.4)	−1.0 (0.6)	2.2 (0.2)	3.2
ASEAN6	4.7 (0.9)	−1.2 (0.1)	1.2 (0.5)	1.1 (0.1)	2.4 (0.2)	2.2 (0.2)	4.7 (0.4)	−0.7 (0.6)	1.7 (0.1)	3.0
CLMV	3.8 (1.1)	9.7 (0.4)	5.7 (0.8)	6.9 (0.4)	4.4 (0.3)	2.9 (0.3)	2.4 (0.1)	−2.2 (0.4)	5.6 (0.6)	4.4
GCC (reference)	−2.2 (−0.2)	−0.2 (1.1)	−0.4 (0.1)	−1.2 (−0.0)	−1.3 (−0.7)	2.7 (0.1)	0.9 (0.1)	4.4 (0.5)	−0.9 (−1.5)	−0.4
US	1.9 (0.0)	5.2 (0.1)	0.5 (0.1)	1.0 (0.0)	−0.3 (−0.1)	1.5 (0.2)	2.3 (0.2)	0.4 (0.4)	−0.1 (−0.2)	0.7
Australia	1.5 (0.0)	−1.0 (0.4)	0.2 (0.0)	0.6 (0.0)	2.6 (0.2)	1.0 (0.0)	0.6 (0.1)	0.9 (0.7)	0.4 (−0.4)	1.0

Unit: Percentage (average annual growth rate, contribution share in parentheses).

Source: APO Productivity Database 2020.

Table 25 Real Income and Terms of Trade

—Average annual growth rate of real income, real GDP, trading gain, and net primary income transfer from abroad

	2000–2005				2005–2010				2010–2015				2015–2018				2017–2018							
	Real income	Real GDP	Trading gain	Net primary income from abroad	Real income	Real GDP	Trading gain	Net primary income from abroad	Real income	Real GDP	Trading gain	Net primary income from abroad	Real income	Real GDP	Trading gain	Net primary income from abroad	Real income	Real GDP	Trading gain	Net primary income from abroad				
China	11.0	10.0	0.9	0.1	Myanmar	12.2	4.9	7.3	0.0	Mongolia	10.6	9.8	0.8	0.0	Nepal	8.7	8.0	0.8	-0.1	Vietnam	8.3	8.6	-0.9	0.6
Iran	9.9	7.7	2.5	-0.3	China	12.0	11.8	0.2	0.1	Lao PDR	8.1	2.8	5.0	0.4	Vietnam	7.3	7.1	0.8	-0.6	Nepal	8.0	7.1	0.4	0.5
Cambodia	9.2	9.6	-0.3	-0.1	Bhutan	8.8	9.5	0.2	-0.9	China	8.1	7.8	0.3	0.0	Cambodia	7.2	7.3	0.2	-0.2	Mongolia	7.8	6.5	-3.9	5.2
Mongolia	8.6	5.1	3.7	-0.2	Cambodia	8.8	5.9	2.9	0.0	Myanmar	7.2	6.3	1.0	-0.1	India	7.0	6.9	0.1	0.0	Bangladesh	7.8	7.8	-0.3	0.3
Myanmar	8.4	5.7	2.8	0.0	India	8.3	8.1	0.3	-0.1	Turkey	6.4	6.8	-0.3	-0.1	Bangladesh	6.9	7.5	0.0	-0.6	Cambodia	7.1	8.8	-1.1	-0.6
Vietnam	7.8	7.3	0.6	-0.1	Singapore	7.5	7.2	-1.0	1.3	India	6.1	6.5	-0.3	0.0	Lao PDR	6.6	6.6	0.2	-0.3	India	6.2	7.4	-1.1	0.0
Malaysia	7.2	5.3	1.2	0.8	Vietnam	7.2	6.5	1.1	-0.4	Vietnam	5.9	5.4	0.8	-0.3	Iran	6.1	4.2	1.8	0.1	Lao PDR	5.8	6.8	-0.9	0.0
Lao PDR	6.8	6.5	-0.1	0.3	Sri Lanka	6.4	6.2	0.2	0.0	Bhutan	5.8	6.6	-0.5	-0.3	Pakistan	5.5	5.2	0.6	-0.2	Fiji	5.8	4.5	-1.5	2.8
India	6.7	6.9	-0.3	0.1	Lao PDR	6.3	4.9	2.2	-0.8	Cambodia	5.7	4.1	1.9	-0.3	Turkey	5.4	6.3	-0.7	-0.1	Turkey	5.4	6.8	-1.2	-0.2
Bhutan	6.0	6.3	0.0	-0.3	Bangladesh	6.1	6.0	-0.6	0.7	Philippines	5.7	5.9	-0.3	0.1	Philippines	5.4	6.2	-0.4	-0.4	Pakistan	5.1	5.5	-0.3	-0.1
Bangladesh	5.5	5.3	-0.1	0.2	Philippines	5.9	4.8	-0.1	1.1	Sri Lanka	5.6	5.2	0.7	-0.3	China	5.1	5.7	-0.6	0.0	Philippines	4.8	6.2	-1.1	-0.3
Philippines	5.4	4.2	-0.3	1.4	Malaysia	5.7	4.8	0.6	0.3	Bangladesh	5.4	5.8	-0.1	-0.3	Indonesia	4.8	4.9	-0.2	0.1	China	4.4	5.0	-0.3	-0.3
Sri Lanka	5.3	4.6	0.6	0.1	Nepal	5.5	4.5	1.0	0.0	Indonesia	5.0	5.4	-0.3	-0.1	Singapore	4.5	4.6	0.9	-1.0	Indonesia	4.0	4.9	-1.1	0.2
Thailand	4.7	5.2	0.0	-0.5	Iran	5.4	5.6	-0.3	0.2	Malaysia	5.0	5.1	-0.2	0.1	Bhutan	4.4	4.9	0.1	-0.7	Hong Kong	3.7	3.0	0.3	0.4
Turkey	4.6	4.8	0.3	-0.5	Indonesia	5.3	5.6	-0.7	0.4	Nepal	4.8	4.1	0.5	0.2	Malaysia	4.3	4.6	0.0	-0.3	Myanmar	3.5	8.1	-5.0	0.4
Korea	4.4	5.1	-0.7	0.0	Mongolia	4.2	6.4	-0.9	-1.4	Pakistan	4.0	3.8	-0.2	0.4	Mongolia	4.2	4.4	0.3	-0.5	Malaysia	3.1	4.3	-0.3	-0.8
Pakistan	4.2	4.4	-0.8	0.6	Thailand	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.1	Thailand	3.7	3.3	0.6	-0.2	Hong Kong	4.2	3.0	0.2	0.9	Thailand	2.8	4.2	-1.1	-0.4
Indonesia	4.1	4.6	-1.0	0.4	Korea	3.9	4.4	-0.6	0.2	ROC	3.4	2.9	0.6	-0.1	Sri Lanka	3.7	3.0	0.8	-0.1	Singapore	2.8	3.9	1.1	-2.2
Singapore	3.9	5.1	0.0	-1.2	Turkey	3.3	3.7	-0.3	-0.1	Korea	3.0	2.7	0.3	0.0	Thailand	3.5	3.6	-0.2	0.1	Bhutan	2.4	2.9	-0.1	-0.3
Nepal	3.4	3.0	0.1	0.1	Hong Kong	3.2	3.6	-0.8	0.3	Fiji	2.8	3.4	0.0	-0.6	Fiji	3.5	4.3	-0.5	-0.3	Sri Lanka	2.0	2.0	0.1	-0.1
Hong Kong	3.1	4.1	-1.0	-0.1	Pakistan	2.6	3.2	-0.9	0.4	Hong Kong	2.8	2.7	0.1	-0.1	Korea	2.9	2.9	0.0	0.0	Korea	1.4	2.7	-1.2	-0.1
ROC	2.8	4.1	-1.6	0.2	ROC	1.9	4.2	-2.3	0.1	Singapore	2.3	4.5	-0.9	-1.3	ROC	1.9	2.9	-0.9	-0.1	ROC	0.6	2.7	-1.9	-0.2
Fiji	1.8	2.0	0.3	-0.5	Fiji	0.5	0.7	0.0	-0.2	Japan	1.2	1.0	0.0	0.2	Japan	0.7	1.0	-0.2	-0.1	Iran	-0.3	-4.1	3.5	0.2
Japan	1.0	1.2	-0.3	0.1	Japan	-0.3	0.1	-0.5	0.1	Iran	-3.1	-0.2	-3.0	0.0	Myanmar	-4.5	4.7	-9.2	0.1	Japan	-0.3	0.3	-0.7	0.1
Bahrain	7.9	6.5	1.3	0.0	Bahrain	8.5	6.4	3.5	-1.4	Bahrain	3.1	3.9	-1.5	0.8	Bahrain	4.2	3.8	0.4	0.0	Bahrain	3.9	2.9	0.9	0.1
Kuwait	10.7	7.3	4.6	-1.2	Kuwait	3.2	0.4	3.3	-0.5	Kuwait	-1.5	3.5	-5.5	0.5	Kuwait	5.3	-0.1	4.8	0.6	Kuwait	12.0	2.3	11.6	-1.9
Oman	8.1	3.0	4.9	0.2	Oman	6.4	2.8	4.2	-0.6	Oman	1.9	3.7	-2.5	0.6	Oman	5.3	4.5	2.0	-1.1	Oman	10.7	7.7	5.3	-2.2
Qatar	12.0	9.7	4.6	-2.3	Qatar	14.8	13.3	1.0	0.6	Qatar	5.4	6.3	-2.7	1.7	Qatar	1.9	2.2	0.0	-0.2	Qatar	1.7	0.4	4.0	-2.7
Saudi Arabia	9.2	4.0	5.3	-0.1	Saudi Arabia	5.4	2.5	2.6	0.2	Saudi Arabia	1.9	5.0	-3.2	0.2	Saudi Arabia	3.3	0.8	2.9	-0.4	Saudi Arabia	7.5	2.0	6.7	-1.3
UAE	6.7	5.0	1.8	-0.1	UAE	5.8	2.5	3.7	-0.3	UAE	4.2	5.3	-1.2	0.1	UAE	0.0	1.9	-1.9	0.0	UAE	-0.3	1.9	-1.9	-0.2
Brunei (reference)	6.3	1.1	5.2	0.0	Brunei (reference)	1.3	0.0	1.4	-0.1	Brunei (reference)	1.2	0.9	-0.8	1.1	Brunei (reference)	0.5	0.7	0.9	-1.1	Brunei (reference)	2.7	3.3	3.6	-4.2
US	2.5	2.5	0.0	0.1	US	1.0	0.9	0.0	0.1	US	2.3	2.1	0.2	0.0	US	2.4	2.2	0.1	0.0	US	2.9	2.8	0.0	0.1
EU15	1.9	1.7	0.1	0.1	EU15	0.7	0.7	-0.1	0.0	EU15	1.0	1.0	0.1	-0.1	EU15	2.1	2.0	-0.1	0.2	EU15	1.4	1.7	-0.4	0.1
EU28	1.8	1.6	0.1	0.1	EU28	0.8	0.8	-0.1	0.0	EU28	1.1	1.1	0.1	-0.1	EU28	2.1	2.2	-0.1	0.0	EU28	1.5	2.1	-0.6	0.0
Australia	4.2	3.3	1.2	-0.2	Australia	4.3	2.8	1.4	0.0	Australia	1.7	2.7	-1.4	0.3	Australia	3.7	2.5	1.5	-0.3	Australia	3.4	2.3	1.3	-0.2

Unit: Percentage.

Sources: Official national accounts in each country, including author adjustments.

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